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Summary 
 
Cognitive models of threat processing maintain that threat, depending on the task at hand, can 
speed (when task relevant) or impair (when task irrelevant) cognitive performance (Pessoa, 
2009). It is generally assumed that attentional bias to threat is modulated by anxiety, with 
increased anxiety leading to increased bias (Bishop, 2007; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998). 
Evidence suggests that such biases are not actually specific to anxiety, however, and instead 
form part of a broader personality spectrum of negative affect or neuroticism (Clark & Watson, 
1991), of which anxiety is but one facet. Further, such emotion-linked attentional biases to threat 
may be modulated not only by task demands, but also by individual differences in ‘regulatory’ 
traits, including emotion regulation and attentional control capacity. Most previous studies have 
focused on the influence of threat on spatial and temporal aspects of attention. It has recently 
been suggested, however, that threat material may also influence higher-level cognitive control 
processes, such as response inhibition. In the current thesis, I examine the influence of threat 
related material on different tasks of cognitive control: the Stroop task, the Flanker task, and the 
Stop-signal inhibition task. In addition, I examine the influence of trait negative emotion 
(neuroticism) and regulatory traits (emotion regulation and attentional control) on selective 
processing of threat material. I set out to test, for the first time, the idea that individual 
differences in negative emotionality (neuroticism) and attentional control/emotion regulation 
would interact to predict the impact of threatening material on cognitive control. More 
specifically, that good attentional control and/or emotion regulation would ‘buffer’ the effects of 
higher levels of neuroticism on the impairment of cognitive control by threatening material.   
In the Flanker tasks, I find evidence for speeded processing of positive emotion, whereas 
performance in the Stroop task is particularly impaired by threat material. By contrast, in the 
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Stop signal task of response inhibition, I find that response inhibition (stopping) is slowed in the 
presence of angry facial expressions, and such slowing is greater in individuals high in trait 
neuroticism. Further, as predicted, the influence of neuroticism is moderated by individual 
differences in emotion regulation, such that good emotion regulation ‘buffers’ the impact of 
neuroticism. The implications of these findings for current cognitive models of threat-processing 
are discussed.  
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Chapter 1: General introduction 
 
It has been well-documented that humans have a limited processing capacity, necessitating that 
certain information, particularly that pertaining to threat, needs to be prioritized (Desimone & 
Duncan, 1995; Moray, 1967; Pessoa, 2010). This has been demonstrated by a large number of 
studies showing an attentional bias to threatening material (e.g. Pessoa, 2009; Pourtois, 
Schettino, & Vuilleumier, in press; Vuilleumier, 2005; see below for a more detailed review). 
While generally adaptive, some individuals, particularly those with mood/anxiety disorders 
manifest an exaggerated bias to threat, which might be relevant to the development/maintenance 
of mood disorder (see e.g. Bar-haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & IJzendoorn, 
2007; Joormann & Siemer, 2011). To date, most of the work in this area has focused on the 
impact of anxiety on spatial (and more recently temporal) attention, as assessed using, for 
instance, spatial dot-probe tasks or the attentional blink paradigm (Mathews, Mackintosh, & 
Fulcher, 1997; Mogg & Bradley, 1998, 1999; Pourtois et al., in press; Vuilleumier, 2005).  
The spatial dot-probe task typically involves the presentation of two emotional stimuli (threat vs. 
non-threat) in vertical arrangement, with participants having to attend to the upper stimulus. 
Following the offset of the stimuli, a small dot will usually appear at the spatial location of one 
of these. So, on some trials the dot and the threatening information successively appear in the 
same position (congruent), whereas on others they appear in opposite positions (incongruent). It 
is participants’ task to indicate the location of the dot, with their response latencies for this being 
recorded. This permits the calculation of an attentional bias score (incongruent – congruent 
trials), with positive values indicating attention towards the threatening material and negative 
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ones avoidance of threat (a score of zero = no attentional bias). Individuals with anxiety/mood 
disorders typically display an exaggerated attentional bias to threat. 
 In the attentional blink paradigm, generally a rapid sequence of items (e.g. 16 items) is 
visually presented at a rate of around 10 per second. As part of this sequence two critical events 
appear: target 1 (e.g. a white letter in a stream of black ones; T1) and target 2 (e.g. the letter X; 
T2). The onset of T1 is typically at around positions 6-9 of the sequence, with T2 occurring at 
variable positions following T1 (e.g. lags 1, 3, 5, 7). Participants, depending on the task, need to 
report one target or both at the end of the item sequence (dependent measure: proportion of 
targets correctly identified). Reports of T2 are usually unaffected at lag 1 (= lag-1 sparing), for 
lags 2-4 performance is impaired (= attentional blink), but then recovers again (close) to baseline 
at lags 5 or 6. Affective variations of the attentional blink task tend to use emotional stimuli for 
either T1 or T2. When T1 is threat-related (e.g. an angry face), this can result in impaired 
detection of a subsequent neutral T2 presented during the period of the ‘blink’ relative to a 
neutral T1, especially in individuals with high levels of neuroticism (see Peers, Simons, & 
Lawrence, 2013 for a review). Conversely, detection of a threat-related T2 presented during the 
period of the blink is typically enhanced relative to a neutral T2 (Peers, Simons, Lawrence, 2013 
for review). Both of these findings are suggested to reflect enhanced processing of threatening 
material. 
 Research has now begun to examine how emotional material impacts higher level 
cognitive control mechanisms such as response inhibition, the ability to prevent a prepotent 
response, which has become obsolete, from execution (Pessoa, 2009; Verbruggen & De Houwer, 
2007; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008; Zetsche, Avanzato, & Joormann, 2012). Indeed, inhibition 
has been suggested as a unifying mechanism to underpin attentional biases (Joormann, 2004). 
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Specifically, the author argued that impaired inhibitory mechanisms in depressed individuals 
might be able to explain the dysfunctional maintenance/disengagement (attentional bias) from 
negative material observed in this disorder. In line with this research, the aims of the current 
thesis are to examine the impact of threat on inhibitory control processes, in relation to emotional 
and regulatory individual differences linked to risk for emotional disorders (neuroticism, 
attentional control, reappraisal).  Such afflictions affect a not insignificant proportion of modern 
society (Somers, Goldner, Waraich, & Hsu, 2006; Waraich, Goldner, Somers, & Hsu, 2004) and 
hence an enhanced understanding thereof is crucial. In the following sections relevant evidence 
will be discussed and evaluated in more depth. I will review studies of attention to threat, the role 
of anxiety in threat appraisal, the impact of emotion on cognitive control, relevant models of 
threat processing, as well as work on individual differences (neuroticism and reappraisal) and 
their relation to cognitive control. It is concluded that, amongst others, the association between 
neuroticism and cognitive control is inconsistent in the literature. I propose that in addition to 
previously reported factors such as variability in performance or cognitive load, this 
inconsistency could also be explained by factors such as the affective nature of the task or 
moderating roles of regulatory individual differences (e.g. reappraisal or attentional control). 
 
Threat processing 
Effective processing of threat is central to our survival and over recent years there has been an 
intense debate as to the underlying mechanisms. One strand of research has examined the effect 
of threat on attention. This work is often in line with a framework by Posner and Petersen 
(Petersen & Posner, 2012; Posner & Petersen, 1990), which proposes that human attention can 
be divided into three major subfunctions, namely attentional shifting, engagement and 
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disengagement. Theoretical models of threat approach this concept broadly, summarizing data 
across a range of threatening stimulus materials (e.g. words, faces, other aversive images, or 
induction of a mild shock; Bishop, 2007; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mathews et al., 1997; 
Pessoa, 2009) and focussing on the fear arousing nature of the cues, but not necessarily 
distinguishing the specific stimulus qualities leading to such arousal (e.g. fearful versus angry 
stimulus sets). Whilst some work has suggested qualitative differences between threat attributes 
such as fear and anger (Ewbank et al., 2009), in the studies reviewed in the following the term 
threat is understood as encompassing the more general category, as put forward in neuro-
cognitive models of threat processing (S. J. Bishop, 2007; Mathews et al., 1997; Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 1998; Pessoa, 2009). Relevant studies using a visual search task show that negative 
and threatening faces efficiently capture attention (Eastwood, Smilek, & Merikle, 2003; Fox et 
al., 2000; M. Williams, Moss, Bradshaw, & Mattingley, 2005; although see Damjanovic, 
Roberson, Athanasopoulos, Kasai, & Dyson, 2010; Tipples, Young, Quinlan, Broks, & Ellis, 
2002). In this paradigm participants’ task is to detect a target stimulus (e.g. 1 angry (neutral) 
face) amongst an array of distracter items (e.g. 3 neutral (angry) faces), allowing comparison of 
the response latencies for the different conditions. Similar findings are obtained with dot probe 
(Brosch, Pourtois, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2011; Pourtois, Grandjean, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 
2004) and attentional blink paradigms (Anderson & Phelps, 2001; Anderson, 2005; De Martino, 
Kalisch, Rees, & Dolan, 2009), revealing faster or more accurate responses towards threatening 
information. Results are slightly different for the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935). In this task 
participants are traditionally required to name the font colour of colour words versus neutral 
words, whilst attempting not to read the words, which is the prepotent (i.e. dominant) response. It 
is generally found that response latencies of incompatible trials (font colour (e.g. blue) and 
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colour word (e.g. red) do not match) are slower than those of compatible ones (font colour (e.g. 
blue) and colour word (e.g. blue) match). Several affective variants of the task also exist. In the 
emotional word Stroop task, for example, participants name the font colour of emotional (vs. 
control) words (McKenna & Sharma, 1995, 2004). Alternatively, in the word-face Stroop task 
(Stenberg, Wiking, & Dahl, 1998) emotional words (e.g. target) are overlaid on emotional faces 
(e.g. distracter), with target and distracter items being either compatible (e.g. angry word and 
angry face) or incompatible (e.g. happy word and angry face).  
Evidence from these Stroop-like tasks suggests that threat related information slows 
responses, particularly when personally relevant or following priming procedures (Gilboa-
Schechtman, Revelle, & Gotlib, 2000; Lundh & Czyzykow-Czarnocka, 2001). However, some 
researchers maintain that this slowing effect is predominantly manifested between (as opposed to 
within) trials, reflecting a slowed disengagement process (McKenna & Sharma, 2004; Phaf & 
Kan, 2007). There have also been concerns that the slowdown in performance in the emotional 
word Stroop task may, partly, be accounted for by lexical factors (Larsen, Mercer, & Balota, 
2006). Indeed, valence and word frequency seem to interact, in that the slowing effect is only 
observed for low frequency words (Kahan & Hely, 2008), although other work has demonstrated 
that even when controlling for lexical properties such as word length or frequency, the slowdown 
effect was found with personally relevant words (Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 2000; Williams, 
Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). In summary then, threat can enhance performance (as in visual 
search, dot probe and attentional blink tasks), but, particularly when task-irrelevant and pertinent 
to the subject, can also impair performance (as in Stroop-like tasks). 
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Threat processing and individual differences in anxiety 
An interesting question is whether such findings are modulated by individual differences. Indeed, 
humans have varying degrees of sensitivity to threat (Mathews et al., 1997; Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 1998) and anxiety, due to being tightly linked with threat, is therefore likely to have 
an impact on the processing thereof. Numerous studies have been conducted to further test this 
assumption. For instance, Byrne and Eysenck (1995) suggest that in a visual search experiment 
high trait anxious cohorts respond faster to threatening targets, but slower to happy targets when 
flanked by threatening distracters, demonstrating that target detection in high trait anxiety is 
facilitated with threatening targets, but hindered with threatening distracters. However, other 
work with this task only corroborates the impaired performance of anxious individuals in the 
face of threatening distracters, but does not support the findings of facilitated performance with 
threatening targets (Miltner, Krieschel, Hecht, Trippe, & Weiss, 2004; Rinck, Becker, 
Kellermann, & Roth, 2003). Results from studies of attentional blink are slightly more mixed. 
Whereas some researchers show that the attentional blink effect is reduced for emotional or 
threatening material in high anxiety, lending additional support to the notion that threat is 
detected more easily with elevated levels of anxiety (Arend & Botella, 2002; Barnard, Ramponi, 
Battye, & Mackintosh, 2005; Fox, Russo, & Georgiou, 2005; Trippe, Hewig, Heydel, Hecht, & 
Miltner, 2007), others have found a reduction in attentional blink for affective stimuli regardless 
of (social) anxiety (De Jong, Koster, Van Wees, & Martens, 2009). Interestingly, Peers and 
Lawrence (2009) found that individuals with poor attentional control exhibited stronger 
emotional distraction effects, an effect that was not observed for high state anxiety nor for a state 
anxiety X attentional control interaction, calling into question the role of state anxiety in the 
attentional blink paradigm (although see Barnard et al., 2005 who found effects of state anxiety 
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on attentional blink performance). Taken together, one can conclude from the above results that, 
in general, anxious individuals are affected by threatening distracters. Some studies also 
advocate enhanced detection of threatening targets in anxiety. However, further studies are 
needed to clarify this issue. 
 A related issue that has generated a sizeable amount of research activity over recent years 
has been the theoretical debate as to whether the attentional bias of anxious individuals concerns 
slower disengagement from or a faster shift towards threatening stimuli. This has been addressed 
with mainly (but not exclusively) two paradigms: the exogenous cueing and the dot probe tasks. 
For example, using a modification of the exogenous cueing paradigm (Fox, Russo, Bowles, & 
Dutton, 2001; Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002; Georgiou et al., 2005; see Mogg, Holmes, Garner, & 
Bradley, 2008 for a critical view) as well as the dot probe task (Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & 
Houwer, 2006; Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2007) researchers argued that high trait 
anxious individuals are poor at disengaging attention from threatening stimuli. In the modified 
exogenous cueing paradigm, crucially, on each trial an emotional stimulus (e.g. threat vs. non-
threat) is presented in a box to the left or right of fixation. Shortly afterwards the emotional cue 
disappears and will be replaced by the target stimulus (e.g. a circle) in either the same box (= 
valid trial) or the box in the opposite spatial location (= invalid trial). Participants’ task is to  
indicate the location of the target (left or right). Elevated RTs on invalid trials for threatening 
material (relative to non-threatening cues) are assumed to reflect slower disengagement from 
threat. Speeded performance on valid trials to threatening (vs. non-threatening) cues would, in 
turn, indicate a faster attentional shift towards threat. 
Other work on the time course of attentional bias revealed that difficulties in 
disengagement from threatening material are prominent at 100 ms of stimulus presentation time 
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in high trait anxious individuals, whereas at 200 and 500 ms these individuals exhibit greater 
avoidance (Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Van Damme, & Wiersema, 2006). However, some 
research with the probe detection task has also suggested that people with increased anxiety may 
shift their attention more quickly towards threatening material, an effect that was found 
regardless of awareness (Bradley, Mogg, White, Groom, & De Bono, 1999; Brotman et al., 
2007; Li, Li, & Luo, 2005; Mogg, Bradley, de Bono, & Painter, 1997; Mogg, Bradley, & 
Hallowell, 1994; Mogg & Bradley, 2002). Furthermore, this orienting response seems to be 
unaffected by exposure duration (Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 1998; Bradley et al., 1999; 
Mogg et al., 1997), is enhanced when high trait and high state anxiety interact (Macleod & 
Mathews, 1988) and can be modulated by a transient activation of the threat network 
(Helfinstein, White, Bar-Haimb, & Fox, 2008) – further support for attentional shift is derived 
from eye-gaze cueing (Fox, Calder, Mathews, & Yiend, 2007; Mathews, Fox, Yiend, & Calder, 
2003) and eye-movement studies (Mogg, Garner, & Bradley, 2007). The eye-gaze cueing task 
involves threatening versus non-threatening facial expressions, in which the eyes are directed 
straight ahead, left or right. Participants need to identify the spatial location (left or right) of two 
target letters (e.g. T vs. L). Targets can thus be congruent with the gaze direction (e.g. target 
appears on the left side with the gaze directed at the same spatial location) or incongruent (e.g. 
target appears on the left side with the gaze directed to the right, i.e. at the opposite spatial 
location). Generally, faster response latencies on congruent trials would be interpreted as 
facilitated engagement, whereas slower responses on incongruent trials could be seen to indicate 
impaired disengagement. The eye-movement study by Mogg and colleagues (Mogg et al., 2007) 
consisted of a standard dot-probe paradigm using affective stimuli with concurrent tracking of 
the eye movements. 
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Overall, the findings from the above studies show that both slower disengagement and 
faster attentional shift have been implicated in threat processing of high anxious individuals. 
Several researchers, however, have discussed the issue that commonly used behavioural tasks do 
not clearly distinguish between the shift and disengagement processes (see e.g. Fox et al., 2001; 
Mogg et al., 2008), highlighting the need to develop novel tasks or techniques that can more 
clearly disentangle the mechanisms underlying the shift and the disengagement components of 
visual attention. 
 Affective variants of the Stroop paradigm have also been extensively tested in anxious 
cohorts. This work reveals that high anxious individuals exhibit greater interference for negative 
or threatening material, especially when it is personally relevant (Becker, Rinck, Margraf, & 
Roth, 2001; Calvo, Avero, Castillo, & Miguel-Tobal, 2003; Dawkins & Furnham, 1989; Miller 
& Patrick, 2000; Mogg et al., 2000; Mogg, Mathews, & Weinman, 1989; for a review see 
Williams et al., 1996; but see van Honk, Tuiten, de Haan, van den Hout, & Stam, 2001 for no 
effect of trait anxiety with a pictorial emotional Stroop task – this is a variant of the Word-Face 
Stroop task using emotional scenes instead of photographic images of facial expressions). An 
experiment by Richards and Blanchette (2004) further corroborates these findings in an 
important way. The authors employed a classical conditioning paradigm whereby neutral words 
and non-words were to be associated with either negative or neutral images. An emotional word 
Stroop task, using these conditioned stimuli, was then administered. As revealed by affective 
rating scales, for high anxious participants non-words, albeit not the neutral words, were 
effectively conditioned. Importantly, Stroop interference was found for the negatively 
conditioned non-words for high anxious individuals, underlining the significance of emotional 
connotation in this effect. Miller and Patrick (2000) reported that the emotional interference 
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effect in high trait anxious individuals occurs regardless of the level of state anxiety, as 
manipulated by anticipation of shock (although see Eglo & Hock (2001) who maintain that 
emotional Stroop interference is not related to the main effects of trait or state anxiety, but is 
only positively associated with state anxiety at high levels of trait anxiety).  
 The emotional word Stroop effects are also found for subliminal versions of the 
paradigm, suggesting that threat is processed pre-attentively in high trait anxious cohorts (Mogg, 
Kentish, & Bradley, 1993; van den Hout, Tenney, Huygens, Merckelbach, & Kindt, 1995; 
Wikström, Lundh, & Westerlund, 2003; but see Thorpe & Salkovskis, 1997). The pre-attentive 
role of threat is further supported by study from Mathews and MacLeod (1986). They used a 
dichotic listening task where neutral passages are played into one ear and, at the same time, 
threatening vs. non-threatening words into the other ear. Participants shadow the neutral passages 
whilst ignoring the input from the other channel. The authors found that individuals with 
generalized anxiety states (relative to control participants) display diminished reaction time 
performance when simultaneously exposed to unattended threatening words. Altogether then, in 
the emotional Stroop paradigm threatening information usually leads to increased interference in 
high anxious participants regardless of awareness. 
 
 Theoretical approaches to attention, threat and individual differences 
A number of models have attempted to account for the above findings of attention to threat. For 
example, Mathews et al. (1997) maintain that anxious individuals, regardless of awareness, are 
more vigilant to threat compared to non-anxious individuals. Their model suggests that the 
effects of anxiety on threat processing are particularly salient for mild threat cues. This is 
because for anxious individuals mild threat cues usually exceed a threshold demanding 
19 
 
processing resources (not so for their non-anxious counterparts) and will therefore affect their 
performance (Mathews et al., 1997). Severe threat cues, as the authors propose, are likely to 
exceed the threshold in both anxious and non-anxious individuals. Hence, according to the 
model, the distinguishing feature between these groups is the threshold at which the shift to 
attentional vigilance arises. To a certain degree, as the researchers note, this interference ensuing 
from the passing of the threshold can be opposed by voluntary effort (task demand) where the 
target representation is strengthened and the threat representation or emotional distraction 
minimized. Therefore, interference/attentional bias is a function of the competition between 
voluntary effort and the threat representation and is manifested only when the threat 
representation prevails. Behaviourally, the attentional bias in anxious individuals is revealed by 
either (comparably) faster performance or slower performance, depending on whether attention 
to threat facilitates identification of the target or whether the experiment requires ignoring 
threatening stimuli, respectively (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998), indicating automatic 
attentional capture of threat in anxious populations. According to the model, such effects on the 
speed of responding are not expected in non-anxious individuals, as, here, voluntary effort/task 
demand should counter activation of the threat representation, thereby allowing successful 
performance. Another feature of the model is that it proposes that attentional bias in anxiety is 
only found when there is competition between two or more cues (or stimulus attributes), but not 
when only one cue is displayed, owing to the fact that a sufficient amount of activation to capture 
attention is consistently produced by one cue. With two or more cues, some being threatening 
(e.g. distracters) and some being neutral (e.g. task-related), an adequate amount of inhibition of 
the threat representation is needed in order to block attentional capture thereof, thus ensuring 
efficient processing of the target (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998). It is this inhibitory mechanism, 
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the authors argue, that seems to be deficient in anxious individuals (see figure 1 for a graphical 
representation of the model). 
 
 
Figure 1: The Mathews and Mackintosh model of biased processing in anxiety 
(adapted from Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998) 
 
Bishop (2007) set out to further integrate the Mathews and Mackintosh model (Mathews et al., 
1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998) with recent findings from the neuroimaging literature (see 
figure 2 for a graphical illustration of the model). The author’s main proposition is that a 
common amygdala-prefrontal network directs attention to threat, with the lateral prefrontal 
cortex (LPFC) exerting top-down control and the rostral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 
21 
 
channelling competition from threat distractors. Indeed, Bishop (2007) argues that the interaction 
between the amygdala and prefrontal areas forms the basis for attentional bias to threat whereby 
amygdala output affects prefrontal top-down control and prefrontal recruitment, in turn, reduces 
amygdala activity. The model also posits that this prefrontal-amygdala connection is modulated 
by individual differences, except at the early stage of perceptual competition where processing is 
amenable to manipulations of task load (Pessoa, McKenna, Gutierrez, & Ungerleider, 2002). So, 
(1) hyper-responsitivity of the amygdala coupled with (2) hypo-activity of the prefrontal cortex 
are considered key features of anxiety (Bishop, 2007). The cognitive equivalent of this process in 
anxiety, as the author maintains, would be an enhanced threat representation (1) along with 
diminished voluntary control (2). An extension of the model further asserts that trait anxiety 
mainly affects the prefrontal regions and state anxiety the amygdala. In sum, anxious individuals, 
irrespective of awareness, are markedly more vigilant to threat than controls. This tendency is 
particularly noticeable with mild threat cues and is usually found under competition between two 
or more stimuli. To some extent the attentional bias can be countered with voluntary effort (task 
demand), however. Such cognitive processes are represented in an interacting prefrontal-
amygdala network, with prefrontal activation (e.g. via LPFC and ACC) enacting top-down 
control on the amygdala and the amygdala generating outputs modulating the prefrontal system – 
a mechanism that might be impaired in anxiety. 
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Figure 2: Depiction of a neurocognitive model of threat in anxiety (adapted from Bishop, 2007) 
 
The Dual competition model and cognitive control of threat 
The Dual competition model 
A related framework, the dual competition model (see figure 3), was proposed by Pessoa (2009) 
in the domain of cognitive control. He defined cognitive control as “[involving] a host of 
‘adjustment processes’, including perceptual selection, detection and resolution of conflict, and 
maintenance of contextual information.” (p. 160). According to Miyake et al. (2000), cognitive 
control consists of three mechanisms, namely “shifting between tasks or mental sets” (shifting), 
“updating and monitoring of working memory representations” (updating) and “inhibition of 
dominant or prepotent responses” (inhibition) (p. 54). Shifting, as these researchers note, is 
assessed by tasks such as the Number-letter, Local-global and other switching-related tasks. In 
the Number-letter task a number-letter pair (e.g. 8M) is shown in one of four squares displayed 
on the screen. Depending on whether the pair is presented in one of the top squares or one of the 
bottom squares, participants need to engage in a different decision (top squares: “is the number 
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odd or even?”; bottom squares: “is the letter a consonant or a vowel?”). In the first two blocks of 
the experiment the pairs are either presented in the top or bottom squares, with the spatial 
placement (top or bottom) alternating between the two blocks, but not within any one of these. 
The third block, in turn, includes placement in both parts (top and bottom), thereby involving a 
shift between the two decision types across trials. The shift cost can then be computed as the 
difference in mean response latencies from those trials, in block 3, involving a mental shift in 
decision type versus the equivalent trials, in blocks 1 and 2, not involving a shift.  
A similar type of process is recruited in the Local-global paradigm. Here, participants are 
presented with different shapes, such as a square whose lines consist of smaller triangles. The 
task involves either a decision about the global features of the stimulus (here: square) or the local 
features (here: triangle). The focus (global versus local) is switched across trials, allowing one to 
calculate the shift cost by taking the difference in RT of those trials where the focus was 
identical to the previous one (no shift trials) versus those where it was different (shift trials). 
 Updating, according to the authors, can be tested by the Keep track, Tone monitoring and 
other working memory related tasks. In the Keep track paradigm the words from multiple 
categories are serially presented. Participants are instructed to remember the last word of each 
category that was shown in any one trial sequence (the word-category membership is made 
explicit to participants at the beginning). This allows one to obtain the proportion of correct 
recall as the dependent measure. In the Tone monitoring paradigm, in turn, tones of different 
pitches (high, medium, low) are played, with participants having to identify the 4
th
 tone of a 
particular pitch presented during the trial sequence. For example, participants would need to 
respond as soon as the 4
th
 high-pitched tone was presented, regardless of the count for the other 
pitches. The proportion correct was also the measure of interest here. 
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Lastly, inhibition can be investigated using Stroop, Stop signal or Flanker tasks, amongst 
others (Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Miyake et al., 2000). The Stop signal paradigm, on the one 
hand side, is a binary choice task where participants respond on the majority of trials, thereby 
developing a prepotent response (= go trials). However, they are instructed to withhold their 
button press on the rare occasion that a stop signal (e.g. an auditory signal) is presented on a trial 
(= stop signal trial). Stop signals are presented at variable delays following the onset of the go-
signal and hence a response that is about to be executed (go-signal) needs to be restrained (stop 
signal) (Rubia et al., 2001). The stop signal task therefore taps into a comparatively later 
inhibition phase than, for example, the go/no-go task where the stimuli themselves are directly 
associated with stopping or going responses, a process that has been referred to as selective 
motor response inhibition (Rubia et al., 2001; Wöstmann et al., 2013). It is also noteworthy that 
the stop signal represents an additional cue requiring attention; stop signal performance is thus 
likely to involve detection of a task-relevant cue (Hampshire, Chamberlain, Monti, Duncan, & 
Owen, 2010). Indeed, whilst motor inhibition has generally been assumed as a key process in 
response inhibition (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008), recent work suggests that context-monitoring, 
a construct concerned with the detection and interpretation of the stop signal, may constitute this 
role in response inhibition (Chatham et al., 2012; Hampshire et al., 2010). Altogether then, the 
stop signal task yields an executive response (RT on go trials, i.e. go RT or Choice Reaction 
Time, CRT) as well as a measure of response inhibition on stop signal trials, referred to as Stop 
Signal Reaction Time (SSRT; see Chapter 5 for further details). This is similar to the colour 
word Stroop paradigm in the sense that this task (= Stroop) also involves an executive response 
on each trial (button press), whilst at the same time involving active cognitive (i.e. not directly 
motor – see below) suppression of a prepotent response (word reading) (Friedman & Miyake, 
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2004). It should be noted that whilst the word reading process can also be considered a 
distracting cue in the Stroop task (Nigg, 2000), the underlying process of this cue is dominant 
(MacLeod, 1991), thereby mapping onto a prepotent response process (Friedman & Miyake, 
2004). In the Flanker task, on the other hand side, participants typically identify a target letter 
that is flanked by compatible (same response category) or incompatible (different response 
category) letters that need to be ignored. A similar principle applies to other stimulus types that 
are used in modifications of this task (e.g. emotional faces in an affective Flanker paradigm) – 
here targets and flankers can also be compatible or incompatible on the dimension of interest, 
such as valence. In general, response latencies on compatible trials are faster compared to 
incompatible ones in the Flanker task. It has been argued that Flanker tasks tap into processes of 
executive control, by virtue of having to execute a response on each trial, as well as into 
processes of focussed attention towards target cues or selective enhancement thereof (Friedman 
& Miyake, 2004). Others have proposed that Flanker tasks also involve cognitive inhibition of 
distracter cues (see below for a distinction from motor response inhibition) as well as response 
competition in that target and distracter cues map onto different response options on 
incompatible trials (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). It seems reasonable to assume that the Stroop task 
entails similar processes in that participants also need to focus their attention on a target cue, 
which may be selectively enhanced, respectively in the Stroop task a task-irrelevant distracter 
cue, same as in the Flanker task, also interferes with the task-relevant cue (target; MacLeod, 
1991). To clarify, some researchers conceptually distinguish motor response inhibition 
paradigms (e.g. go/no-go and stop signal tasks) from interference inhibition paradigms (e.g. 
Simon, Flanker and Stroop tasks) (Hart, Radua, Nakao, Mataix-Cols, & Rubia, 2013; Wöstmann 
et al., 2013). One of the fundamental differences between these tasks is that the former 
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predominantly and explicitly elicit motor response inhibition, whereas the latter focus on 
cognitive inhibition, that is inhibition of distraction and conflict detection (Chambers, Garavan, 
& Bellgrove, 2009; Hart et al., 2013; Nigg, 2000). Specifically, interference inhibition tasks 
require the inhibition of conflicting cues, which may interfere with performance to the target cue, 
such as prompting an incorrect motor response or creating informational conflict, only when 
inhibition fails (Hart et al., 2013; Kalanthroff, Goldfarb, & Henik, 2013; Nee, Wager, & Jonides, 
2007; Nigg, 2000).  Thus, in motor response inhibition paradigms motor suppression forms an 
intrinsic part of the task instructions, whereas in interference inhibition paradigms an incorrect 
motor response may only occur when participants fail to adhere to the task instruction of 
ignoring the distracting cue. Another difference between interference inhibition versus motor 
response inhibition tasks is that in the former the measure of interest (interference) is recorded on 
executive trials, whereas the key inhibitory measure of the latter tasks (response inhibition) is 
measured on non-executive (i.e. stop signal or no-go) trials.  
In light of these distinctions, there has been behavioural and neural evidence, suggesting 
that these different task types show some unique features (Brydges et al., 2012; Herba, Tranah, 
& Rubia, 2010; Nee et al., 2007), although several studies also point to strong functional overlap 
between these (Stop-signal, Stroop, Flanker) tasks (Aichert et al., 2012; Friedman & Miyake, 
2004; Miyake et al., 2000; Miyake & Friedman, 2012; Verbruggen, Liefooghe, Notebaert, & 
Vandierendonck, 2005; Verbruggen, Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, 2006; Wager et al., 2005). 
This evidence is not necessarily contradictory though as the different tasks may well overlap 
with regard to one mechanism (e.g. response selection), whilst they may differentially recruit 
other processes (e.g. attentional selection) (Nee et al., 2007). Indeed, linking this back to the 
broader concept of cognitive control, research has shown that the three constructs of shifting, 
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updating and inhibition are moderately associated, whilst also exhibiting evidence of some 
independence, suggesting that the concept of cognitive control embodies both commonalities as 
well as separabilities between its sub-functions (Miyake et al., 2000). This proposal (unity and 
diversity of cognitive control) also seems to be in line with recent experimental and 
neurobiological findings (Miyake & Friedman, 2012; Munakata et al., 2011; Verbruggen, 
Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, 2004). It has therefore been put forward that these mechanisms 
of cognitive control are interacting and linked to a common resource pool, whereby if one 
function is recruited it will also reduce the resources available for the other functions (Pessoa, 
2009). Moreover, according to the dual competition model, high threats
1
 impact on specific 
cognitive control functions (e.g. inhibition) as well as on the general resource pool to ensure 
prioritized and efficient processing of the item. This often entails the drawback of diminished 
behavioural performance, particularly when the threat cue is task-irrelevant (Pessoa, 2009). The 
model also posits that such effects are not observed for low threats, which generally do not 
recruit the common resources and, especially when task-relevant, lead to faster performance. 
Individual differences, as the author points out, are assumed to play a further modulatory role 
such that (1) cognitive control functions relevant for the task are adjusted accordingly or (2) the 
distribution of common-pool resources is potentially altered, which, in turn, has an effect on the 
remaining cognitive control resources. Taken together, cognitive control can be subdivided into 
mechanisms of inhibition, shifting and updating. These processes interact and share a common 
resource pool. High (but not low) threat can affect the specific mechanisms of cognitive control 
                                               
1 Whilst Mathews and Mackintosh (1998) refer to high threat in terms of immediate danger (e.g. reaching for a 
snake), Pessoa (2009) is less explicit about his definition of this term. It can, however, be inferred from the evidence 
that he discusses (e.g. Frederick Verbruggen & De Houwer, 2007) that, according to his understanding, high threat 
can be elicited with stimulus content, such as pictures. Hence, it seems that what Pessoa (2009) refers to as high 
threat cues would be described as to mild threat cues in the Mathews and Mackintosh (1998) model. 
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and the common resources, with individual differences serving an additional modulatory 
function. 
 
 
Figure 3: Dual competition model illustrating the impact of stimulus-driven and state-dependent 
effects on cognitive control (grey circles) and the common resource pool (blue circle). Thick 
(thin) arrow denotes stimuli of elevated (lower/state) threat levels (adapted from Pessoa, 2009). 
 
Emotion and cognitive control 
There is now an emerging body of research on the relation between cognitive control and 
emotion. Most of this work has focussed on the broad inhibition mechanism of cognitive control. 
For example, presenting positive, negative and neutral schematic faces in an affective Flanker 
task, Fenske and Eastwood (2003) found greater flanker interference effects when the target face 
was positive (compared to negative or neutral targets), supporting the notion that the detrimental 
effects of negative information on performance are particularly likely to occur when it is task-
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irrelevant (see e.g. Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mathews et al., 1997). Stenberg et al. (1998), 
using an affective word-face Stroop paradigm, reported interference effects across a number of 
different distractor emotions, showing that response latencies on incompatible trials-types were 
usually slower than those for compatible ones, regardless of whether the target was positive or 
negative. Moreover, an affective stop-signal task where emotional images preceded the target 
stimuli revealed that response and stop latencies were slowed as a function of the high arousal 
content, but not the valence (positive, negative) of the images (Frederick Verbruggen & De 
Houwer, 2007). Hare, Tottenham, Davidson, Glover, and Casey (2005), however, revealed an 
effect of valence in an emotional Go/ NoGo task when affective items functioned as targets. The 
Go/NoGo paradigm is a binary choice task where usually one stimulus type, occurring fairly 
frequently, is associated with a button press (target; Go trial), whereas another, occurring rarely, 
requires participants to withhold their response (nontarget; NoGo trial). This design yields two 
main outcome measures of interest: response latencies (on Go trials) and proportion of false 
alarms (on NoGo trials). In their study, Hare and colleagues (Hare et al., 2005) used fearful, 
happy and neutral face images across a set of different tasks. Each task involved fearful cues as 
either target or nontarget paired with one of the other expressions. The researchers demonstrated 
that response latencies to fearful faces were slower than comparison stimuli (i.e. happy and 
neutral), but participants were less accurate at inhibiting responses for happy items, an effect that 
can also be modulated by individual differences (e.g. Ladouceur et al., 2006). All in all, these 
findings suggest that emotion tends to affect the inhibition component of cognitive control. Such 
effects are also obtained when emotion is task-irrelevant in some scenarios (e.g. in affective 
Stroop and Flanker tasks), although interference from emotional valence can be reduced when 
this information temporally precedes the target.  
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Some evidence has also been put forward regarding emotion and the updating and shifting 
components of cognitive control. The updating component, as described above, is linked to the 
direct manipulation of content in working memory, as opposed to the mere storage of 
information (Miyake et al., 2000). The literature on emotion and the updating component is 
relatively sparse. However, a study by Schweizer and Dalgleish (2011), which combined 
emotional material with a working memory task, might shed some initial light on this. Using a 
novel emotional working memory capacity (eWMC) task where participants with lifetime history 
of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and a comparison group were instructed to remember 
neutral words whilst at the same time processing trauma-related (versus neutral) sentences, 
Schweizer and Dalgleish (2011) found that eWMC performance of the PTSD cohort was 
impaired for trauma-related sentences and that generally this group exhibited poorer eWMC 
relative to the controls. Still, more direct and numerous measures of emotion and updating are 
needed. In an affective Internal Shift Task (De Lissnyder et al., 2012), depressed individuals 
(versus controls) displayed diminished shifting performance, something that was unaffected by 
emotional information. In this task, which is a measure tapping into both shifting and updating 
components, emotional faces (angry versus neutral) of both genders are presented. In one block 
participants focus on the gender dimension of the faces, counting male versus female images; in 
another block the focus is on the emotion dimension where angry versus neutral expressions 
need to be counted. On each trial, response latencies are recorded via a simple button press, once 
the mental count has been updated by participants for that stimulus. At the end of a block 
participants report their mental counts for each stimulus category. This design allows 
computation of switch costs (shifting performance), which constitute the difference in RT of 
switch vs. no-switch trials within a block. In switch trials, the category to be counted differs from 
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that of the previous trial (e.g. target trial (n) = male face; previous trial (n-1) = female face), 
whereas in no-switch trials it is identical (e.g. target trial (n) = male face; previous trial (n-1) = 
male face).  
The findings by De Lissnyder and colleagues (De Lissnyder et al., 2012) were corroborated 
by De Lissnyder, Koster, Derakshan and De Raedt (2010) whose Affective Shift Task, again, 
yielded no effects of valence on switch cost, but instead showed effects of valence for inhibition. 
In their task, arrays of four faces were presented. The faces varied along the dimensions of 
emotion (angry vs. happy), gender (male vs. female) and colour (light grey vs. dark grey). 
Participants needed to determine which of the four faces differed from the others on a particular 
dimension (emotion, gender or colour), with participants being informed of the task-relevant 
dimension prior to each trial. Based on RT performance, the authors computed measures of 
inhibition and of set-shifting cost. Inhibition scores were obtained by taking the difference 
between inhibitory versus control trials. Inhibitory trials signified those trials where the stimulus 
dimension of the target trial (n) differed from that of the previous trial (n-1), but was identical to 
the dimension two trials preceding (n-2) (e.g. gender – emotion – gender). In control trials the 
stimulus dimensions of the two preceding trials (n-1 and n-2) were different from that of the 
target trial as well as from each other (e.g. colour – emotion – gender). Thus, both inhibitory and 
control trials (both trial n) followed two set-shifts. However, on inhibitory trials a previously 
inhibited dimension (in the example above: gender in trial n-2) becomes activated again, whereas 
in control trials another dimension, compared to that of the two preceding trials, is presented. 
Set-shifting cost (also: switch cost), in turn, reflects the time needed to respond on non-inhibitory 
trials where the stimulus dimension differs from that of the preceding trial (e.g. switch from 
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colour to emotion) relative to repeat trials where the stimulus dimensions are the same on two 
consecutive trials (e.g. emotion – emotion). 
Altogether, these findings clearly show that emotion generally affects performance on 
cognitive control tasks, indicating that it may impact on a common resource pool, as 
hypothesized by (Pessoa, 2009). This conclusion is also in line with research on event-related 
potentials. This work indicates that threatening or affective information increases one event 
related potential (ERP) component, occurring ~ 400-600ms post stimulus onset, the late positive 
potential (LPP), suggesting greater consumption of resources (Cuthbert, Schupp, Bradley, 
Birbaumer, & Lang, 2000; Flaisch, Stockburger, & Schupp, 2008; MacNamara, Ferri, & Hajcak, 
2011; Schupp et al., 2004; Weinberg & Hajcak, 2010, 2011; see Hajcak, MacNamara, & Olvet, 
2010; Schupp, Flaisch, Stockburger, & Junghöfer, 2006 for reviews). For the shifting 
component, valence, to the author’s knowledge, has not yet been demonstrated to modulate task 
performance, but this can partly be explained by the fact that existing affective task-switching 
paradigms have exerted a high task demand on participants by involving several cognitive 
control mechanisms in the same task (shifting and updating: De Lissnyder et al. (2012); shifting 
and inhibition: De Lissnyder et al. (2010)). Such an increased task demand might have, 
according to the Mathews and Mackintosh model (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mathews et 
al., 1997), diminished potential effects of valence on shifting by inhibiting the input from the 
threat evaluation system. 
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Measures of individual differences in anxiety and related emotional traits 
Neuroticism as a measure of threat processing 
Individual differences in attentional bias to threat have been linked to trait anxiety as indexed by 
the STAI-T (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970; Spielberger, 1983), and to anxiety 
disorders (Bishop, 2007; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mathews et al., 1997; see also evidence 
discussed above). However, although several studies have not found attentional bias to threat or 
negative stimuli in other emotional disorders (Gilboa & Gotlib, 1997; Karparova, Kersting, & 
Suslow, 2005; E. Koster, Crombez, Van Damme, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2005; Mogg, 
Bradley, Williams, & Mathews, 1993; Wisco, Treat, & Hollingworth, 2012; for a review see 
Mathews & MacLeod, 2005), there is now emerging evidence that there is in fact a link between 
attentional bias and such disorders, including unipolar depression and bipolar disorder (B. P. 
Bradley, Mogg, & Lee, 1997; Caseras, Garner, Bradley, & Mogg, 2007; Donaldson, Lam, & 
Mathews, 2007; Eizenman et al., 2003; Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Yue, & Joormann, 2004; 
Joormann & Gotlib, 2007; Leyman, De Raedt, Schacht, & Koster, 2007; Leyman, Raedt, & 
Koster, 2009; Rinck & Becker, 2005), only that this effect may not be evident for all features of 
selective attention and may depend on the type of threat (Joormann & Siemer, 2011). This 
suggests that these disorders (i.e. anxiety and other emotional disorders) are linked as part of a 
coherent internalizing spectrum, with neuroticism as the temperamental core of such disorders 
(Griffith et al., 2010; see also the so-called 'Tripartite' model for a similar proposition Clark & 
Watson, 1991; Clark, Watson, & Mineka, 1994). Indeed, this idea is further supported by a study 
showing that neuroticism or negative affectivity, rather than anxiety or depression, predicts an 
initial attentional bias for angry faces (Oehlberg, Revelle, & Mineka, 2012). Such findings are 
also in line with the profile of neuroticism, whereby this trait’s principal manifestations are a 
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sensitivity to threat, punishment and negative affect (DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson, 2007; 
DeYoung, 2010a, 2010b). Moreover, one of the principal instruments to measure anxiety in 
research of attentional bias to threat, the trait version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-
T; Spielberger et al., 1970; Spielberger, 1983), may not be a reflection of trait anxiety but, 
instead, of negative affect (Bados, Gómez-Benito, & Balaguer, 2010). Watson and Clark (1984) 
put forward a similar argument, suggesting that both trait anxiety and neuroticism constitute 
features of the same overarching trait: negative affectivity. One conclusion emerging from these 
findings then is that individual variation in the overarching trait of neuroticism may be 
particularly relevant for understanding individual variation in attention to threat. 
 
Measures of neuroticism 
The main scales for neuroticism (as a personality trait), include the NEO (labelled such as it 
was developed for the investigation of the three dimensions of Neuroticism, Extraversion and 
Openness to experience; Costa & McCrae, 1985, 1992), Trait Descriptive Adjectives (Goldberg, 
1992) and the Big Five Inventory (BFI; Benet-Martinez & John, 1998; John, Donahue, & Kentle, 
1991). These scales possess impressive reliability, convergent validity and discriminant validity 
(John, Naumann, & Soto, 2008), thereby avoiding some of the shortcomings of the STAI-T 
scale. John et al. (2008) recommend the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO PI-R) 
measure for use when there is sufficient testing time, participants are educated and the subject of 
investigation are the facets of the Big Five. In all other cases, they argue, the BFI-44 might be 
preferable. In general then, it can be said that, based on the validity and reliability of the scales as 
well as its content (sensitivity to threat), neuroticism constitutes a suitable measure for the 
exploration of individual differences concerning negative affect and threat. 
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  Neuroticism: behavioural (threat processing) and clinical findings 
Given this profile it does not come as a surprise that neuroticism, like trait anxiety, has been 
associated with enhanced threat processing (Leikas & Lindeman, 2009; Reynaud, El Khoury-
Malhame, Rossier, Blin, & Khalfa, 2012; Tamir, Robinson, & Solberg, 2006; Wilson, Kumari, 
Gray, & Corr, 2000) and, in line with the Tripartite Model (Clark & Watson, 1991; Clark et al., 
1994; see also Griffith et al., 2010) amongst others, with a number of emotional disorders (see 
also Bienvenu & Brandes, 2005; Brandes & Bienvenu, 2006). The Tripartite Model (Clark et al., 
1994; Clark & Watson, 1991) stipulates that neuroticism is a core feature underlying both 
anxiety and depression. So, to distinguish these disorders, according to this model, further 
features need to be considered: anhedonia (specific to depression) and physiological 
hyperarousal (specific to anxiety). Studies that have directly linked neuroticism to threat 
processing have shown that threatening information evokes elevated startle reactions, as 
measured by eye-blink amplitude (Wilson et al., 2000), skin conductance responses (an index of 
peripheral physiological arousal) and expressive activity (e.g. in the corrugator supercilii muscle, 
which controls the frowning response) in high trait neuroticism (Reynaud et al., 2012). 
Moreover, in high (relative to low) trait neuroticism speeded threat identification is related to 
lower negative affect (Tamir et al., 2006), whereas the interaction between neuroticism and 
threat identification predicts negative recall bias (Leikas & Lindeman, 2009).  
As for the relationship between neuroticism and emotional disorders, research suggests, for 
instance, that neuroticism is linked to the symptomatology of depression (Farmer et al., 2002; 
Saklofske, Kelly, & Janzen, 1995) and vulnerability to depression (Saklofske et al., 1995; but see 
Farmer et al., 2002). Genetic data further show that there is substantial overlap between the 
factors affecting genetic variation in trait neuroticism and those relating to the symptoms of 
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anxiety and depression (Jardine, Martin, & Henderson, 1984). Overall, it can be concluded that 
neuroticism is a trait related to affective disorders, to enhanced responding to threat and is 
characterised by affective dysregulation. These topics and the links between them are explored in 
this thesis. 
 
Neuroticism and cognitive control: behavioural and neural evidence 
 Neuroticism and behavioural studies 
There is also evidence of an association between neuroticism and cognitive control (Haas, 
Omura, Constable, & Canli, 2007; Helode, 1982; Paelecke, Paelecke-Habermann, & Borkenau, 
2012; Robinson & Tamir, 2005). Work with early adolescent males, for instance, revealed a 
positive correlation between neuroticism and the interference effect of a modified colour-word 
Stroop task (Helode, 1982). Moreover, increased attentional blink magnitude was found in 
individuals with high levels of neuroticism (Bredemeier, Berenbaum, Most, & Simons, 2011). A 
link between stop signal reaction time (SSRT), a measure of response inhibition, and impulsivity, 
which – amongst others – is related to neuroticism (see DeYoung, 2010c), was established by 
Logan, Schachar and Tannock (1997). However, other studies have yielded no significant 
relationship between neuroticism and cognitive control (Olvet & Hajcak, 2012) or attentional 
bias tasks (Chan, Goodwin, & Harmer, 2007). Nonetheless, in a series of affective and non-
affective reaction time (RT) experiments, including two cognitive control paradigms (Stroop and 
Go/No-Go tasks), Robinson and Tamir (2005) showed that neuroticism correlated with virtually 
all of their RT measures, but only when these represented intra-individual variability (as in RT 
standard deviations; RT SDs) rather than mean RTs. This led to the formulation of the mental 
noise hypothesis, which stipulates that elevated levels of neuroticism are linked with increased 
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intra-individual variability in RT performance, as measured by RT SDs. By contrast, 
administering a vocal emotional Stroop task, an emotional word Stroop task where participants 
vocalise their response choices, Paelecke et al. (2012) found that neuroticism did correlate with 
mean RTs, but only when cognitive load was high. Finally, behavioural and neuroimaging 
findings by Haas et al. (2007) also suggest that neuroticism and cognitive control are 
overlapping. An emotional Word-Face Stroop task exhibited a positive association between the 
anxiety facet of neuroticism and incompatible trial-types, equivalent correlations with the 
depression facet or neuroticsm did not reach significance nor did any of these correlations with a 
Stroop cost measure (Haas et al., 2007). A similar pattern emerged in this study for correlations 
between the amygdala and the subgenual anterior cingulate whereby during high conflict trials 
these regions were positively associated with neuroticism and with the anxiety facet of 
neuroticism in particular. The findings pertaining to the relationship between neuroticism and 
cognitive control are therefore mixed. Whilst some studies have found a straightforward link 
between these variables, others have not and it seems that intra-individual variability of 
performance (RT SDs) and cognitive load play a role in some contexts. It is noteworthy, 
however, that most studies of cognitive control that involved affective stimuli did report an 
association, suggesting that the affective nature of a task may contribute to the association. This 
idea would also be in line with several accounts of neuroticism that emphasize its specific 
sensitivity to threat and negative affect (DeYoung et al., 2007; DeYoung, 2010a, 2010b). It is 
important to attempt to separate out the effects of neuroticism on basic negative affect sensitivity 
and cognitive control, which is one aim of this thesis. Specifically, I will examine this using 
affective cognitive control tasks where emotion is task-relevant versus task-irrelevant and 
correlating the resulting scores from these tasks with neuroticism. 
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Neuroticism and neurotransmitters 
The relationship between neuroticism and intra-individual performance variability or mental 
noise, as this is also termed, has found additional support in research on neurotransmitters. 
Specifically, there have been suggestions that a decrease in γ-amino butyric acid (GABA) 
transmission between cells in the dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), as manipulated by 
micro-injection of GABAA antagonists, is linked to within-subject variability in performance 
(Pouget, Wattiez, Rivaud-Péchoux, & Gaymard, 2009). Such variability has, as discussed above, 
also been associated with neuroticism, whereby high trait neuroticism is marked by a greater 
intra-individual variability in performance (mental noise; Flehmig, Steinborn, Langner, & 
Westhoff, 2007; Robinson & Tamir, 2005), indicating that trait neuroticism may be correlated 
with the inhibitory neurotransmitter GABA. This hypothesized association between GABA and 
neuroticism has been further affirmed in a recent Magnetic Resonance Spectroscopy (MRS) 
study. Boy et al. (2011) found that the concentration of GABA in the dlPFC, as measured by 
MRS, was negatively associated with variation in trait urgency, which is a facet of neuroticism 
(DeYoung, 2010c). Furthermore, various genetic and neuroscientific studies have implicated 
GABA in neuroticism and emotional disorders (Aleksandrova, Souza, & Bagby, 2012; Crestani 
et al., 1999; Glue, Wilson, Coupland, Ball, & Nutt, 1995; Liu et al., 2007; Sanders & Shekhar, 
1995; Sen et al., 2004; but see Monteleone, Maj, Iovino, & Steardo, 1990; for reviews see Cryan 
& Kaupmann, 2005; Kalueff & Nutt, 2007). Other work has also proposed links between 
neuroticism and serotonin transporter (Sen et al., 2004), glutamic acid decarboxylase (GAD) 1 
(Hettema et al., 2006) and cannabinoid variants (Aleksandrova et al., 2012). Particularly the 
finding of an association between GAD enzymes and neuroticism is quite relevant here. GAD 
enzymes synthesize GABA from glutamate, and so variation in GAD genes is theoretically 
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connected to the proposed relationship between GABA and neuroticism. Altogether, these 
findings lend support to the idea that there is a relationship between mental noise/GABA 
concentration (e.g. in the dlPFC) and neuroticism. 
 
Neuroticism and evidence from neuroimaging  
Neuroimaging studies have also yielded promising links. Here, during affective behavioural 
tasks, structural scans or rest, associations between neuroticism and a variety of brain regions 
have been demonstrated, including in the amygdala (Haas et al., 2007; Harenski, Kim, & 
Hamann, 2009), anterior cingulate (Chan, Harmer, Goodwin, & Norbury, 2008; Haas et al., 
2007), insula (Deckersbach et al., 2006; Feinstein, Stein, & Paulus, 2006), cerebellum (Schutter, 
Koolschijn, Peper, & Crone, 2012), right superior parietal cortex (Chan et al., 2008), medial 
prefrontal cortex (Haas, Constable, & Canli, 2008; Kim, Hwang, Park, & Kim, 2008) and the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Harenski et al., 2009). In particular, the prefrontal and amygdala 
involvement of neuroticism attests to its role in threat detection or emotion generation and 
overlaps with attentional control (disengagement from threat) and emotion regulation (e.g. 
attentional avoidance), which are known to recruit the similar areas (Cisler & Koster, 2010; 
Ochsner & Gross, 2007). Additional support for this interpretation comes from work showing 
that emotion regulation has also directly been connected with neuroticism, whereby neuroticism 
tends to lead to worse regulatory efforts (Gross, 2008; John & Gross, 2007). A longitudinal study 
by Kokkonen and Pulkkinen (2001) also demonstrated that neuroticism predicted increased use 
of emotional ambivalence, a form of emotion dysregulation, and decreased use of repair, a 
beneficial regulatory strategy. Overall, these findings show that whilst the link between 
neuroticism and cognitive control has not always been consistent at a behavioural level, it is 
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possible that this inconsistency can be explained by intra-individual variability (mental noise), 
cognitive load or the affective nature of the tasks. Furthermore, neural findings suggest that 
similar regions are recruited for neuroticism, emotion regulation and attentional 
control/attentional bias, lending support to the idea that these constructs overlap to a certain 
extent.   
 
Mechanisms of emotion regulation 
The process model of emotion 
The relationship between neuroticism and emotion (dys)regulation has been a recurring theme in 
the literature. Emotion regulation denotes the ability to regulate which emotion to feel, when an 
emotion is initiated and what the nature of the emotional experience or expression is (Gross, 
1998a). The process model of emotion (Gross, 1998b; see figure 4) has proposed that emotion 
regulation can usefully be divided into different temporal stages. At a broad level, the model 
maintains that emotion regulation is manifested in modulating either the incoming information to 
the system (antecedent-focussed emotion regulation) or the outgoing information (response-
focussed emotion regulation). These two stages, according to the model, each consist of several 
sub-processes. On the one hand, response-focussed emotion regulation involves a variety of 
approaches that shorten, extend, increase, or decrease the emotional experience, expression or 
physiological functioning (e.g. suppression; Gross, 1998b). On the other hand, according to the 
model, antecedent-focussed emotion regulation involves strategies such as situation selection 
(i.e. engaging (or not) with people or in situations dependent on their potential emotional 
influence), situation modification (i.e. changing a situation in order to adjust its emotional 
impact), attention deployment (i.e. choosing to attend or not attend something with the goal of 
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modulating one’s emotions), and cognitive change (i.e. modulating the emotional impact by 
reinterpreting one’s environment or one’s ability to cope with the environment, e.g. reappraisal). 
 
 
Figure 4: Process model of emotion (adapted from Gross, 1998b) 
 
Emotion regulation outcomes 
Although a plethora of emotion regulation strategies exists (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & 
Schweizer, 2010; Garnefski, Kraaij, & Spinhoven, 2001), reappraisal and suppression are 
certainly amongst the more prominent ones in research (Gross, 2002), possibly due to their 
contrasting outcomes.  Reappraisal is an adaptive strategy of emotion regulation (Gross, 2002), 
which, in the form of cognitive restructuring, also constitutes a key component of Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979). Early findings have established that 
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instructed reappraisal is effective in regulating negative emotion by decreasing the subjective 
emotional experience as well as the overt expression of emotion whilst maintaining physiological 
indices at baseline level (Gross, 1998b). By contrast, instructed suppression, that is the inhibition 
of emotional expressions, is often seen as a maladaptive regulatory strategy (Gross, 2002). It 
leads to increases in sympathetic recordings, decreases in expressive behaviour, but, crucially, 
not to changes in emotional experience, as Gross (1998) shows. More recent findings have 
corroborated this beneficial role of reappraisal (but see work by Sheppes and colleagues 
(Sheppes, Catran, & Meiran, 2009; Sheppes & Meiran, 2007, 2008) who maintain that the onset 
time of reappraisal affects the regulatory success). Following a reappraisal manipulation, 
Jamieson, Nock and Mendes (2011) have reported ameliorated cardiovascular responses to 
arousal in a stressful situation and a diminished attentional bias, as measured by an emotional 
word stroop task involving threatening and control words. Typically in studies of reappraisal/ 
emotion regulation participants are confronted with multiple negative (or positive) emotional 
scenes or movie sequences. Their task is to re-interpret the emotional situation (e.g. in a more 
positive light – positive reappraisal) or to regulate their emotions by means of other strategies 
(e.g. suppression), such as to alter their negative (or positive) feelings. Outcome measures of 
emotion regulation are often self-report or physiological indices, comparing emotional reactivity 
of time periods where no regulatory instructions were given to emotional reactivity during 
regulatory phases. Alternatively (or additionally), emotional reactivity can be compared on these 
indices as a function of different regulatory strategies. Blechert and colleagues (Blechert, 
Sheppes, Tella, Williams, & Gross, 2012) further demonstrated that reappraisal renders 
evaluations of angry faces less negative at both explicit and implicit task levels. In a second 
study these researchers found that although instructed reappraisal concerning angry expressions 
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increased P100 amplitudes (a positive peak of the event related potential recorded at 100 ms 
following stimulus onset), reflective of enhanced attentional processing at this initial phase, in 
later amplitudes (N170, early posterior negativity (EPN), late positive potential (LPP)) 
reductions were manifested, suggesting less configural/emotional face processing and emotional 
attention, as well as sustained attention and meaning evaluation, respectively. The N170 reflects 
a negative peak of the event related potential recorded at 170 ms following stimulus onset, 
whereas the EPN is typically recorded just afterwards, between 200 ms to 300 ms. Modulations 
of the LPP by reappraisal have also been demonstrated in other work (Foti & Hajcak, 2008; 
Hajcak & Nieuwenhuis, 2006), thus corroborating these findings and indicating that reappraisal 
can diminish the extent to which unpleasant information commands central resources.  
 
Neurobiology of emotion regulation 
A neural model of emotion regulation developed by Ochsner and Gross (2007; see figure 
5) has implicated the dorsal medial and lateral prefrontal cortex (dmPFC and dlPFC) as well as 
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) in  a top-down description-based appraisal system, the 
ventral and orbital prefrontal cortex in a top-down outcome-based appraisal system and the 
posterior cortical (e.g. parietal lobe) along with the subcortical regions (e.g. amygdala) in 
bottom-up perceptual and bottom-up affective appraisal systems, respectively. The model posits 
that the top-down description-based and outcome-based appraisal systems regulate the emotional 
responses, with the former system engaging higher cognitive functions for emotional control and 
the latter system recruiting mechanisms concerned with passive conditioning and instrumental 
choice for the purpose of emotion regulation. This top-down neural architecture has recently 
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been confirmed in a meta-analysis of reappraisal studies by Kalisch (2009). Moreover, mirroring 
the findings at behavioural and physiological levels, instructed reappraisal (compared to 
instructed suppression) is identified with reduced activation in regions of emotional reactivity 
such as the amygdala and insula (Goldin, McRae, Ramel, & Gross, 2008). In sum, these findings 
confirm the idea that reappraisal is an effective emotion regulation strategy that can modulate the 
extent to which threat impacts on cognitive resources and performance (see e.g. work on the 
LPP). Furthermore, it is associated with positive outcomes at behavioural, physiological and 
neural dimensions and mainly recruits the frontal network (e.g. dmPFC and dlPFC) to exert its 
regulatory role. 
 
 
Figure 5: Neurocognitive model of emotion regulation (adapted from Ochsner & Gross, 2007) 
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 Habitual reappraisal 
Typically in emotion regulation research, reappraisal is manipulated experimentally. 
Gross and John (2003) argue that this approach is suitable for establishing causal effects, but is 
restricted to identifying only the short-term outcomes of a strategy. Emotion regulation plays an 
intrinsic part of our daily lives, however, where rather than being instructed to adopt a particular 
strategy we have developed or genetically inherited automatic regulatory habits (i.e. trait emotion 
regulation; Gross & John, 2003; Gutknecht et al., 2007; Murakami, Matsunaga, & Ohira, 2009; 
Williams, Bargh, Nocera, & Gray, 2009; van Rijn, Swaab, Aleman, & Kahn, 2006; for reviews 
see Canli, Ferri, & Duman, 2009; Canli & Lesch, 2007), which in turn can be linked to longer-
term consequences of these regulation processes. Akin to the evidence from instructed emotion 
regulation, trait reappraisal has been related to improved well-being together with enhanced 
functioning in various other personal and social facets (Gross & John, 2003; McRae, Jacobs, 
Ray, John, & Gross, 2012). These findings are further corroborated by a recent study, which 
found in a subsample of previously depressed individuals that elevated depressive symptoms 
were related to lower trait reappraisal, but high trait scores on rumination and suppression 
(Joormann & Gotlib, 2010). Employing an anger induction, Mauss, Cook, Cheng and Gross 
(2007) also observed that high (versus low) trait reappraisal, at both baseline and provocation 
stages, effectively reduced anger and negative emotion, enhanced positive affect and led to fairly 
adaptive cardiovascular challenge responses. Work by Arndt and Fujiwara (2012) provides a 
possible cognitive explanation of this adaptive profile of anger regulation. They ran an emotional 
dot-probe paradigm with angry and neutral face images. Their results showed that individuals 
with high trait reappraisal (but low anxiety) as well as those with high trait anxiety (but low trait 
emotion regulation) both exhibited slower disengagement from the threatening stimuli compared 
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to controls. The authors suggest that this negativity bias is due to increased attention to negative 
information in reappraisers, thus permitting the information to undergo a detailed cognitive 
evaluation during reappraisal. For high trait anxiety, by contrast, the researchers considered the 
bias to be maladaptive. Using angry and fearful faces to evoke emotional responses, Drabant and 
co-researchers (Drabant, McRae, Manuck, Hariri, & Gross, 2009) examined the neural basis of 
trait reappraisal. As is commonly found in studies of instructed reappraisal (see above), their 
study revealed increased activation in the prefrontal (e.g. dlPFC and dmPFC) and parietal areas 
along with decreased amygdala activity. Altogether, these findings of trait reappraisal 
complement those from experimental manipulations, confirming that reappraisal recruits similar 
neural regions and is adaptive regardless of whether it is instructed or habitual.  
 
Emotion regulation and cognitive control 
Emerging evidence suggests a link between reappraisal and cognitive control (Joormann & 
Gotlib, 2010; Joormann & Siemer, 2011; McRae et al., 2012; Sheppes & Meiran, 2008). For 
example, a study by Sheppes and Meiran (2008) revealed that a delayed initiation of instructions 
to downregulate emotions with reappraisal tapped into self control resources, as reflected in 
diminished performance in a test of cognitive control (Stroop task) at a later testing point. By 
contrast, upregulation of negative emotions with reappraisal resulted in improved Stroop 
performance and an elevated LPP (Moser, Most, & Simons, 2010). Using a negative affective 
priming task, Joormann and Gotlib (2010) reported that  trait reappraisal was positively 
associated and trait suppression negatively associated with inhibition of negative material. In 
negative priming tasks consecutive trial pairs are presented, with one of these trials being the 
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prime trial and the other the test trial. On each trial, target and distracter stimuli are displayed 
(e.g. two (emotional) adjectives), whereby participants are instructed to ignore the distracter and 
respond to the target. The crucial manipulation of this paradigm is that in the so-called negative 
priming condition the valence of the distracter in the prime trial and the target in the test trial is 
identical, whereas, in the control condition, the valence of these is different. It is generally 
expected that inhibition of the distracter in the prime trial should lead to longer response 
latencies towards the target in test trials when the valence category is the same for both (i.e. the 
distracter in the prime and the target in the test trial; negative priming condition), as compared to 
when it is different (control condition).  
In another study McRae et al. (2012) tested participants on a variety of cognitive control 
tasks and examined correlations with reappraisal ability. Whereas working memory capacity, 
abstract reasoning (marginally) and set-shifting costs correlated positively with reappraisal 
ability, the Stroop cost measure and verbal ability did not. Further supporting findings are 
derived from work with other emotion regulation strategies (Gyurak et al., 2009; Schmeichel & 
Demaree, 2010; Schmeichel, Volokhov, & Demaree, 2008; Wilkowski, Robinson, & Troop-
Gordon, 2010), suggesting that, more generally, emotion regulation and cognitive control may be 
closely interwoven and may rely on common underlying neural mechanisms (e.g. McRae et al., 
2010). Taken together these findings confirm that there is a connection between emotion 
regulation and cognitive control. 
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Interaction of neuroticism and emotion regulation (reappraisal) 
Even though neuroticism and reappraisal both exhibit links to cognitive control, it seems likely 
that they each exert unique roles in this regard. Indeed, some work suggests that emotion 
regulation mediates the impact of neuroticism (Muris, Roelofs, Rassin, Franken, & Mayer, 2005; 
Wang, Shi, & Li, 2009). To that effect, Wang et al. (2009) reported that reappraisal (but not 
suppression) mediated the relationship between neuroticism and self-reported positive versus 
negative affect. Similarly, Muris et al. (2005) presented results showing that the impact of 
neuroticism on anxiety and depression may be operating through effects on two maladaptive 
emotion regulation strategies (rumination and worry) (see also Verstraeten, Bijttebier, Vasey, & 
Raes, 2011). By contrast, other work has put forward the idea that emotion regulation moderates 
(i.e. buffers) the effect of neuroticism (Auerbach, Abela, & Ringo Ho, 2007; Troy & Mauss, in 
press; Troy, Wilhelm, Shallcross, & Mauss, 2010). In line with this work, Troy & Mauss (in 
press) suggest that the link between stress and resilience is moderated by cognitive reappraisal. 
This proposal is corroborated by findings from Troy et al. (2010). These researchers found that 
reappraisal ability moderated the association between high stress levels and symptoms of 
depression, whereby high (versus low) reappraisal levels were associated with lower symptom 
levels in response to high (but not low) stress. In addition, Robinson and colleagues (Ode, 
Robinson, & Wilkowski, 2008; Ode & Robinson, 2009; Robinson, 2007) have reported that 
agreeableness, which they argue is related to emotion regulation, moderates the association 
between neuroticism and negative affective processing tendencies, such as anger or depression. 
Furthermore, results from Auerbach, Abela and Ringo Ho (2007) indicated that, subsequent to an 
exacerbation (relative to a reduction) of depression or anxiety symptoms, individuals with high 
neuroticism and low emotional repair exhibited more frequent risk taking behaviours. The 
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authors also reported that the level of risk taking was reduced when, holding the other factors 
equal, participants were high in emotional repair, which was attributed to increased practice in 
ameliorating negative mood states or isolation effects. Yet, some work from the developmental 
literature advocates that attentional control or effortful control moderate the relationship between 
neuroticism or negative affect and psychological difficulties (Meesters, Muris, & Rooijen, 2007; 
Muris, 2006; Rothbart & Bates, 2006; Rothbart & Posner, 2006; see also Robinson, 2007) – 
effortful control is a temperament factor encompassing aspects of cognitive and attentional 
control (Muris, 2006). Overall, these findings demonstrate that emotion regulation mediates as 
well as moderates the relationship between neuroticism and maladaptive outcomes (e.g. 
symptoms of depression), with attentional control also playing a potential moderating role of this 
relationship.  
It has also been shown that cognitive control moderates the effect of neuroticism on 
negative outcomes. This begs the questions to what degree emotion regulation and cognitive 
control represent common underlying mechanisms and to what extent they interact. A study by 
Moser, Most and Simons (2010) shed some light on this issue, showing that up-regulating 
negative emotion by means of reappraisal decreased subsequent Stroop interference and 
modulated the sustained potential. The sustained potential, in this study, was reflective of peak 
activity in the temporal window of 750 to 900 ms following Stroop-onset and has generally been 
linked to cognitive control (Lansbergen, Van Hell, & Kenemans, 2007; West, Jakubek, Wymbs, 
Perry, & Moore, 2005; West, 2003). These results, along with the findings above, indicate, 
somewhat tentatively, that the association between neuroticism and cognitive control may be 
moderated by reappraisal – this idea could also account for the mixed findings in the literature 
concerning this association. This topic will be further investigated in this thesis. 
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Summary  
Depending on the nature of the task, threat can either enhance or impair performance. Similar 
tendencies are found in high anxious individuals who can also detect threat when presented 
unconsciously. It seems that such effects in anxiety partly arise from both faster shifts towards 
and slower disengagement from threatening material. Theoretical models posit a general 
vigilance towards threat in anxiety, which is particularly prominent in scenarios of mild threat 
and competing cues and is often observed even when stimuli are presented outside of awareness 
(Bishop, 2007; Mathews et al., 1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998). According to these 
models, such attentional bias can, to some extent, be countered by voluntary control 
mechanisms. It is assumed that a prefrontal-amygdala network controls threat processing and is 
dysfunctional in anxiety (Bishop, 2007). A related framework is proposed for cognitive control 
whereby high threat stimuli as well as some individual differences can impact on cognitive 
control mechanisms and a common resource pool, thus affecting performance (Pessoa, 2009). 
This proposition is generally supported by behavioural (i.e. cognitive control) and physiological 
(i.e. LPP) work, with the exception perhaps for the shifting component of cognitive control. The 
measures of anxiety employed in much of this research overlap with neuroticism, the latter of 
which might therefore be a suitable alternative measure.  Neuroticism is related to emotional 
disorders, to impaired threat processing, to mental noise, to several neurotransmitters (e.g. 
GABA) and genetic variation thereof as well as to emotion regulation at behavioural and neural 
levels.  
Reappraisal is an adaptive emotion regulation strategy, leading to positive outcomes at 
behavioural, physiological and neural levels, and this is irrespective of whether its use is 
explicitly instructed or habitual. It can reduce the impact of threat on cognitive resources and 
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performance, recruiting the frontal network to exert its regulatory function. There is evidence 
that both emotion regulation and neuroticism are linked to cognitive control. The latter 
association (i.e. neuroticism versus cognitive control) is somewhat inconsistent in the literature 
and might be affected by (1) intra-individual variability of performance, (2) cognitive load, (3) 
the affective nature of a task and (4) be moderated by reappraisal. The latter possibility (4) also 
seems consistent with theoretical models of threat processing, which propose that the impact of 
anxiety on performance can be moderated by voluntary control (Bishop, 2007; Mathews et al., 
1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998). 
 
Aims of the thesis 
In line with neurocognitive models of threat processing (Bishop, 2007; Mathews et al., 1997; 
Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Pessoa, 2009) as well as the mental noise hypothesis (Robinson 
& Tamir, 2005), I have set out to investigate several key questions in this thesis. It was of 
interest to examine, across a series of different affective cognitive control tasks, the influence of 
threatening material on performance under high versus low task demands (Word-Face Stroop 
and - Flanker tasks, see below) and in the presence of one or more stimulus cues (Stop signal 
task, see below). Furthermore, it was sought to establish to what degree i) neuroticism is related 
to intra-individual variability in performance (RT SDs), ii) neuroticism is related to the affective 
nature of a task and iii) its influence on threat processing is moderated by voluntary control skills 
such as reappraisal.  
 To this end, I have developed affective versions of a number of well-known cognitive 
control tasks that all tap into the inhibition component of cognitive control, specifically 
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Response-Distractor Inhibition (Friedman & Miyake, 2004). This type of inhibition consists of 
two closely linked functions that may have a common underlying inhibitory mechanism: (1) 
Prepotent Response Inhibition, “the ability to deliberately suppress dominant, automatic, or 
prepotent responses” and (2) Resistance to Distractor Interference, “the ability to resist or resolve 
interference from information in the external environment that is irrelevant to the task at hand” 
(Friedman & Miyake, 2004, p. 104). It is generally important using several tasks to measure 
components of cognitive control to circumvent the problem of “task impurity” (i.e. where a 
particular ‘inhibition’ task taps into multiple, potentially confounding, processes in addition to 
the process of interest). Hence, for each of these two related functions (numbered 1 and 2 above) 
I have developed two tasks, resulting in four different paradigms. In particular, I devised 
affective Face-Flanker (2)
2
, Word-Face Stroop (1), Word-Face Flanker (2) and Stop-Signal (1) 
paradigms. Each of these tasks included angry and happy stimuli and was run (except the first 
task) with two versions: one where emotion was task-relevant and another where it was task-
irrelevant. Briefly, the Flanker tasks involved affective targets (faces or words) that were flanked 
by facial expressions of emotion presented to the left and/or right of the target stimulus. Targets 
and flankers could be compatible (i.e. they both expressed the same emotion) or incompatible 
(i.e. they both expressed different emotions). Although some Flanker studies using affective 
material have already been published (Fenske & Eastwood, 2003; Ochsner, Hughes, Robertson, 
Cooper, & Gabrieli, 2009), these employed schematic facial expressions or word stimuli. 
However, except for one conference presentation (Palermo & Coltheart, 2004a) there have been 
                                               
2 The numbers denote which of the two inhibitory functions, (1) Prepotent Response Inhibition and (2) Resistance to 
Distractor Interference, a particular task maps onto according to the taxonomy used by Friedman and Miyake 
(2004). Although the authors initially categorized tasks conforming with this taxonomy, their findings revealed that 
(1) and (2) were strongly associated, as discussed in the main text. Hence, the distinction used here is based on the 
initial theoretical, rather than empirical, rationale of these researchers, focussing on the processes that these tasks 
predominantly (but not necessarily exclusively) seem to tap into. 
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no published scientific reports of Flanker studies using photographic emotional expressions as 
both targets and flankers (affective Face-Flanker paradigm). This is somewhat surprising in light 
of the finding that emotion and face recognition seem to be automatic (Lavie, Ro, & Russell, 
2003; Tracy & Robins, 2008), with threatening distracters being particularly salient (Bishop, 
2007; Mathews et al., 1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998). There have been propositions of 
capacity limits for face processing (Bindemann, Burton, & Jenkins, 2005), but these have only 
been tested with neutral faces. A novel contribution of the Face-Flanker paradigm is therefore to 
specifically test the effect of emotion in a face flanker paradigm with photographic expressions 
of emotion. This is important as such stimuli can be considered to possess higher ecological 
validity (e.g. Horstmann & Bauland, 2006) and are frequently utilised in emotion research. 
Similarly for the affective Word-Face Flanker task, although there have been reports of such 
tasks using neutral material (Bindemann et al., 2005), this paradigm, to the author’s knowledge, 
has not been tested with affective material yet. A particular strength of this paradigm is that 
careful attention was paid to matching the word stimuli on a large number of lexical criteria, 
thereby controlling for possible confounding explanations of the results based on lexical factors, 
something that is often not followed with sufficient rigor in other research (see Larsen et al., 
2006 for a related criticism regarding the Stroop paradigm).  
The Word-Face Stroop paradigm was comparable in principle to the Flanker tasks, only 
that this time the targets (words) were overlaid on the distracters (faces) – targets and distracters 
were also compatible or incompatible in content as in the Flanker tasks. For each of these three 
tasks (Flanker and Stroop tasks) a measure of emotional interference (cost) was then obtained by 
contrasting response latencies of incompatible versus compatible trial-types (see Chapters 2-4, 
Results). Although affective Word-Face Stroop tasks have been reported previously (Etkin, 
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Egner, Peraza, Kandel, & Hirsch, 2006; Haas, Omura, Constable, & Canli, 2006; Haas et al., 
2007; Preston & Stansfield, 2008; Stenberg et al., 1998), these studies have either not or only 
sparsely controlled for lexical confounding factors. This potential problem was extensively 
addressed in this study, by controlling for a large number of lexical characteristics of the word 
targets.  
In the Stop-Signal paradigm a face target was presented on each trial. On the majority of 
all trials (75%) participants needed to make a binary response (e.g. whether the target is pleasant 
or unpleasant); on the remainder of the trials (25%) a stop signal appeared in the form of a blue 
rectangle and participants needed to withhold their responses. This permitted computation of 
response latencies on trials where participants pressed a button (Choice Reaction Time; CRT) as 
well as, on stop signal trials, the stop signal reaction time (SSRT), a measure of response 
inhibition (see Chapter 5, Methods). In previous stop signal paradigms, affective material either 
served as task-irrelevant information (Sagaspe, Schwartz, & Vuilleumier, 2011; Verbruggen & 
De Houwer, 2007; Wilkowski, 2012) or as stop signals (Pessoa, Padmala, Kenzer, & Bauer, 
2012; Wilkowski, 2012), with emotion not affecting behavioural performance when task-
irrelevant unless combined with high trait emotionality (e.g. trait anger). However, there have 
been no reports yet, examining the effect of task-relevant emotional targets on stop signal 
performance. Indeed, the author is not aware of any published records where task-relevance was 
systematically varied in affective Word-Face Flanker/Stroop as well as Stop signal paradigms, 
which would be an important test and extension of relevant models of threat processing (Bishop, 
2007; Mathews et al., 1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Pessoa, 2009). 
 Each of these four tasks has been allocated one chapter in this thesis and more detailed 
descriptions of the tasks and the relevant associated scores are provided in the corresponding 
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chapters. This design, involving experimental variations in task-relevance, enabled calculation of 
emotional interference (cost) when attention was directed towards (task-relevant) or away from 
(task-irrelevant) emotional content and served as a manipulation of task demand for the Stroop 
and Flanker tasks (see Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mathews et al., 1997). It has been shown 
in previous research that task goals, such as categorizing the gender versus the colour of an 
affective stimulus, can modulate emotional interference (Van Dillen, Lakens, & Den Bos, 2011). 
For the stop signal tasks this manipulation of task-relevance served a different purpose. Here, it 
was of interest to examine whether one cue (i.e. emotion task-relevant) was sufficient to obtain 
interference effects from emotion or whether, as Mathews and colleagues maintain (Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 1998; Mathews et al., 1997), a minimum of two cues is required (e.g. gender task-
relevant and emotion task-irrelevant). In this respect the Stop signal task where emotion is task-
irrelevant could be considered comparable to the traditional affective word Stroop paradigm, 
with a neutral target (here: gender) and an emotional distractor (here: emotion).  
In terms of the research goal concerning individual differences (aim ii) above), the 
outcome measures of the affective cognitive control tasks were correlated with self-report 
measures of reappraisal and neuroticism in order to clarify which type of cognitive / emotional 
control is associated with these traits. Moreover, I tested whether neuroticism and emotion 
regulation interacted in predicting threat appraisal, as measured by the aforementioned cognitive/ 
emotional control tasks (aim iii) above). Previous work has found that attentional control can 
reduce the impact of emotional distracters (Peers & Lawrence, 2009). However, it has not yet 
been examined to what degree other types of voluntary control, such as reappraisal, may affect 
the cognitive control of emotional information respectively may moderate the association 
between neuroticism and threat appraisal. It is this latter interaction that will be explored in this 
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thesis by manipulating threat appraisal in a number of different affective cognitive control 
paradigms. To date, there have been no studies reporting a systematic examination of this issue 
across a large number of such tasks. Indeed, although abundant evidence has been accumulated 
on the effect of anxiety and threatening material on spatial (and more recently temporal) 
attention (Mathews, Mackintosh, & Fulcher, 1997; Mogg & Bradley, 1998, 1999; Pourtois et al., 
in press; Vuilleumier, 2005), the number of studies examining the effect of threat or anxiety on 
cognitive control is relatively sparse (Pessoa, 2009; Verbruggen & De Houwer, 2007; Zetsche et 
al., 2012). This is particularly true for neuroticism whose nature and origin requires further 
clarification (Lahey, 2009; Ormel et al., 2013). At the same time evidence has implicated 
neuroticism as one of the key factors in a wide range of clinical disorders, attesting to its 
significance in public health (Kotov, Gamez, Schmidt, & Watson, 2010; Lahey, 2009; Ormel et 
al., 2013). An improved understanding of neuroticism and its boundary conditions can therefore 
have profound implications for this sector. Additionally, with emotion dysregulation being 
strongly linked to mental disorders (Aldao et al., 2010; Gross & Munoz, 1995), the regulation of 
emotion has become an integral part of most modern psychotherapies (e.g. Beck, Rush, Shaw, & 
Emery, 1979). It is therefore particularly promising to test the effect of reappraisal, a beneficial 
emotion regulation strategy (Gross, 2002), on threat behavior, which has only recently begun to 
receive attention from other researchers (e.g. Blechert et al., 2012).  
Further novel contributions of this work include the comprehensive investigation, across 
several cognitive control paradigms, of task-relevance on emotion processing in the light of 
individual differences. In particular, unique to the approach taken in this thesis is that I not only 
examine the links between individual differences and mean RT performance to threat, but that I 
also look at the corresponding intra-individual variability in RT performance in that regard 
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(mental noise hypothesis). This has not been reported before with such a broad range of 
cognitive control tasks where task-relevance of threat is varied. This work can therefore usefully 
test and extend existing models of threat processing (Bishop, 2007; Mathews et al., 1997; 
Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Pessoa, 2009) by investigating the role of task-relevance, 
emotional and regulatory traits (neuroticism and reappraisal) and their interaction on threat 
processing. Specifically, such models tend to focus on mean performance, but not the intra-
individual variability thereof, which thus poses a crucial extension. 
Another novel contribution, something that up to now has received comparatively little 
attention in the research community, includes that effect sizes have consistently been reported in 
all experiments of this thesis, thereby providing, unlike p-values, a true measure of the 
experimental effects independent of sample size (Hentschke & Stüttgen, 2011).  
The above evidence and the tasks used in this thesis, lead to the following predictions. 
That is, Pessoa (2009) hypothesizes that high threat leads to impaired performance. The 
Mathews and Mackintosh model (Mathews et al., 1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998), in turn, 
predicts that the impact of threat on performance is strongest when it functions as a distractor and 
when the stimulus display involves more than one cue. These predictions will be tested by 
examining the difference in RT performance between threatening versus non-threatening targets 
as well as distracters.  
The Mathews and Mackintosh model further leads to the prediction that increased task 
demand reduces any emotional distraction effects. This hypothesis will be explored with the 
gender decision tasks of the Word-Face Stroop and - Flanker tasks, where emotion constitutes 
task-irrelevant information. Specifically, it will be examined in these tasks if threatening versus 
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non-threatening distracters lead to greater interference effects (costs). Altogether then, the 
hypotheses outlined until this point will serve as a test of principle of whether the models’ 
predictions can be extended to encompass the novel affective cognitive control paradigms 
developed for this thesis. 
It can also be expected from the Mathews and Mackintosh model that the higher the level 
of trait neuroticism (anxiety), the more threatening material will interfere with performance. 
Similarly, in line with the mental noise hypothesis (Robinson & Tamir, 2005), I predict that 
increased levels of neuroticism are associated with greater intra-individual variability in 
performance towards threatening information. For the Stroop and Flanker tasks, this will be 
tested by running correlation analyses between the trait measures (especially neuroticism and 
reappraisal) and the cost scores (based on RTs and RT SDs). For the Stop signal task difference 
scores will be created for CRTs, CRT standard deviations (CRT SDs) and SSRTs (angry minus 
happy trial types; see Chapter 5, Results, for further details); these scores will then be correlated 
with the relevant trait measures. Except for the Stroop task (Haas et al., 2007), this, to the 
author’s knowledge, has not been directly tested with the other affective cognitive control 
paradigms (Flanker and Stop signal) before. Particularly, only a few studies have examined the 
link between neuroticism and RT SDs in tasks involving affective material (e.g. Robinson & 
Tamir, 2005) and this has not been done for any of the paradigms presented in this thesis. 
The Mathews and Mackintosh model further predicts that the association between 
neuroticism and threat appraisal (mean RTs) can be moderated by voluntary control mechanisms 
such as reappraisal or attentional control. Based on this rationale, I have generated an equivalent 
hypothesis in terms of the mental noise hypothesis, using RT SDs. So, I would expect that the 
link between neuroticism and threat appraisal (RT SDs) is moderated by the above voluntary 
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control skills. There have been no studies that have tested the potential moderating role of 
positive emotion regulation skills such as reappraisal, which is a suitable factor for interventions 
(Beck et al., 1979; Gross, 2002), on this association. Importantly, such boundary conditions have 
not been tested for the relationship between neuroticism and intra-individual performance 
variability. 
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Chapter 2: Selective attention to facial emotion in a Flanker Paradigm  
Introduction. 
 
The Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) is a conflict paradigm where participants 
focus on and make a decision about a target stimulus which is flanked by nearby distracting 
stimuli (flankers) that need to be ignored. The crucial conditions of a typical flanker letter task 
can be illustrated with the following letter arrays: (1) H H H or (2) H T H. Here, the letter in the 
middle of these arrays is the target and is enclosed by the flankers, which are task irrelevant and 
should be ignored. The general finding is, that participants exhibit difficulties avoiding 
processing the flankers, despite instructions not to. In particular, it is observed that when target 
and flankers are different (i.e. incompatible; see (2)) participants show slowed response latencies 
compared to when the target-flanker pair is identical (compatible; see (1)). This slowing effect 
on incompatible trials is presumed to arise, amongst others, from stimulus conflict, denoting a 
mismatch between target and distracter stimuli, as well as response competition, where target 
and distracter cues are associated with two opposing responses; on compatible trials such 
competition does not arise as target and distracter cues are matched respectively are mapped onto 
the same response (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; Wager et al., 2005). The difference in response 
latencies between compatible versus incompatible trial types is known as the flanker 
compatibility effect. Although the flanker compatibility effect is modulated by factors such as 
stimulus size, inter-stimulus distance, pre-cues and category membership (e.g. Paquet & Craig, 
1997), it is generally found to be a robust behavioural effect – as noted by Rouder and King 
(2003), for example. More recently, researchers have reported emotional variants of the flanker 
task; instead of letters such studies have utilised emotional face stimuli (e.g. Fenske & Eastwood, 
2003; Palermo & Coltheart, 2004). Relevant to this work is an emerging literature suggesting 
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capacity limits in face processing in the flanker paradigm (e.g. Bindemann, Burton, & Jenkins, 
2005; Brebner & Macrae, 2008; Palermo & Rhodes, 2002). However, such capacity limits have 
only been demonstrated with fairly neutral face stimulus sets, but not yet for facial expressions of 
emotion. Indeed, emotional faces are generally recognized automatically (Tracy & Robins, 2008) 
and especially threatening distracters are known to impair performance (see e.g. Bishop, 2007; 
Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mathews et al., 1997). Moreover, a study by Lavie, Ro, and 
Russell  (2003) indicated that neutral face flankers show a strong interference effect that is not 
affected by perceptual load, suggesting that face processing is automatic. Given the automaticity 
of face processing and emotion recognition as well as the general interference effects found with 
threatening distracters, it is possible that an emotional face flanker task yields flanker 
compatibility effects. Indeed, although modulated to some degree by context, this is just what 
Palermo and Coltheart (2004) found in their study using facial expressions of emotion (see also 
Fenske & Eastwood, 2003). 
Despite the relatively large number of cognitive flanker studies, only a limited number of 
studies concerning an emotional version of the flanker task are available. For example, Ochsner, 
Hughes, Robertson, Cooper and Gabrieli (2009) conducted an fMRI study using a cognitive and 
affective word flanker task. They found that in both conflict tasks common brain regions were 
activated, including the bilateral dorsal anterior cingulate, posterior medial frontal, and 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortices. Some regions were activated dependent on the conflict type, 
however, with the rostral medial prefrontal cortex being recruited in the affective condition and 
the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex in the non-affective (cognitive) condition. Furthermore, 
Fenske and Eastwood (2003) reported an affective flanker study where they presented 
participants with positive, negative and neutral schematic faces.  The authors demonstrated that 
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the flanker effect is modulated by emotion. Specifically, the results of their final experiment 
(experiment 2) showed that the magnitude of the flanker compatibility effect for negative targets 
was smaller than that of neutral or positive targets; the effect for neutral targets, in turn, was 
smaller compared to positive targets. These findings support the notion that threatening 
distracters are linked with elevated interference effects (see e.g. Bishop, 2007; Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 1998; Mathews et al., 1997). However, some work has also questioned Fenske and 
Eastwood's (2003) interpretation of emotional modulation of the flanker compatibility effect on 
the grounds of the perceptual characteristics of the schematic faces (Horstmann, Borgstedt, & 
Heumann, 2006). 
 In an attempt to replicate Fenske and Eastwood's (2003) study – experiment 2 in 
particular – I devised a similar task, but this time using photographic images of facial 
expressions, which have higher ecological validity than schematics (e.g. Horstmann & Bauland, 
2006). In our experiment we presented participants with angry, happy or neutral facial 
expressions as targets and flankers. Participants’ task was to judge the emotion of the target face 
whilst ignoring the flankers.  
 Based on (Mathews et al., 1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Pessoa, 2009) I expected 
that angry material impairs performance. Moreover, I predicted that greater interference from 
threatening material as well as greater intra-individual variability would be associated with 
elevated levels of neuroticism. However, it was expected that these associations would be 
moderated (i.e. buffered) by reappraisal and/or attentional control skills. 
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Methods. 
Participants 
 
Participants were recruited, in exchange for course credit, through the Research Participation 
Scheme of the School of Psychology, Cardiff University. This is an online experimental 
management system (EMS) used for advertising experiments and recruiting participants based at 
Cardiff University. The study had been approved by the local Research Ethics committee and 
each volunteer provided written informed consent to take part – this applies to all studies 
reported in this thesis. Participants were 18 students (2 males) and had a mean (SD) age of 21.2 
(5.0) years (range: 19-38); other studies of cognitive control have used comparable sample sizes 
and have informed the choice for this particular sample size (Bellgrove et al., 2006; Cai, George, 
Verbruggen, Chambers, & Aron, 2012; Chambers et al., 2006, 2007; Verbruggen, Aron, Stevens, 
& Chambers, 2010). Students have been tested in a large number of similar studies (Bredemeier 
et al., 2011; Haas et al., 2008, 2007; Logan et al., 1997; Paelecke et al., 2012; Robinson & 
Tamir, 2005; Tamir et al., 2006) and were hence, as well as due to their associated ease of 
recruitment, the population of choice for all experiments presented in this thesis (although see 
Sears (1986) for potential problems concerning the generalizability from student samples). This 
sample consisted predominantly of females as the majority of the available sample at the School 
of Psychology, Cardiff University, is female, thereby being a pragmatic choice. Moreover, 
research has generally shown that females exhibit superior performance in emotion recognition 
compared to males – this is therefore expected to maximise any effects of emotion in this task 
(Collignon et al., 2010; Donges, Kersting, & Suslow, 2012; Hall & Matsumoto, 2004; Hall, 
1978; Hampson, Vananders, & Mullin, 2006; but see Erwin et al., 1992; Grimshaw, Bulman-
Fleming, & Ngo, 2004; Hoffmann, Kessler, Eppel, Rukavina, & Traue, 2010; Li, Yuan, & Lin, 
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2008; Rahman, Wilson, & Abrahams, 2004 for qualifications of this effect). Each participant had 
normal or corrected-to-normal eyesight, was right-handed and had no past history of psychiatric 
disorders.  
 
Stimuli 
 
A Toshiba Satellite® Pro A200 laptop (Toshiba Information Systems Ltd., Surrey, UK) with an 
Intel® Pentium® Dual-Core™ processor (Intel corp., Santa Clara, CA) and a screen size of 39.5 
cm (15.55 inch) was used to run the experimental task. Stimulus presentation and recording was 
controlled by Microsoft
®
 Visual Basic 6.0 (Microsoft Corporation, 1987–1998). 
 Stimuli were photographs of angry, happy and neutral facial expressions for three 
different female identities (MF, MO and NR) selected from the Pictures of Facial Affect (PoFA) 
database (Ekman & Friesen, 1976). Faces were chosen based on high accuracy, reaction time and 
intensity ratings reported by Palermo and Coltheart (2004). Adobe® Photoshop® version 6 
(Adobe Systems Inc., Mountain View, CA, USA) was utilised for preparation of the face stimuli. 
All faces were cropped to an identical elliptical form to remove hair, shape and background cues. 
 The fixation screen and viewing distance (62.5 cm to the screen) were kept similar across 
all experiments reported in this thesis. Fixation was comprised of a white addition symbol (+) 
that was presented in the centre of the screen. Depending on the experiment, it subtended 0.37° 
or 0.44° of visual angle in height and width respectively. Here, the experimental display 
consisted of a target face (angry, happy or neutral expression) in the centre of the screen, which 
was flanked horizontally by a pair of face stimuli (flanker faces). The flanker faces also showed 
angry, happy or neutral expressions and both always displayed the same expression on any one 
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trial. On each display target and flanker faces were either identical (compatible) or different 
(incompatible) in terms of the emotional expression. All faces presented on each trial were of the 
same identity. Face stimuli subtended 2.93° x 2.20° of visual angle (in height and width, 
respectively). The inter-elements-distance between target and flanker faces was .73° of visual 
angle. All stimuli were presented against a grey background – this colour was maintained for all 
subsequent experiments. Examples of the face stimuli sets are shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. Stimulus displays for all experimental conditions illustrated with one of the three identities that were used. Note: for neutral 
targets: incompatible affect =  incompatible angry; incompatible neutral = incompatible happy. 
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Questionnaire measures 
 
Participants completed the Short Big Five Inventory (BFI-11; Rammstedt & John, 2007), 
measuring the five-factor personality dimensions (see below), along with the Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003), an instrument assessing trait emotional 
control (see below), and the state and trait anxiety scales of the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety 
inventory (STAI; see below; Spielberger, 1983; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970). A 
number of other self-report measures were collected for the purpose of another study and are 
thus not reported here.  
 
Neuroticism and other ‘big five’ personality traits: BFI-11 
 
Neuroticism (trait negative emotionality) was measured, together with the other ‘big five’ 
personality traits (i.e. extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, openness) using a brief 
version of the ‘big five inventory’ – the BFI-11. The BFI-11 manifests an at least comparable 
predictive validity of external measures (e.g. behaviour) to the longer personality scales (Credé, 
Harms, Niehorster, & Gaye-Valentine, 2012; Thalmayer, Saucier, & Eigenhuis, 2011). 
Particularly the neuroticism scale of the BFI-11 correlates well with the BFI-44 (r = .86), whilst 
also showing good test-retest reliability (Rammstedt & John, 2007). In light of these findings as 
well as the advantages associated with brief measures (e.g. reduced testing time, avoidance of 
fatigue) the BFI-11 could be seen as a suitable measure of trait neuroticism. The BFI-11 was 
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constructed by selecting 2 (out of 8 to 10)
3
 representative items from each factor of the BFI-44 
(Rammstedt & John, 2007). The authors found an overall mean correlation of .83 between the 
BFI-11 and the BFI-44, with the BFI-11 explaining 70% of variance in the complete scale. Their 
analyses further showed a decent retest stability (overall stability coefficient: .75; stable 
variance: 56%), substantial support for discriminant validity (mean intercorrelations: .11 (range: 
.08 to .13)), a mean convergence validity with the NEO-PI-R of .67 (45% shared variance) and 
some evidence for external validation (overall convergent validity correlation: .44). The BFI-11 
(Rammstedt & John, 2007) examines participants on five factors, using a 1 (disagree strongly) to 
5 (agree strongly) rating scale. The factors comprised extraversion (i.e. “.. is outgoing, sociable”; 
“..is reserved” (reverse scored)), agreeableness (i.e. “.. is considerate and kind to almost 
everyone”; “..tends to find fault with others” (reverse scored); “.. is generally trusting”), 
conscientiousness (i.e. “..tends to be lazy“ (reverse scored); “.. does a thorough job”), 
neuroticism (i.e. “..is relaxed, handles stress well “(reverse scored); “.. gets nervous easily”) and 
openness (i.e. “..has few artistic interests “ (reverse scored); “.. has an active imagination”), with 
each item constituting a continuation of the sentence fragment “I see myself as someone who ...”. 
Items were summed to obtain an overall score for each factor, with higher scores denoting higher 
trait levels for a particular factor (here the focus was on neuroticism only: maximum score: 10; 
minimum score: 2).  
 
 
 
 
                                               
3 These numbers vary as there was not an equal number of items for each personality construct in the original BFI-
44 scale, with numbers ranging from 8 to 10 items per construct (e.g. neuroticism: 8 original items; openness: 10 
original items). 
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Habitual Emotion Regulation Styles: the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) 
 
Gross and John (2003) created a set of 10 items (the ERQ) that each specifically mapped onto 
the emotion regulation strategies of either reappraisal (e.g. “When I want to feel more positive 
emotion (such as joy or amusement), I change what I’m thinking about.”) or suppression (e.g. 
“When I am feeling positive emotions, I am careful not to express them.“) – items relating to 
positive as well as negative emotions were included for each regulation strategy. In support of 
this dual representation of the strategies, these researchers reported that intercorrelations between 
the two scales (reappraisal versus suppression) were minimal across samples (mean r = -.01). 
Moreover, their factor analyses indicated a two-factor solution, with one factor for reappraisal 
and one for suppression (positive and negative emotions were split equally across both factors). 
Each factor, as these authors demonstrated, exhibited a respectable mean internal consistency 
(reappraisal: .79; suppression: .73) and a test-retest reliability of .69 was found over a time 
interval of 3 months. Finally, Gross and John (2003) showed over a series of experiments that 
reappraisal is generally positively associated with well-being as well as numerous other facets of 
adaptive functioning at personal and social levels whereas the direction of these associations was 
the other way round (negative) for suppression (for further evidence regarding the link between 
trait reappraisal and behavioural/ neural measures, see viii) Mechanisms of emotion regulation, 
General Introduction). Responses were collected using a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree) rating scale. Items were summed for each factor and high scores indicated high trait levels 
on the relevant emotion regulation strategy (here we focussed on reappraisal; maximum score: 
42; minimum score: 6). 
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State and trait anxiety: STAI 
 
The STAI (Spielberger et al., 1970; Spielberger, 1983) involves two main scales of 20 items 
each, one measuring state and the other trait anxiety. The former scale assesses participants’ 
feelings at a particular time point (e.g. “I feel calm” (reverse scored); “I feel tense”), using a 4-
point rating scale (1 = “Not at all”; 2 = “Somewhat”; 3 = “Moderately so”; 4 = “Very much so”). 
The latter scale assesses how participants generally feel (e.g. “I feel satisfied with myself” 
(reverse scored); “I get a state of tension or turmoil as I think over my recent concerns and 
interests”), also on a 4-point rating scale (1 = “Almost never”, 2 = “Sometimes”, 3 = “Often”, 4 
= “Almost always”). For each scale, all 20 items are summed to yield a total score of state or trait 
anxiety, respectively (maximum score: 80; minimum score: 20) – higher scores denote higher 
levels of anxiety. Although the STAI generally manifests acceptable internal consistency and 
test-retest reliabilities (Barnes, Harp, & Jung, 2002), there are potential issues with the 
convergent and discriminant validity of this instrument (Bados et al., 2010; Bieling, Antony, & 
Swinson, 1998; Vigneau & Cormier, 2008). Given its wide use in research on attentional bias to 
threat (Bar-haim et al., 2007; Bishop, 2007; Pessoa, 2009), I decided to include this inventory for 
reasons of comparability of findings with previous research. 
 
Procedure 
 
Participants signed up on the EMS for a time of their convenience. Time slots were available 
between 7 am and 10 pm and participants made use of the full range. Upon arrival at the testing 
laboratory participants were given a verbal overview of the study by the experimenter. They 
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were then asked to read the information sheet and consent form, were provided with an 
opportunity to ask questions for clarification and, if agreeing to participate, asked to sign the 
consent form. Next, participants were given a chance to familiarise themselves with the target 
stimuli (here: target faces) and the according labels thereof and were given specific instructions 
for the experiment. This general procedure was followed in all behavioural experiments reported 
in this thesis.  
Here, participants were instructed to concentrate on the target faces on each trial, 
ignoring the flanker faces. They needed to determine whether the emotion of the target face was 
angry, happy or neutral and were asked to respond as quickly as possible whilst maintaining a 
high level of accuracy. Responses to the target faces were self-paced and could be indicated 
using the sideways and downwards pointing cursor keys – stimulus-response mapping was 
counterbalanced across participants. During training, feedback on the accuracy of their decision 
was provided at the end of each trial and participants were asked to use this to improve their 
accuracy of emotion labelling. 
There were nine unique trial types derived from the factorial combination of target 
(angry, happy, neutral) and compatibility (compatible, incompatible affect
4
, incompatible 
neutral
5
). Each trial type was repeated 12 times in every block, thus leading to an overall of 108 
trials per block (i.e. 33% compatible trials and 67% incompatible trials). This then allows a 
Flanker compatibility score to be computed (performance in incompatible minus compatible 
trials; see Chapter 1 and Introduction for further details). 
Blocks were initiated by pressing the enter button and trials were shown in random order, 
using the Rnd function in Microsoft
®
 Visual Basic 6.0 (Microsoft Corporation, 1987–1998). 
                                               
4 incompatible angry (for neutral targets) 
5 incompatible happy (for neutral targets) 
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There was one practice block (or more if necessary) and there were four experimental blocks, 
leading to a total number of trials of approximately 540 (depending on the amount of practice).  
Trials started with the presentation of the fixation cross for 508ms (32 refreshes @ 63 Hz) to 
indicate where participants should focus their gaze. After this the face stimuli were shown. Prior 
to the next trial, feedback in the form of the words “correct”/”incorrect” presented in black upper 
case letters was displayed for 603ms (38 refreshes @ 63 Hz) and there was an inter-trial interval 
(with fixation) for 1000ms (63 refreshes @ 63 Hz). With an average response time of 1 sec. per 
trial, each block lasts around 5 minutes, amounting to approximately 25 minutes of testing time 
for the Face-Flanker task. On completion of a block participants could take a break for as long as 
needed and after the first two experimental blocks, to provide an additional opportunity for rest, 
participants were asked to fill in the questionnaires. There was a full debrief at the end of the 
experiment. 
 
Results. 
 
One participant was excluded from the analyses due to technical errors with the experiment. For 
all other participants mean reaction time (RT), RT SDs, both for correct responses, and mean 
accuracy (ACC) data were computed. In line with recommendations by Ratcliff (1993) and 
Osborne and Overbay (2004), RT data were treated for outliers at (1) the individual trial level 
(i.e. “raw” RT scores) as well as (2) with regard to trial type across participants. The latter of the 
two stages accounts for atypical factors affecting a participant’s performance (e.g. poor 
concentration). (1) For any one participant those individual RT scores that were more than 2.5 
SDs from the mean RT for a particular stimulus-type were removed along with their 
corresponding ACC values. (2) Next, I computed means (SDs) across all participants for each 
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stimulus-type. Here, participants whose scores for one or more trial-types were at least 2.5 SDs 
from the mean were excluded from the analyses. At both stages of outlier removal (i.e. (1) and 
(2)) this procedure led to less than 18% of the data being discarded as extreme scores. Mean RT 
was divided by mean accuracy in order to create a new combined measure for every participant 
(adjusted RT (ART); Townsend & Ashby, 1983) that linearly accounts for speed accuracy trade-
offs. This was necessary since, in some conditions, error rates larger than 10% were found for a 
few participants. Subsequent analyses will therefore focus on this measure (ART)
6
. Data were 
also normalised using the procedure suggested by Loftus and Masson (1994). As these authors 
note, whilst this procedure does not affect the outcome of the statistical within-subjects tests, it 
removes the between-subjects variance, which is irrelevant for within-subjects analyses, on the 
error bars. For the normalisation I computed the individual subject means by taking the mean of 
all conditions for each participant. The individual subject means, in turn, were averaged across 
participants to form the grand mean. Next, the grand mean was deducted from each of the 
individual subject means, yielding a subject-deviation score for each participant. Data 
normalisation was completed by subtracting the subject-deviation score from the original ART 
score for each participant and each condition. 
I expected slower response times when faced with threatening information, particularly 
when this information acts as a distracter. Within-subjects analyses of variance (ANOVA) were 
performed with target (angry, happy, neutral) and compatibility (compatible, incompatible 
neutral, incompatible affective (angry/happy)) as factors. There was a significant main effect of 
target (F(2, 28) = 10.90, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .44), whereas the main effect of compatibility (F(2, 28) = 
                                               
6 Analyses with RT and accuracy lead to the same conclusions. ART scores were not computed for the RT SD data. 
This was because some participants obtained an accuracy of 100% for some trial-types, resulting in the 
corresponding SD to be of a score of 0. Since dividing the relevant RT SD scores by an SD of 0 (which would be a 
necessary step to obtain the ART SD score) would lead to mathematical issues, it was decided to not compute ART 
SDs for any of the experiments reported in this thesis, using RT SDs instead. 
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1.80, p = .18, ηp
2
 = .11) and the compatibility X target interaction (F(4, 56) = .36, p = .88, ηp
2
 = 
.02) were not significant. Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni correction demonstrated that 
angry targets exhibited slower ART's relative to happy targets (p = .005, 95% CI 42.39; 238.89) 
but were not significantly different from neutral targets (p = 1, 95% CI -106.44; 62.84). Happy 
targets revealed faster ART's compared to neutral targets (p = .008, -284.05; -40.83).  The means 
(standard errors; SEs) for ART are presented in Figure 7. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Mean (SE) ART identification of the target emotion for each flanker condition.  Note: 
For neutral targets: Incompatible Affect = Incompatible Happy; Incompatible Neutral = 
Incompatible Angry. 
 
 
 
In summary, happy targets showed faster ART’s than angry or neutral targets. Due to the 
lack of predicted main effects (see page 73f) for compatibility or a compatibility X target 
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interaction, tests examining individual differences, flanker costs or comparing the magnitude of 
the flanker effects across targets were not conducted. 
 
Discussion. 
 
 
The present experiment sought to investigate whether the flanker compatibility effect can be 
observed with emotional stimuli using photographic images of facial expressions. I predicted that 
angry material impairs performance. Furthermore, I expected that greater interference from 
threatening material as well as greater intra-individual variability would be associated with 
elevated levels of neuroticism, with these associations being moderated (i.e. buffered) by 
reappraisal and/or attentional control skills. However, the results suggest that happy targets 
exhibit faster ART’s compared to angry or neutral targets, with angry targets not being slower 
than neutral ones, which, against predictions, does not suggest an impairment that is unique to 
angry stimuli. Also against our expectations, no flanker compatibility effects were obtained, with 
angry faces in particular not creating increased interference effects. Hence no individual 
difference analyses were carried out.  
There are several possibilities that may explain our findings. Firstly, Bindemann, Burton 
and Jenkins (2005) suggested that the face processing capacity is limited to one face per display. 
In my task this capacity limit may have been exceeded (I had three faces per display). It seems 
plausible that when participants focussed on the target face they had already reached their 
capacity limit and therefore did not have sufficient resources available to process the flanker 
faces, which would, in turn, explain the absence of significant flanker compatibility effects. 
Secondly, the superior performance of happy targets in our task is in line with previous research 
where happy faces are generally found to have faster RT and higher ACC (see Palermo and 
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Coltheard, 2004). This could be consistent with Pessoa's (2009) Dual-competition model which 
argues that low arousing emotional stimuli have enhanced early sensory representations and 
thereby improve behavioural performance when task-relevant. Indeed, prior neuroimaging 
evidence has shown enhanced early visual cortex activation for happy relative to neutral faces 
(Pessoa, 2009). This superiority effect might be driven by the perceptually salient features of 
happy faces, including the comparatively large proportion of white in the mouth region of these 
expressions (e.g. Calvo and Nummenmaa, in press). It could be argued that such differences in 
emotion recognition may have contributed to the lack of flanker compatibility effects (e.g. 
perhaps individual differences in emotion recognition ability created additional noise in our data, 
making it more difficult to detect flanker effects). Thirdly, previous research has shown that 
flanker compatibility effects are affected by stimulus size and precues (e.g. Paquet and Craig, 
1997). For example, our stimuli were larger than those of Fenske and Eastwood (2003), who 
used schematic faces, to facilitate emotion recognition. However, it could be that reducing the 
size of our stimuli somewhat would increase flanker compatibility effects.  
It is also possible that the relatively low proportion of compatible trials in this experiment 
(33%) contributed to the lack of compatibility effects. Studies have shown that a low rate of 
compatible (combined with a high rate of incompatible) trials in a task can substantially reduce  
interference effects (Casey et al., 2000; Crump, Gong, & Milliken, 2006; Crump, Vaquero, & 
Milliken, 2008; Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979; Lowe & Mitterer, 1982; West & Baylis, 1998). Hence, 
the low proportion of compatible trials in this task may have prevented a prepotent response 
tendency to be build up for these trials. This explanation could be examined in future studies by 
systematically manipulating the proportion of compatible trials.   
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It should also be noted that despite research suggesting that females exhibit superior 
emotion recognition performance compared to males (Collignon et al., 2010; Donges et al., 
2012; Hall & Matsumoto, 2004; Hall, 1978; Hampson et al., 2006), some evidence indicates that 
this is dependent on the gender of the cue, with women being particularly efficient at recognizing 
male faces (Erwin et al., 1992; Rahman et al., 2004). It is therefore conceivable that the selection 
of female faces for this study may have dampened any potential facilitatory effects in emotion 
recognition that would otherwise (i.e. using male faces) be observed with female participants. 
Another potential shortcoming of this study concerns the sample size. Although the sample size 
was informed by other studies of cognitive control in the field (Bellgrove et al., 2006; Cai et al., 
2012; Chambers et al., 2006, 2007; Verbruggen et al., 2010), none of these studies involved 
emotional material. Indeed, Fenske and Eastwood (2003) recruited 48 participants for a 
comparable Flanker design with schematic expressions of emotion. The relatively low sample 
size in this experiment may thus not have provided sufficient power to detect the, perhaps more 
subtle, effects of emotion on Flanker interference. Still, one way to circumvent the issue of 
power might have been to run a Bayesian t-test or ANOVA. 
Mathews et al. (1997) stipulate that attentional bias to threat increases exponentially, with 
the bias being particularly strong at higher levels of anxiety; bias effects at lower levels of 
anxiety may therefore not always be prominent. For this study a non-clinical sample was taken. 
Such samples are comparatively easy to recruit in larger numbers and have the advantage that 
performance is not affected by concurrent medication, as is often the case in patient research. 
However, at the same time this poses the difficulty that participant’s levels of 
anxiety/neuroticism may not have been sufficiently high or varied to elicit the attentional bias 
found in individuals with elevated levels on these traits. One way to, at least partly, address this 
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in future research could be to induce state anxiety in participants (see e.g. Macleod & Mathews, 
1988), whilst it would also be of interest to test whether the capacity limits in face processing 
(Bindemann et al., 2005) are attenuated in clinical anxiety, with, in this case and as predicted, 
threatening distracters impairing performance. The current findings do not allow any direct 
conclusions in this respect (i.e. state anxiety/ clinical samples). 
In conclusion then, our results support previous research on face processing capacity (e.g. 
Bindemann, Burton and Jenkins, 2005; Brebner and Macrae, 2008) by showing that flankers may 
not be processed in an emotion identification task where more than one real face is presented on 
each trial. These results could also lend support to the notion that threatening distracters do not 
always affect performance. Specifically, this might be in line with the idea that increased task 
demands (here: possibly manifest through capacity limits in face processing) may reduce 
attentional bias to threat, as postulated by Mathews and Mackintosh (Mathews et al., 1997; 
Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998). However, these findings challenge existing accounts of threat 
processing in that threat may not always uniquely lead to specific enhancements or impairments 
in performance (e.g. Pessoa, 2009). Some caution should, however, be exerted in the 
interpretation of these findings as it is possible that they were influenced by differences in 
emotion recognition (Palermo and Coltheard, 2004), the low sample size, the low proportion of 
compatible trials (Casey et al., 2000; Crump et al., 2006, 2008; Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979; Lowe 
& Mitterer, 1982; West & Baylis, 1998), or the specific characteristics of our stimuli (e.g. 
stimulus size, Paquet and Craig, 1997 or the use of female faces in a sample of mainly female 
participants, see Erwin et al., 1992; Rahman et al., 2004)). Whilst the current chapter examined 
the effects of threat in a distracter interference paradigm, the following chapter will more closely 
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test the impact of personality and threat in a distracter interference paradigm involving a 
prepotent response (Word-Face Stroop task). 
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Chapter 3: Selective attention to emotion in a Stroop paradigm  
Introduction. 
 
The Stroop paradigm (MacLeod, 1991; Stroop, 1935) is one of the most well known cognitive 
control tasks. In its frequently used format participants are presented with colour words (e.g. red) 
that are either displayed in a font colour matching the semantic meaning of the word (compatible 
trial, here: red font colour) or in a font colour that differs from the semantic meaning 
(incompatible trial, here: green font colour). Generally, participants are then instructed to name 
the font colour of a word whilst ignoring its semantic meaning. It is found that response latencies 
on compatible trials are faster compared to those of incompatible trials, which is commonly 
referred to as the Stroop interference effect. Over the years Stroop-like variations of the task 
have been devised, including an emotional word Stroop (e.g. Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 
1996), a pictorial Stroop (e.g. Lavy & van den Hout, 1993) or a word-face Stroop task (e.g. 
Egner & Hirsch, 2005; Etkin, Egner, Peraza, Kandel, & Hirsch, 2006; Kavcic & Clarke, 2000; 
Stenberg, Wiking, & Dahl, 1998). 
In the emotional word Stroop paradigm (Williams et al., 1996) emotionally relevant 
words (e.g. shark) or emotionally neutral words (e.g. pear) are presented in different colours, the 
latter of which participants need to name. It is expected that response latencies are slowed for 
emotionally salient compared to emotionally neutral words and this effect is, in turn, interpreted 
as emotional interference. As Etkin et al. (2006) noted, the emotional word Stroop task has been 
criticised for not testing emotional interference with cognitive processing, however. Instead, it 
measures the effect of emotional material on diverting attention from the primary task. This 
stems from the fact that, amongst others, the emotional words do not create response competition 
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or semantic disruption with the primary task (word colour; Algom, Chajut, & Lev, 2004). For 
these reasons the emotional interference effect assessed in the emotional word Stroop task is not 
considered equivalent to the cognitive interference effect tested in the original word Stroop task. 
In the word-face Stroop paradigm (e.g. Egner & Hirsch, 2005; Etkin et al., 2006; Kavcic & 
Clarke, 2000; Stenberg et al., 1998) these problems (i.e. lack of semantic and response conflict) 
are overcome. Here, a word (emotional or nonemotional) is overlaid on the centre of a 
photographic image of a face (emotional or nonemotional) and participants' task is to respond to 
either the face or word. The advantage of the word-face Stroop paradigm over the emotional 
word Stroop task is that the task-irrelevant stimuli can be in semantic and response conflict with 
the task-relevant stimulus set, thus making its measure of Stroop interference more comparable 
to that of the classical colour-word Stroop task. The word-face Stroop paradigm generally elicits 
strong interference effects from distractors (compared to compatible trials) in its cognitive and 
emotional versions (e.g. Egner & Hirsch, 2005; Etkin et al., 2006; Haas, Omura, Constable, & 
Canli, 2006, 2007; Kavcic & Clarke, 2000). Although differential interference effects for specific 
emotions are not consistently reported in this paradigm, there is a tendency showing that 
response latencies for task-relevant negative emotions are slower when paired with an 
incompatible emotion (positive) relative to a compatible emotion (negative) and vice versa for 
task-relevant positive emotions (see Preston & Stansfield, 2008; Stenberg et al., 1998).  
Some work has also examined the effects of task-relevance on threat processing in a 
Word-Face Stroop paradigm. Lin (2008) conducted a study where cognitive and emotional 
versions of this paradigm were contrasted. In this experiment participants discriminated the faces 
on emotion, whilst ignoring in-/compatible words of emotion (task-relevant) or gender (task-
irrelevant), and also discriminated faces on gender with in-/compatible gender (task-relevant) or 
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emotion (task-irrelevant) words as distractors. The author found interference effects of both 
emotion and gender words on face discrimination (i.e. faster response latencies for compatible 
relative to incompatible trials) when the words were task-relevant, but not when they were task-
irrelevant.  
Similar to Lin (2008) we devised a Word-Face Stroop task for the present study where 
the emotional information task-relevant versus irrelevant. Specifically, in one task participants 
were presented with angry-related, happy-related, non-emotional target word, whereas non-
gender and gender-related (male/female) targets were presented in a second task. In each task the 
target words were overlaid on a number of distracter images (i.e. angry, happy and calm facial 
expressions of both genders as well as scrambled images). Participants’ task was to identify the 
gender (male-related, female-related, non-gender) or the emotion (happy-related, angry-related, 
non-emotional) of the words whilst ignoring the faces.  
I selected calm faces as control stimuli for several reasons. Neutral facial expressions (an 
alternative stimulus set to calm faces) are commonly perceived as ambiguous in valence 
(Cooney, Atlas, Joormann, Eugène, & Gotlib, 2006) and their interpretation is easily rendered 
more negative through learned associations (Yoon & Zinbarg, 2008) or individual differences 
(Donegan et al., 2003; Somerville, Kim, Johnstone, Alexander, & Whalen, 2004). Past research 
has addressed this problem with artificially generated control stimuli, such as 25%  happy faces 
(Mourão-Miranda et al., 2012; Phillips et al., 1997, 2001). However, I opted for calm 
expressions for posing a perceptually similar, but emotionally less salient and thereby potentially 
“more neutral” alternative to neutral expressions (Tottenham et al., 2009). 
The rationale for using scrambled images, my set of non-face control stimuli, is derived 
from the face processing literature. In 1986 Bruce and Young proposed facial expression and 
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facial identity nodes as two separate entities in the face recognition system. Whereas the former 
draws on information about view-centred descriptions, the latter relies on information about 
specific facial components (featural information) and the spatial arrangement thereof 
(configurational information). These researchers later acknowledged, though, that facial 
expression and identity nodes overlap to some degree (Calder & Young, 2005; Young & Bruce, 
2011; see also Ganel & Goshen-Gottstein, 2004), suggesting that processing of facial expressions 
may indeed be affected by featural and configurational information, a conclusion that is also 
supported by some patient work (see Gagliardi et al., 2003). According to this work then, there 
are two main routes of disrupting recognition of emotional expressions: (1) changing the view-
centred descriptions of the face (e.g. by changing the orientation) and (2) impairing 
configurational and featural processing. Since it was my aim to render these control stimuli 
comparable to the affective faces, except with regard to their emotional nature, it was important 
to preserve as many other qualities of the original images as possible whilst, at the same time, 
blocking recognition of the emotional expression. The first route - i.e. (1) – would add/remove 
information to the original image and would hence not be ideal. In terms of disrupting the second 
route there seem to be several methods available, of which blurring, scrambling and inversion of 
the face are commonly used (e.g. Collishaw & Hole, 2000). Blurring is known to predominantly 
hinder featural processing (Collishaw & Hole, 2000; Schwaninger, Lobmaier, & Collishaw, 
2002), but, again, removes information from the original image (i.e. high spatial frequencies; 
Costen, Parker, & Craw, 1994) and is therefore not in line with my aims. Although face 
inversion and scrambling both impair configurational processing
7
, face scrambling can also 
reduce featural information, depending on the extent of the procedure (Collishaw & Hole, 2000) 
                                               
7 Tanaka & Farah (1993) argue that face scrambling disrupts holistic information, which in some ways is related to 
configurational processing. 
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and therefore might have a broader impact on disrupting the recognition of expressions. For this 
reason I created scrambled faces as control stimuli. In selecting a suitable pixel size for this 
procedure, I was careful to select a size that was sufficiently small to prevent any specific facial 
features (e.g. the eye) to be recognized. So, although configurational information will have been 
affected by the scrambling procedure, it is likely that featural information was also impaired at 
this level of pixilation. Another aspect that may well have been affected by the scrambling 
procedure, too, is the facial symmetry (Chen, Kao, & Tyler, 2007). Due to facial symmetry, 
configurational as well as featural processing being disrupted by the scrambling procedure (and 
the resulting impairment of expression and identity processing), scrambled images are best seen 
as approximately matched non-emotional, non-face control images. Scrambled images have been 
employed for similar purposes in previous research (Eger, Jedynak, Iwaki, & Skrandies, 2003; 
Hagan, Hoeft, Mackey, Mobbs, & Reiss, 2008; Platek et al., 2006; Seitz et al., 2008).  
We chose a gender decision as the manipulation of task-relevance (in addition to the 
emotional one) because it requires participants to process the face (something that is likely to be 
necessary for emotion recognition) rather than merely a perceptual characteristic of the stimulus 
such as whether the face was surrounded by “red” or “blue” circle (see Lavy & van den Hout, 
1993 for an example of presenting faces in a coloured circle in a Stroop task), thereby possibly 
making it more difficult to ignore the emotional aspects. An alternative decision to gender that 
also requires processing of the face is identity. Identity and emotion seem to be interdependent 
(Calder & Young, 2005; Ganel & Goshen-Gottstein, 2004), however, which could complicate 
the interpretation of our results. By contrast, although gender may affect emotion recognition 
(Atkinson, Tipples, Burt, & Young, 2005; Williams & Mattingley, 2006), the reverse effect is 
only minimal, thus making it preferable over identity.  
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I predicted that a slowing in performance should be observed for threatening information. 
Furthermore, I expected this distraction effect to be attenuated with increased task demand 
(gender decision task). I also predicted that as the level of trait neuroticism rises, interference 
from threatening material as well as intra-individual variability increase (i.e. greater 
compatibility scores – see below for further details). Finally, I expect that the influence of 
neuroticism on the appraisal of threat (based on mean response latencies and RT SD measures) is 
lessened in those with adequate reappraisal (or attentional control) skills. 
 
Methods. 
Power analyses 
 
G*Power, version 3.1.3, was used to conduct a priori power calculations (Faul, Erdfelder, 
Buchner, & Lang, 2009; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). This was done to ensure that 
this study would have sufficient experimental power to detect the main effects of interest. 
Particularly, I sought to examine (1) the simple contrast of attentional bias to threat vs. non-
threat within subjects (within-subjects t-test), (2) the association between attentional bias versus 
neuroticism (correlation) and (3) the interactions between neuroticism and emotion 
regulation/attentional control in predicting degree of attentional bias (multiple regression). Power 
calculations for each of these statistical tests are discussed in turn, with the desired levels of 
power = 0.8 and alpha = 0.05 being set at conventional levels (Noordzij et al., 2010). (1) On the 
basis of a recent meta-analysis (Bar-haim et al., 2007), the effect size for attentional bias to threat 
is d = 0.45.  Based on this effect size then, a one-tailed within-subjects t-test, comparing 
attentional bias to threat vs. non-threat, with a total sample of N = 32, would have 80% power to 
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detect an effect of this size, whereas a sample of N = 63 would have 97% power to detect such 
an effect.
8
 (2) By convention, a correlation of r = 0.3 is a small effect, and a sample of N= 64 
would have 80% power to detect a one-tailed correlation of this magnitude.  For a medium 
correlation (r = 0.5, one-tailed), then a sample of N = 21 would have 80% power. (3) Calculating 
effect sizes for multiple regression requires knowing the δ R2 value. However, I could not find 
any indications of this value for relevant studies in the literature. So, assuming a medium effect 
size for R
2 
change (effect size f
2
 = 0.15) and setting the number of tested predictors = 2 and the 
total number of predictors = 5, then a sample size of N = 68 would have the desired level of 
power to detect this (80%). In line with these considerations, I conclude that a sample of size N = 
68 should have sufficient power to yield the effects of interest. Given that the remaining studies 
of this thesis also seek to examine the above effects, similar sample sizes were selected for these, 
too, thereby ensuring adequate experimental power. 
 
Participants 
 
Participant recruitment and requirements were identical to those of the Face Flanker paradigm, 
except where noted otherwise. A total of 70 participants (35 females) were recruited for this 
experiment. Participants had a mean (SD; range) age of 21.8 (4.1; 18-47), were native speakers 
of English and were either left or right handed.  
 
                                               
8 This suggests that the sample size for the Face Flanker study (chapter 2) was likely too low. 
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Stimuli and questionnaire measures 
 
An RM™ Expert 3030 (RM plc, Milton Park, UK) with an Intel® Pentium® Dual-Core™ 
processor E2180 at 2.00 GHz (Intel corp., Santa Clara, CA) and a ViewSonic® VA1916W-2 
monitor (ViewSonic Corporation, Walnut, CA) with a screen size of 38 cm (19 inch) were used 
to run the experimental task. The experiment was administered using the Psychophysics Toolbox 
extensions running in Matlab® (MathWorks, Natick, MA; Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). 
The face stimuli were photographs of calm, angry and happy expressions (as well as 
scrambled versions thereof) selected from the NimStim set of facial expressions (Tottenham et 
al., 2009). I chose 9 Caucasian identities (4 females; models #01, 02, 03, 06, 22, 23, 24, 25, 34), 
which ensured legibility of the target words when overlaid on face and scrambled face 
distractors, respectively.  In order to match angry and happy facial expressions of emotion on 
rated arousal I selected the open-mouth (angry faces) and exuberant (happy faces) versions (see 
Tottenham et al., 2009). For calm faces the closed-mouth versions were my preferred choice to 
provide a fairly neutral and non-arousing control condition (open-mouth expressions tend to be 
more arousing as established in pilot work). My decision to use happy and angry faces was based 
on two reasons: (1) their rater agreement, intensity ratings and reaction times were relatively 
similar (Palermo & Coltheart, 2004b) and (2) a sufficiently large number of well-matched words 
corresponding to these emotions could be identified (see Stevenson, Mikels, & James, 2007).
9
 
All faces were cropped to an identical elliptical form to remove hair, shape and background cues. 
Adobe Photoshop version 6 (Adope Systems Inc., San Jose, CA) was used for stimulus 
preparation. Scrambled versions were devised for each angry and happy face based on the 
                                               
9 These criteria of stimulus selection differ slightly from those for subsequent experiments as the pilot experiment 
had not yet been completed at this stage. 
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procedure from Conway, Jones, DeBruine, Little, & Sahraie (2008). Thus, the face images were 
divided into blocks of 8 x 8 pixels, which were then randomized in order to produce the 
scrambled images. This yielded a total of 18 scrambled faces (for examples see Figures 8 and 9). 
My word stimuli were taken from the Affective Norms for English words database 
(ANEW; Bradley & Lang, 1999). The ANEW comprises a list of 1034 English words that were 
rated on the affective dimensions of valence, arousal and dominance using the Self-Assessment 
Manikin (SAM; Bradley & Lang, 1999). The SAM, initially reported by Lang (1980), consists of 
graphic representations that are arranged along 9-point bipolar scales for each of these 
dimensions. That is, for the valence dimension there are displays ranging from happy, satisfied 
figures at one end to unhappy, unpleasant ones at the other end; equivalent figures, depicting the 
relevant dimension, are presented for the other scales (arousal: figures ranging from “excited” to 
“calm”; dominance: figures varying from “dominant” to “in control”). Based on the categorical 
emotion ratings of the ANEW word list by Stevenson et al. (2007) a subset including words that 
were either assigned to the specific emotions of anger and happiness or not assigned to any 
emotional category (neutral) by both male and female raters was identified. The words from my 
neutral subset are not commonly associated with a specific gender and I therefore used these 
words for my non-gender trials, too. I also selected a set of common male and female forenames 
from UK census data (http://www.statistics.gov.uk/specials/babiesnames_boys.asp; 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/specials/babiesnames_girls.asp). Using the norms from the English 
Lexicon Project (Balota et al., 2007), all words were balanced on word length, the Kučera and 
Francis (1967) frequency norms, the log-transformed Hyperspace Analogue to Language (HAL) 
frequency norms (Lund & Burgess, 1996), orthographic neighbourhood (Coltheart, Davelaar, 
Jonasson, & Besner, 1977), the number of syllables, the mean lexical decision latency, the 
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proportion of accurate responses for a particular word in a lexical decision and in a naming task, 
and the mean naming latency. Treating each of the foregoing lexical characteristics as the 
dependent variable, I conducted Between-Subjects ANOVA’s with word type as factor (angry-
related, happy-related, neutral, male-related and female-related). None of these tests reached 
statistical significance (all ps > .1), suggesting that the different word types from my set are 
comparable on these lexical criteria. Two Between-Subjects ANOVA’s with emotional word-
type as factor (angry-related, happy-related and neutral) revealed statistically significant effects 
of arousal (F(2,23) = 43.05, p < .001, ω = .88) and valence (F(2,23) = 135.81, p < .001, ω = .96). 
Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction showed that angry (Mean = 6.64 (arousal); 
Mean = 3.05 (valence)) and happy (Mean = 6.44 (arousal); Mean = 8.14 (valence)) words 
exhibited similar arousal ratings (p = 1.0; 95% CI -.10; .61), but differed from each other on 
valence (p < .001, 95% CI 4.29; 5.90). Neutral words (Mean = 4.04 (arousal); Mean = 5.51 
(valence)) differed significantly from angry and happy words on arousal (ps < .001; 95% CIs: -
3.19; -1.58 (happy); -3.38; -1.77 (angry)) and valence (ps < .001, 95% CIs: -3.39; -1.79 (happy); 
1.70; 3.31 (angry)). Overall, these analyses yielded a final set with eight words for each word 
type (i.e. angry-related, happy-related, neutral, male-related, and female-related words; see 
appendix 2 for full list and ratings). 
The word-face Stroop stimuli were created by overlaying a word in the central area of a 
face (i.e. around the nose, which is known for not being a critical region of the face for 
recognition and discrimination of angry and happy faces (Fox & Damjanovic, 2006; Smith, 
Cottrell, Gosselin, Schyns, & Gosselin, 2005)).  Each face type (angry (male/female), happy 
(male/female), calm (male/female) and scrambled was paired with each word type (angry-
related, happy-related, neutral, male-related, and female-related words). In the emotion decision 
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task only angry-related, happy-related and neutral words were overlaid on the face stimuli, 
whereas in the gender decision task only male-related, female-related and neutral words were 
used for this purpose. The target words were capitalized in grey Arial Font (point size 30) and 
rendered in a smooth pillow emboss style to enhance their legibility (Figures 8 and 9). Stimuli 
subtended 10.96°x 7.84° of visual angle (in height and width, respectively). 
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a)  b)  
c)   d)  
 
Figure 8. Example stimulus display for the emotion decision task (no male faces shown 
due to copyright). a) compatible for angry target, b) incompatible affect for angry target, 
c) compatible for neutral target and d) incompatible scrambled for happy target. 
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a)  b)  
 
c)  d)  
 
Figure 9. Example stimulus display for gender decision task (no male faces shown due to 
copyright). a) compatible happy for female target, b) incompatible happy for male target, 
c) incompatible scrambled for female target and d) compatible scrambled for neutral 
target. 
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The same questionnaires as in the Face Flanker paradigm were used with the addition of 
several other measures, including the Attentional Control Scale (ACS; Derryberry & Reed, 2002; 
the remaining measures were for the purpose of another study and are thus not reported here). 
Broadly speaking, the ACS assesses, on a scale from 1 (almost never) to 4 (always), an 
individual’s ability to focus attention and ignore distracters; more specifically, it measures one’s 
overall capacity for attentional control (e.g. “When concentrating, I can focus my attention so 
that I become unaware of what’s going on in the room around me”; maximum score: 80; 
minimum score: 20), but can also provide measures for three subfactors (attentional focus, 
attentional shift and flexible thought control; Derryberry & Reed, 2002). My analyses 
concentrated on the overall capacity factor, which was computed by summing the scores for all 
items (i.e. high score = high attentional control). The ACS has been shown to have good internal 
reliability (i.e., α = .88) and to predict resistance to interference in Stroop-like spatial conflict 
tasks as well as attentional disengagement from threat stimuli among highly anxious people 
(Derryberry & Reed, 2002). Furthermore, Sulik et al. (2010) demonstrated that self-report and 
performance-based measures (e.g. Stroop task) of attentional control were indicators of a single 
latent attentional control construct. 
 
Procedure 
 
Participants signed up using the online EMS system in exchange for cash or course credit as in 
the Face Flanker paradigm. This procedure was also followed for all subsequent experiments. 
For the word-face Stroop task they were instructed to discriminate the target words and to ignore 
the distractor faces. Responses should be given as fast and accurate as possible and could be 
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indicated using the “c”, “v” and “b” keys – stimulus-response mapping was counterbalanced 
across participants. In the session pertaining to the emotion decision participants needed to 
determine whether the target word was “pleasant” (= happy-related10), “unpleasant” (= angry-
related) or “non-emotional” (= neutral); response labels for the gender decision task were: 
“male” (= male-related), “female” (= female-related) or “non-gender” (= neutral). These 
response labels, as opposed to labels such as “angry” or “happy”, were chosen intentionally so 
that no one target word (e.g. angry or anger) mapped or closely mapped onto the response when 
others did not (e.g. frustrated). During training, feedback on the accuracy of participants’ 
decision was provided at the end of each trial and participants were asked to use this to improve 
the accuracy of emotion/gender labelling. 
There were 12 unique trial types derived from the factorial combination of word type 
(angry-related, happy-related, neutral) and compatibility (compatible, incompatible affect, 
incompatible calm, incompatible scrambled)
11
 for the emotion decision task and 21 separate trial 
types based on the combination of word type (male-related, female-related, neutral), 
compatibility (compatible, incompatible) and emotion (angry, happy, calm
12
, scrambled
13
) for 
the gender session. In compatible trials the emotion/gender of the word type and face were part 
of the same emotion/gender category (e.g. target word: happy-related; distractor face: happy); in 
incompatible trials word type and face were not part of the same emotion/gender category (e.g. 
                                               
10 These label “descriptors” were not made explicit to participants, only those in quotes (e.g. “pleasant”, 
“unpleasant” etc.) were. 
11 For neutral target words the compatibility labels were as follows: compatible = compatible calm; incompatible 
affect = compatible scrambled; incompatible calm = incompatible angry; incompatible scrambled = incompatible 
happy. 
12 Due to calm expressions combining both emotional (calm) and gender (male, female) information, they could, in 
some cases, be both compatible (e.g. neutral target and calm (male) face) and incompatible (e.g. neutral target and 
male (calm) face) at the same time – incompatible elements are shown in parenthesis in the examples. 
13 Scrambled faces could not be assigned to a particular face gender type. 
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target word: happy-related; distractor face: angry). Over the course of the experiment there were 
288 compatible trials (33%) and 576 incompatible ones (66%), resulting in 864 trials for the 
experimental phase per session. In other words, for the emotional decision task there were 72 
trials for each of the 12 conditions. Based on this, Stroop intereference scores can be computed 
by subtracting performance on compatible trials from that of incompatible ones (see Chapter 1 
and Introduction for further details). 
The gender decision task, by contrast, consisted of 32 trials for each condition with 
female distractor faces (9 trial types), 40 trials for each condition with male distractor faces (9 
trial types) and 72 trials for each condition with scrambled distractor faces (3 trial types). Trials 
were presented in random order with the randperm function in Matlab® (MathWorks, Natick, 
MA) and every 144 trials participants were given the chance to take a break for as long as 
needed. Furthermore, for each session there was one practice block where only the word stimuli 
were displayed (to improve participants' accuracy in emotion/gender discrimination of the word 
stimuli) and another practice block consisting of a shortened version of the experimental phase 
(144 trials per practice block). Thus, participants completed 1152 trials per session (25% 
compatible trials, 50% incompatible trials; 25% of ambiguous compatibility
14
).  
Trials started with the presentation of the fixation cross for 508ms to indicate where 
participants should focus their gaze followed by the experimental stimuli. Participants' responses 
to the experimental stimuli were self-paced, but the stimuli were only shown for the duration of 
1000 ms. Prior to the next trial feedback in the form of the words “correct”/”incorrect” presented 
in white upper case letters in Courier New type (font size 25) was displayed for 603ms. The total 
time for the experimental phase of one session was therefore around 30 minutes. Participants 
were asked to complete the questionnaires in between sessions 1 and 2; sessions 1 and 2 were 
                                               
14 See footnote 10 
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run on two separate days whereby the order of the session (gender versus emotion) was 
counterbalanced. Moreover, due to the large number of stimuli with scrambled faces (i.e. each 
facial expression of emotion had a scrambled counterpart) I counterbalanced the scrambled 
stimuli for each task whereby half of the stimuli for one word type were shown to one group of 
participants and the other half to the other group. There was a full debrief at the end of the 
experiment. 
 
Results. 
1) Pre-processing for all Word-Face Stroop tasks 
Three participants were excluded due to technical errors with the experiment and one further 
participant was removed for failing to complete the second part of the study. I ran an identical 
pre-processing procedure to that of the Face-Flanker paradigm for the remaining participants 
with calculation of mean RT, RT SDs and mean ACC, outlier removal at subject and group 
levels (+/- 2.5 SD from mean; here: less than 15% of outliers) and normalisation. Due to error 
rates usually being slightly larger than 10%, I, again, computed a measure that linearly accounts 
for speed accuracy trade-offs (= ART; Townsend & Ashby, 1983). Consequently ART will be 
my measure of choice for reporting performance in the Word-Face Stroop experiment.
15
  
 
2) ANOVAs 
I predicted that a slowing in performance should be observed for threatening information, 
particularly when the threat poses distracting information. Furthermore, I expected this 
distraction effect to be attenuated with increased task demand (gender decision task). To test 
                                               
15 Largely similar trends are observed for RT and ACC data. 
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these predictions, first, a Within-Subjects ANOVA was performed on the emotion decision task 
with word type (angry-related, happy-related, neutral) and compatibility (compatible, 
incompatible affect, incompatible calm, scrambled) as factors. Results showed statistically 
significant main effects of word type (F(2, 114) = 22.13, p < .001,  ηp
2
 = .28) and compatibility 
(F(3, 171) = 26.66, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .32) as well as a word type X compatibility interaction (F(6, 
342) = 12.63, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .18). Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni correction revealed 
that all comparisons of compatibility at the different levels of word type reached statistical 
significance (p < .05), with the exception of incompatible affect versus scrambled trials for both 
angry (p = 1; 95% CI -39.35; 36.34) and happy targets (p = 1; 95% CI -37.36; 29.18) as well as 
incompatible happy versus incompatible angry (p = 1; 95% CI -33.20; 14.59) and compatible 
versus scrambled trials (p = .34; 95% CI -7.28; 43.32) for neutral targets. 
For the gender decision task, to focus on the key variables of interest, I first performed a 
2 (word type: male-related, female-related) X 2 (compatibility: compatible, incompatible) X 2 
(distractor emotion: angry, happy) Repeated-Measures ANOVA. Results showed a significant 
main effect of compatibility (F(1, 56) = 69.15, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .55), with the main effects of word 
type (F(1, 56) = 2.36, p = .13, ηp
2
 = .04) and distractor emotion (F(1, 56) = .45, p = .51, ηp
2
 = 
.01) not reaching significance. This main effect was qualified by significant word type X 
compatibility (F(1, 56) = 22.96, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .29) and word type X distractor emotion (F(1, 56) 
= 11.07, p = .002, ηp
2
 = .17) interactions; the compatibility X distractor emotion (F(1, 56) = 1.58, 
p = .21, ηp
2
 = .03) and word type X compatibility X distractor emotion (F(1, 56) = .50, p = .48, 
ηp
2
 = .009) interactions were not significant. Pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni corrected) 
revealed that compatible trial-types were significantly faster than incompatible ones for both 
male (p < .001, 95% CI -92.20; -57.84) and female (p < .001, 95% CI -55.69; -27.61) target 
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words.
16
 Moreover, whereas happy distracters slowed performance for male targets (p = .01, 
95% CI -39.61; -4.96), for female targets angry distracters slowed responses (p < .04, 95% CI -
28.95; -.67).  
Next, I conducted a full 3 (word type: male-related, female-related, neutral) X 7 
(compatibility: compatible angry, compatible happy, compatible calm, incompatible angry, 
incompatible happy, incompatible calm, scrambled) Repeated-Measures ANOVA including all 
trial-types for the gender decision task. I obtained a statistically significant main effect of 
compatibility (F(6, 336) = 19.8, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .26) as well as a word type X compatibility 
interaction  (F(12, 672) = 8.8, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .14); the main effect of word  type did not reach 
statistical significance (F(2, 112) = 1.2, p = .31, ηp
2
 = .02). Pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni 
corrected) demonstrated that for male and female target words compatible trial-types were 
significantly faster compared to incompatible trial-types of the same emotion (all ps < .01) as 
well as to scrambled trials (all ps < .001). The only exceptions to this trend were the comparisons 
of compatible calm versus incompatible calm and compatible angry versus scrambled trials (both 
for female targets), which were marginally significant (p = .11, 95% CI -66.35; 3.01) and non-
significant (p = .34, 95% CI -61.46; 7.60), respectively. Furthermore, for male target words 
incompatible happy trials were significantly different from scrambled trials (p = .03, 95% CI 
2.40; 82.99) whereas incompatible angry trials were marginally significantly different from 
incompatible calm trials for female targets (p = .06, 95% CI -.460; 54.10). Finally, for neutral 
target words performance for both compatible calm female (p = .01, 95% CI 3.53; 56.56) as well 
as incompatible happy female distracters (p = .03, 95% CI 1.43; 61.68) was significantly slower 
than that for scrambled faces while performance for incompatible angry female distracters was 
                                               
16 The interaction effects seem to be mainly due to the differences between male versus female targets at compatible 
and incompatible trial types. 
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marginally significantly slower (p = .10, 95% CI -2.24; 61.20). All other comparisons with 
respect to compatibility at neutral targets were statistically non-significant (all ps > .60). Mean 
(SE) ARTs for both emotion and gender decision tasks are shown in Figure 10. 
 
a)  
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b)  
c)  
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d)  
Figure 10. Means (SEs) for all conditions of the emotion and gender decision tasks. (a) 
emotion decision task, (b) gender decision task: female target words, (c) gender decision 
task: male target words, (d) gender decision task: neutral target words. Note: For neutral 
targets incompatible affect = incompatible happy and incompatible calm = incompatible 
angry. 
 
 
3) Individual difference analyses  
To summarise, analyses for the emotional decision task revealed strong compatibility effects, 
with performance on incompatible trial-types being slower than that on compatible ones. Of 
interest was whether threatening (i.e. angry) distracters would impair performance more than 
other distracter types. Whilst threatening targets exhibited slowed performance, this main effect 
of word type interacted with compatibility. Threat distracters were found to produce effective 
interference effects. However, they did not impair performance more than happy distracters for 
neutral targets and, crucially, happy distracters in fact slowed performance for angry targets 
more than did angry distracters for happy targets, as revealed in a direct comparison of the 
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relevant angry and happy compatibility scores (see footnote 17 for more details about the scores; 
paired-samples t-test: t(57) = 2.24, p = .03, r = .28). This suggests that, for this particular task, 
threat impairs performance when a target, but that happy (relative to angry) distracters produce a 
similar amount of interference (see results for neutral targets), if not more (see results for angry 
targets).  
For the gender decision task I found that target gender and distracter emotion interacted, 
with happy distracters impeding performance for male targets and angry distracters similarly for 
female targets. In an additional, and more elaborate, analysis of this task it was revealed for male 
and female targets that, generally, compatible trial-types were faster than the incompatible 
equivalent of the same distracter emotion. Moreover, in tendency the various compatible trials 
did not differ from each other – likewise for the incompatible ones. For neutral targets, trials with 
female distracters differed from those with scrambled distracters (this was not found for male 
distracters, which did not differ from scrambled images). In short, the main finding for the 
gender decision task is that compatible trial-types were faster than their incompatible 
counterparts of the same distracter emotion. Also, whilst distracter emotion, largely, did not 
seem to have an impact on the findings of compatibility, distracter emotion, regardless of 
compatibility, had an effect on responding to targets.  
I predicted that as the level of trait neuroticism rises, interference from threatening 
material as well as intra-individual variability increase (i.e. greater compatibility scores – see 
below for further details). Furthermore, I expected that the influence of neuroticism on the 
appraisal of threat (based on mean response latencies and RT SD measures) is lessened under 
high task demand and in those with adequate reappraisal (or attentional control) skills. I created 
Stroop interference scores for each of the various target words by subtracting the mean ART of 
103 
 
compatible from that of incompatible trials
17
, such that higher scores represented enhanced 
interference from incompatible material – analogous scores were computed for the RT SD data. 
Next, I performed a series of Pearson correlation analyses between neuroticism, attentional 
control, state and trait anxiety and reappraisal versus these Stroop interference effect measures 
(for both mean ART and RT SD scores). However, against predictions, none of these 
correlations reached statistical significance (all ps > .05). 
Using the MODPROBE macro of Hayes and Matthes (2009) for SPSS® (IBM corp., 
Armonk, NY), I probed the potential moderating/buffering effect of reappraisal and attentional 
control (M) on the relationship between neuroticism (focal predictor) and Stroop interference 
scores (i.e. emotion decision task: affective incompatible angry minus compatible angry 
(outcome variable 1) and affective incompatible happy minus compatible happy (outcome 
variable 2) for both mean ART as well as RT SD scores). In an attempt to control for potential 
confounding factors of this association either the reappraisal or the attentional control measure 
(W1) was added as a covariate (i.e. whichever of these measures did not act as a moderator in a 
particular analysis) to the regression model together with the predictors so that its possible 
impact on regression coefficient estimates could be controlled. The MODPROBE provides the 
amount of variance in the effect that is solely accounted for by the interaction; it also provides 
the squared multiple correlation for the full model, which contains the expression of the 
                                               
17 For the gender decision task the following interference scores were created: compatible neutral targets (distractor 
gender: male or female – no gender for scrambled images; distractor emotion: calm or scrambled) were subtracted 
from incompatible neutral targets (distractor gender: male or female; distractor emotion: angry or happy). Moreover, 
compatible male targets (distractor gender: male) were subtracted from incompatible male targets (distractor gender: 
female), with both minuend and subtrahend always having the same distractor emotion (i.e. angry, happy or calm) – 
this was done analogously for female targets. For the emotional decision task the compatibility scores were: (1) 
compatible angry targets (distractor emotion: angry) were subtracted from incompatible angry targets (distractor 
emotion: happy, neutral or scrambled), (2) compatible happy targets (distractor emotion: happy) were subtracted 
from incompatible happy targets (distractor emotion: angry, neutral or scrambled), (3) compatible neutral targets 
(distractor emotion: neutral or scrambled) were subtracted from incompatible neutral targets (distractor emotion: 
angry or happy). 
104 
 
interaction. In addition to generating a general regression output, the MODPROBE determines 
the impact of the focal predictor on the outcome variable at different scores of the moderator (see 
Hayes & Matthes, 2009). Predictor and moderator variables were not mean centred as this is only 
necessary for more complex models involving multiple predictors and interactions (Hayes & 
Matthes, 2009; Hayes, 2005).  By default the MODPROBE macro computes the conditional 
effects of the focal predictor at three levels of the moderator, that is at high (= + 1 SD on the 
mean), moderate (= mean) and low (= - 1 SD on the mean) scores. In order to visualize 
significant interactions the macro, in line with the foregoing procedure, divided participants in 
my study into three separate groups of high trait reappraisal, moderate trait reappraisal and low 
trait reappraisal. Counter to my predictions, however, no significant moderation effects were 
found (mean ART data: reappraisal (M): b = -.11, t(53) = -.10, p = .92 (outcome variable 1); b = 
-.18, t(53) = -.31, p = .76 (outcome variable 2); attentional control (M): b = -1.30, t(53) = 1.71,   
p = .09 (outcome variable 1); b = .51, t(53) = 1.26, p = .22 (outcome variable 2); RT SD data: 
reappraisal (M): b = .48, t(53) = 1.20, p = .24 (outcome variable 1); b = .04, t(53) = .39, p = .91 
(outcome variable 2); attentional control (M): b = .51, t(53) = .31, p = .11 (outcome variable 1); b 
= -.06, t(53) = .31, p = .85 (outcome variable 2)); exploratory analyses with the remaining Stroop 
interference measures did not yield any significant moderation effects either (all ps > .05). 
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Discussion. 
 
It was hypothesized that threatening information impairs performance, with such interference as 
well as increased intra-individual variability being particularly prominent in individuals with 
high trait neuroticism. At the same time, it was expected that attentional bias would be reduced 
under high task demand as well as for individuals of high reappraisal or attentional control skills. 
The results demonstrated that response latencies on compatible trials were faster compared to 
those of incompatible trial types. Moreover, whilst threat diminished target performance, happy 
distracters exerted at least equally strong (if not, in fact, stronger) interference effects than 
threatening material when emotion was task-relevant. In contrast, when emotion was task-
irrelevant it was found that happy distracters hindered performance for male targets, whereas 
angry distracters did so for female targets – effects of emotion on interference were not observed 
under high task demand. Against expectations, no significant links between Stroop measures and 
individual differences were revealed. 
 The finding that happy distracters slow responses to male targets and, similarly, angry 
distracters slow responses to female targets can be considered to be in line with previous 
research, which finds that male faces tend to be more readily associated with anger, whereas 
females faces tend to be related to happiness (Becker, Kenrick, Neuberg, Blackwell, & Smith, 
2007; Williams & Mattingley, 2006). One could therefore argue that the slowed performance to 
male targets with happy distracters was observed because happy distracters could be conceived 
as being incompatible with male targets (male faces would be compatible with angry faces). 
Likewise for the results with female targets, here angry faces can be considered as incompatible 
distracters, thereby slowing performance.  
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Based on theoretical accounts (e.g. Pessoa, 2009) it was unexpected to find that happy 
distracters impaired performance similarly to angry distracters in some cases and worse in others, 
although it might be explained, to some degree, by the notion of enhanced early sensory 
representations for low arousing material. Moreover, it has been shown in various studies that 
happy faces are particularly salient (e.g. due to the mouth region; Calvo & Lundqvist, 2008; 
Calvo & Marrero, 2009; Calvo & Nummenmaa, 2008; Calvo, Nummenmaa, & Avero, 2008; 
Damjanovic et al., 2010; Miyazawa & Iwasaki, 2010; Poirier & Faubert, 2012), thus often 
leading to enhanced detection. This study tried to address such perceptual factors by selecting 
angry and happy faces with open mouths, thereby ensuring a similar amount of teeth being 
displayed. However, the mouth region of angry versus happy faces also differs in other respects 
(e.g. the shape of the lips). So, even if the stimuli were relatively matched in terms of teeth 
white, it could be that other aspects of the mouth region (e.g. shape of lips) or face may be 
responsible for the effects obtained here. This cannot be conclusively answered with the current 
dataset and will need to be addressed in future work. 
As for reappraisal, although late onset of instructed reappraisal has previously been 
linked to Stroop performance (Sheppes & Meiran, 2008), other research (McRae et al., 2012) has 
not found any associations between Stroop performance and reappraisal ability. It could thus be 
that Stroop performance is only linked to late onset of instructed reappraisal, but not necessarily 
a habitual form thereof. This would also be in line with proposals by Joormann and Siemer 
(2011) who suggest that cognitive control (e.g. Stroop performance) tends to be associated with 
late (as opposed to early) forms of reappraisal onset, suggesting that different forms of 
reappraisal might be differentially linked to cognitive control.  
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Although the main interference effects were in line with previous research (performance 
on incompatible trials slower), it was somewhat unexpected that performance for incompatible 
scrambled images did generally not differ from that of the incompatible affect conditions – 
previous research has revealed that performance on incompatible neutral trial-types is slower 
than that for the compatible condition, but faster than the incompatible affective condition (see 
e.g. Preston & Stansfield, 2008). It is conceivable that because scrambled images did not depict 
any facial expressions, whereas all other distracter stimuli did, that (a) they were more salient to 
participants and (b) more clearly identified with neutral targets. So, when exposed to other target 
types, participants might more readily notice the discrepancy between target and distracter (due 
to (a) and (b)), thereby leading to greater interference. By contrast, for neutral targets compatible 
scrambled images might be classified more rapidly as compatible due to (a) and (b), thereby 
leading to superior performance in this condition. This explanation can also be extended to 
account for the somewhat more prominent (although in most cases not statistically significantly 
so) interference effects from incompatible scrambled images in the emotion decision task – as 
compared to the interference effects in the gender decision task. That is, it seems possible that 
participants associated scrambled images more with a neutral emotion than with a neutral gender, 
thus resulting in somewhat greater
18
 interference for angry- or happy-related (relative to gender) 
targets. Indeed, one could say that participants are more likely to encounter relatively neutral 
emotions in their daily lives compared to a neutral gender, supporting the idea that scrambled 
images are potentially more closely associated with a neutral emotion as opposed to a neutral 
gender. Ultimately, this speculation is subject to future investigation, however. 
A limitation of these experiments is that calm faces could be perceived as ambiguous in 
nature in the gender decision task, whereby, for example, a male calm face may be compatible 
                                               
18 This possible difference was not tested for statistical significance. 
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(male distracter) with a male target, but at the same time incompatible (calm distracter). It is 
believed that this issue has been addressed to some degree in that scrambled images served as 
alternative controls. However, with scrambled images being rather “non-face-like” it is then 
difficult to distinguish whether any differential effects of emotion versus scrambled controls 
arose due emotional or facial features. Future research could address this problem by adopting a 
different categorisation task where such conflict does not emerge. 
A further limitation of this experiment concerns the distribution of compatible versus 
incompatible trials. In both tasks (emotion and gender) the proportion of compatible trials was 
substantially lower than that of incompatible ones. This design feature may therefore have 
prevented a prepotent response tendency from being developed for compatible trials, thereby 
reducing the interference effects. Previous research has shown that interference effects are 
sensitive to the proportion of compatible trials, with diminished cost effects found when there is 
a large proportion of incompatible trials (Casey et al., 2000; Crump et al., 2006, 2008; Logan & 
Zbrodoff, 1979; Lowe & Mitterer, 1982; West & Baylis, 1998). It seems possible that such 
relatively reduced interference effects may have had an impact on the association (or the lack 
thereof) between the individual difference variables (particularly neuroticism) and threat 
appraisal. Future work needs to examine this issue more closely by using a task with a low 
proportion of incompatible (vs. compatible) trials. 
It would be interesting for future research to explore the relationship between the Stroop 
task and other individual differences in more detail. For example, it could be of interest whether 
other traits relevant to emotional disorders, such as rumination or mindfulness, moderate the link 
between neuroticism and attentional bias. Moreover, it seems fruitful to further examine the 
potential links between Stroop performance and reappraisal. In a recent study Verbruggen, 
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Adams and Chambers (2012) reported that engagement in a stop signal paradigm affected 
subsequent performance on a gambling paradigm. Applying this to the current task, one could, 
for instance, test the effect of Stroop performance on a subsequent online reappraisal paradigm, 
thus further examining the links between reappraisal and cognitive control. 
Altogether then, this study revealed that, in line with the Dual-competition model 
(Pessoa, 2009), performance can be impaired in the face of threatening information. However, it 
was somewhat unexpected that positive information would lead to a similar, if not stronger, 
impairment in performance; early sensory representations of low arousing material (Pessoa, 
2009) might provide a possible explanation for this finding. As predicted by the Mathews and 
Mackintosh model (Mathews et al., 1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998), the impact of emotion 
was diminished under high task demand. Still, emotion was found to interact with performance 
towards gender targets in a way that can be considered to be in line with existing findings on the 
link between emotion and gender (Becker et al., 2007; Williams & Mattingley, 2006). Against 
expectations threat appraisal was not associated with individual differences as measured in this 
study. A number of reasons may account for this, including a large proportion of incompatible 
(relative to compatible) trials; several suggestions have been made to address such shortcomings 
in future studies. This study also adds to the literature on the links between neuroticism, emotion 
regulation and cognitive control, indicating that, at least under certain circumstances, it may not 
be possible to demonstrate a relationship between these variables. It will be the task of future 
research to further examine this issue.  
This study has demonstrated that threat affects performance in distracter paradigm 
involving a prepotent response when only one face cue is displayed per trial. In the following 
chapter it will be explored if similar effects can be obtained when the distracter cue is spatially 
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separated from the target, as in is the case in a related distracter interference task (Word-Face 
Flanker paradigm; Bindemann et al., 2005), and how performance on such a task might interact 
with different emotion-linked traits.  
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Chapter 4: Selective attention to emotion in a Word-Face Flanker paradigm 
 
Introduction.  
Encouraged by the findings from the Word-Face Stroop task where single distracting faces were 
shown to induce reliable interference effects, I set out to examine whether similar effects could 
also be obtained in an affective Flanker task, using words as targets and faces as distracters. This 
study would then aid in the interpretation of the affective Face-Flanker task, addressing the 
question of whether affective interference effects can be obtained when just one emotional face 
is used per trial. 
 As mentioned before, related work using photographs of facial expressions of emotion 
has revealed that the effects from face flanker paradigms are not particularly robust (Palermo and 
Coltheart, 2004) or even not statistically significant (Bindemann, 2004). Indeed, there is an 
emerging literature suggesting capacity limits in face processing in the flanker paradigm (e.g. 
Bindemann, Burton and Jenkins, 2005; Palermo and Rhodes, 2002; Brebner and Macrae, 2008). 
Notably, Bindemann et al. (2005) demonstrated that a face target-face flanker design did not 
produce reliable interference effects, whereas the combination word target-face flanker exhibited 
the strongest effects in a comparison of different combinations of face and non-face stimuli as 
targets and flankers. They concluded that the processing limits of faces in a flanker paradigm 
may be that of one face per trial. Similarly, word-face flanker interference effects have been 
shown in a classification task (e.g. gender classification; Brebner and Macrae, 2008). These 
findings suggest that an affective word-face flanker task is more likely to yield interference 
effects than its affective face-face counterparts. To the authors knowledge, such studies have not 
yet been published, however. Even though affective word-word flanker interference effects have 
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already been reported by other researchers (e.g. Ochsner, Hughes, Robertson, Cooper and 
Gabrieli, 2009), it seems to be a particularly fruitful avenue to determine the generalisability of 
these effects to other affective material, such as by extending this work to facial expressions of 
emotion as in an affective word-face flanker paradigm. Since facial expressions of emotion are 
widely used in emotion research (e.g. Ekman and Friesen, 1976) and to further inform research 
on cognitive versions of the word-face flanker paradigm, they constitute a logical choice. 
To this end I have devised six affective word-face flanker tasks: three tasks with an 
emotional decision versus three other tasks with a gender decision. As before, these two decision 
types were used as manipulations of task demand (higher task demand in the gender decision 
task). As for the emotional decision tasks, in one task participants were presented with angry-
related and happy-related target words that were flanked by angry or happy facial expressions of 
emotion (Pleasant-Unpleasant task). In a second task angry-related and neutral target words were 
paired with angry, calm or scrambled faces (Unpleasant-Neutral task) and in a third task happy-
related and neutral target words were paired with happy, calm or scrambled faces (Pleasant-
Neutral task). In each of these tasks participants had to determine the emotional nature of the 
target word (depending on the task: pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral) whilst ignoring the distracter 
face. In contrast, in the gender decision tasks male-related versus female-related words were 
displayed as targets in one task (Male-Female task), along with male (angry, happy) and female 
(angry, happy) distracter faces. In a second task (Female-Neutral task) the target words (female-
related and neutral) were shown along with various female (angry, happy and calm expressions) 
and scrambled distracter faces. The third gender decision task, the Male-Neutral task, was 
created analogously to the Female-Neutral task, only that female(-related) words/faces were 
replaced by male ones. So, in line with the target stimuli, in the gender decision task participants 
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had to decide whether the targets were male-related, female-related or neutral as well as ignore 
the distracter faces. 
This six-task-design had been adopted in order to avoid one choice component being 
easier than another, thus addressing a potential shortcoming of the affective Face-Flanker 
paradigm. To illustrate, if there had been all three word types (angry-related, happy-related and 
neutral) in a single task, it is conceivable that for neutral word types only a one step decision 
would be required (“emotional or neutral?”), whereas for the emotional word types at least two 
decision steps would be needed (“emotion or neutral?” as well as “angry or happy?”) – similar 
arguments can be made regarding the gender decision (e.g. 1. “gender versus neutral?”; 2. “male 
or female?”, with neutral stimuli only involving decision type 1. and gender stimuli involving 
both decisions, 1. and 2.). Tasks involving only two choices naturally circumvent this problem 
and were therefore deemed preferrable. 
I predicted that threatening information would result in slowed performance. This 
attentional bias to threat is also expected to be further modulated by individual differences in 
neuroticism, with elevated levels of neuroticism leading to increased interference from 
threatening material as well as enhanced intra-individual variability. However, I expect that this 
is attenuated under high task demand as well as in individuals with high levels of trait reappraisal 
or attentional control.  
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Methods. 
Participants 
 
Participant recruitment and requirements were the same as for the Word-Face Stroop paradigm. 
However, in this study there were 67 participants (33 women) with a mean (SD; range) age of 
21.7 (4.7; 18-47).  
 
Emotional decision tasks 
 
Stimuli 
 
Pleasant-Unpleasant task 
Stimulus presentation tools and software (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) were identical to those of 
the Word-Face Stroop task. Additionally, E-Prime® 1.0 (Psychology Software Tools Inc, 
Pittsburgh, PA) was used to run the automated version of the Ospan task (hereafter: Ospan; 
Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005). 
 
Faces  
 
The face stimuli were photographs of angry and happy expressions selected from the NimStim 
set of facial expressions (Tottenham et al., 2009). Based on my own piloting work I selected 8 
Caucasian identities (4 males; ID’s: 01, 02, 05, 06, 22, 24, 25, 32) from the angry (open-mouth 
versions) and happy (exuberant versions) subsets
19
. These specific stimuli were identified for 
providing the best match on measures of arousal, valence, reaction time, accuracy, emotional 
intensity and rater agreement (see Appendix).  
                                               
19 Due to different selection criteria between this experiment and the Word-Face Stroop task some of the ID’s used 
were different between these two experiments. Hence, full details are provided again. 
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There were largely three reasons for using happy and angry faces: (1) the results of my 
pilot study suggesting reasonable matching between these positive and negative emotions, (2) 
this rendered this task more comparable to the Word-Face Stroop task, facilitating potential 
comparisons across tasks and (3), same as for the Word-Face Stroop task, a sufficiently large 
number of well-matched words corresponding to these emotions could be identified (see 
Stevenson, Mikels and James, 2007). Stimulus preparation (i.e. cropping) was followed as in the 
Word-Face Stroop task. 
 
Words 
 
I utilised the identical matched word set of angry- and happy-related words as in the Word-Face 
Stroop task. The words were capitalized and presented in white 25-point Courier New font. The 
height for all words was 0.53˚ of visual angle. Words measured between 4.92° (longest word) 
and 1.41° (shortest word) of visual angle in width.  Face stimuli subtended 3.26° x 2.64° of 
visual angle (in height and width, respectively).  All word types (angry-related and happy-
related) were displayed centrally as targets and were paired with each face distractor (angry 
(male, female) and happy (male, female)). Face distracters were randomly presented to the left or 
right of the target; the location was determined using the randsample function of the Statistics 
Toolbox in Matlab® (MathWorks, Natick, MA). A minimum inter-stimulus distance of 1.32˚ of 
visual angle was maintained on all trials.  
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Unpleasant-Neutral task 
 
Stimulus development and presentation was identical to that of the Pleasant-Unpleasant task 
apart from the following differences. 
 
Faces 
 
The same angry faces as in the Pleasant-Unpleasant task were used as well as a set of 8 calm 
faces (open-mouth versions). The calm faces were from the same Id’s, selected based on the 
same specifics outlined for the angry and happy faces above and underwent an identical stimulus 
preparation procedure. Calm faces were chosen to serve as a neutral face baseline whereas the 
scrambled stimuli constituted a purer non-emotional baseline that was otherwise identical to the 
emotional stimuli on perceptual characteristics. The scrambled faces of angry facial expressions 
were prepared in the same manner as for the Word-Face Stroop task by following the procedure 
from Conway et al. (2008). 
 
Words 
 
The angry-related and neutral words from the Word-Face Stroop task comprised my word 
stimuli in this experiment. Words measured between 4.92° (longest word) and 1.41° (shortest 
word) of visual angle in width.  All word types (angry-related and neutral) were displayed 
centrally as targets and were paired with each face flanker (angry (male, female), calm (male, 
female) and scrambled).   
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Pleasant-Neutral task 
 
This task is identical to the Unpleasant-Neutral task with the exception of the differences noted 
below. 
 
Faces and Words 
 
The happy faces from the Pleasant-Unpleasant task were selected as well as the calm faces from 
the Unpleasant-Neutral task. Moreover, for this experiment I prepared scrambled versions of 
happy faces (see Word-Face Stroop task for details of the procedure to devise scrambled 
images). 
The happy and neutral word sets were used that had been identified for the two preceding 
tasks. Word width varied between 3.96° (longest word) and 1.41° (shortest word) of visual angle.  
Each of the target words (happy-related and neutral) was presented in the screen centre and was 
flanked by each face type (happy (male, female), calm (male, female) and scrambled).  
 
 
Questionnaire measures and Ospan 
 
I administered the same paper-based measures as in the Word-Face Stroop task. Additionally, 
participants were assessed on an automated version of the Ospan task (Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, 
& Engle, 2005), which is a performance-based measure of attentional control, thus 
complementing the self-report data of the attentional control questionnaire with a measure that is 
less prone to response bias, for example. Here, participants needed to remember sets of 3-7 
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letters in the correct order for subsequent recall. Prior to the presentation of each letter (letters 
were shown individually) participants were required to solve simple math problems (e.g. (2*3) + 
1 = ?). The main measures of interest were the absolute and the total Ospan scores, the former of 
which represents the number of correctly recalled sets, whereas the latter constitutes the number 
of correctly recalled letters. To illustrate, a set of 5 letters where 3 letters are correctly recalled 
and a set of 4 letters with perfect recall would yield an absolute Ospan score of 0 + 4, but a total 
Ospan score of 3 + 4. Thus, the higher the Ospan score (absolute or total) is, the higher is the 
measured working memory (WM) capacity. As revealed by Unsworth et al. (2005), the Ospan 
exhibited a reasonable convergence validity (mean r = .42) of a magnitude that would be 
expected based on correlations between other WM span measures. The Ospan further loaded 
substantially on a WM capacity factor (.68) and manifested decent alpha (α = .78) and test-retest 
(r = .83) reliabilities. 
 
Verbal intelligence: National Adult Reading Test (NART) 
 
The NART was also administered as a proxy-measure of verbal intelligence (Crawford, Stewart, 
Cochrane, Parker, & Besson, 1989; Nelson, 1982). The NART consists of 50 “untypical” English 
words in terms of their adherence to standard grapheme-phoneme correspondence rules (e.g. 
abstemious or debt). Participants’ task is to read out loud each of these words. The total number 
of errors in pronunciation is then used to estimate verbal IQ. The NART possesses excellent test-
retest (Smith, Roberts, & Pantelis, 1998),  split-half (Crawford, Stewart, Garthwaite, Parker, & 
Besson, 1988; Crawford, Parker, Stewart, Besson, & Lacey, 1989; Nelson, 1982), and high inter-
rater reliabilities, as well as high construct validity and strong cross-validation with other 
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measures of intelligence or verbal fluency (Bright, Jaldow, & Kopelman, 2002; Crawford, 
Moore, & Cameron, 1992; Crawford et al., 1989; Crawford et al., 1989). Furthermore, it has 
been linked to demographic indicators of intelligence, such as education and social class 
(Crawford, Allan, Cochrane, & Parker, 1990), although age, when controlled for by these other 
demographic variables, and sex do not particularly seem to affect NART performance (Crawford 
et al., 1988). The NART has been used in other studies of individual differences and cognitive 
control (e.g. Horn, Dolan, Elliott, Deakin, & Woodruff, 2003). 
 
Procedure 
Pleasant-Unpleasant task 
 
For the Pleasant-Unpleasant task participants were instructed to discriminate the target words 
and to ignore the face distractors. Participants needed to determine whether the word type was 
“pleasant” or “unpleasant”. Responses should be made as fast and accurately as possible by 
pressing the “H” and “J” keys with the index and middle fingers (one key was assigned to each 
finger).
20
 Stimulus-response mapping was counterbalanced across participants. During training, 
feedback on the accuracy of their decision was provided at the end of each trial and participants 
were asked to use this to improve the accuracy of emotion labelling. 
There were four different trial types derived from the factorial combination of word type 
(angry-related, happy-related) and compatibility (compatible, incompatible). In compatible trials 
the emotional valence of the word type and face was identical whereas in incompatible trials it 
was not. Each trial type was repeated 128 times in the experimental task, amounting to a total of 
                                               
20 It was deemed that this key arrangement might be somewhat more comfortable for participants as it was not on 
the “edge of the keyboard” as in the foregoing experiment (i.e. c, v, b). 
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512 trials (50% compatible trials; 50% incompatible trials). As described before, Flanker 
compatibility scores were computed by subtracting performance on compatible trials from that 
on incompatible ones (see Chapter 1 and 2 for further details). Trials were presented in random 
order, as determined by the randperm function. There was one practice block (100 trials) where 
only the word stimuli were displayed (to improve participants' accuracy in emotion 
discrimination of the word stimuli) and another practice block consisting of the actual 
experimental task (also 100 trials). Thus, participants completed 712 trials for this task 
altogether. 
Trials started with the presentation of the fixation cross for 500ms, followed by the 
target-distractor display. Participants' responses to the experimental stimuli were self-paced, but 
the stimuli were only shown for a duration of 600 ms. Prior to the next trial feedback was 
displayed for 250 ms. This was accomplished by presenting the fixation cross in green font 
colour (correct response) or red font colour (incorrect response), respectively. On completion of 
every 128 trials participants could take a break for as long as needed. The total time required for 
this task was approximately 16 minutes. 
 
Unpleasant-Neutral task 
 
The procedure for this task was identical to that of the Pleasant-Unpleasant task, except for the 
following differences. Here, the task was to decide whether the target words were “unpleasant” 
or “neutral”. The potential response keys were “H”, “J” and “Space”, with “Space” (always 
being mapped onto neutral target words) and one of the other two keys was selected for each 
participant. The selection of keys was carried out such that across the three emotional decision 
tasks no single key was mapped onto more than one target stimulus per participant. For example, 
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if in the Pleasant-Unpleasant task the “H” key was associated with unpleasant target words, this 
would also be the case for the Unpleasant-Neutral task. Moreover, the “Space” bar was to be 
pressed using the thumb, whereas the “H” and “J” keys were to be pressed using the index and 
middle fingers respectively or vice versa depending on participants’ handedness. To illustrate, a 
right-handed participant would always press the “H” key using the index finger and the “J” key 
using the middle finger, this mapping was reversed for left-handed participants. I adopted this 
procedure for ease and speed of responding and to maximise recording participants’ “true” 
performance ability, thus avoiding, for example, that participants would need to respond with 
their non-dominant hand or fingers. 
 There were 6 unique trial types based on the factorial combination of word type (angry-
related or neutral) and compatibility (compatible, incompatible calm, incompatible scrambled
21
). 
To ensure an even split between angry and neutral (including calm and scrambled faces) stimuli 
in the experimental task, trial types including angry faces were repeated 128 times and scrambled 
and calm faces were repeated 64 times. Overall, this, again, amounted to 512 experimental trials 
and 712 trials in total (16 minutes). Of all trials 50% were compatible and 50% incompatible. 
However, given the split of trials between angry versus neutral (i.e. calm and scrambled) 
distracter types, 25% of all angry distracters were compatible and 25% incompatible. For calm 
distracters 12.5% were compatible and 12.5% incompatible – likewise for scrambled distracters, 
therefore also resulting in, altogether, 25% compatible and 25% incompatible trials for neutral 
distracters. 
 
                                               
21 For neutral stimulus types the compatibility categories were as follows: compatible = compatible scrambled, 
incompatible calm = compatible calm, incompatible scrambled = incompatible. 
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Pleasant-Neutral task 
 
This procedure was the same as the Unpleasant-Neutral task, except that this time participants 
decision on targets was between “pleasant” and “neutral” word types and that the angry faces 
were replaced by happy expressions. The Pleasant-Unpleasant, Unpleasant-Neutral and Pleasant-
Neutral tasks were presented in random succession, the order of which was established using the 
randsample function. For examples of the different trial types in the emotional decision tasks, see 
Figure 11. 
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a)  
b)  
c)  
d)  
Figure 11. Example displays of trial types in the emotional decision tasks 
(flankers were presented to the left or right of the target on any one trial). a) 
happy-related target word flanked by a happy, female distractor face (compatible), 
b) happy-related target word with a calm, female distractor face (incompatible 
calm), c) neutral target word flanked by an angry, female distractor face 
(incompatible), d) angry target word with a scrambled distractor face 
(incompatible scrambled). Note: Male faces are not shown due to copyright issues 
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Gender decision tasks 
Stimuli 
Male-Female task 
 
In the Male-Female task I followed the same steps in stimulus preparation and display as in the 
Pleasant-Unpleasant task. Any differences of the procedure are noted below. 
 
Faces and Words 
 
Male and female faces (angry as well as happy expressions) were taken from the Pleasant-
Unpleasant task whereas the male- and female-related words from the Word-Face Stroop task 
constituted the word set of the current experiment. Words measured between 4.40° (longest 
word) and 1.41° (shortest word) of visual angle in width.  All word types (male- and female-
related) were displayed centrally as targets and were paired with each face flanker (male (angry, 
happy) and female (angry, happy)).   
 
Female-Neutral and Male-Neutral tasks 
Faces and Words 
This task was designed identically to the Male-Female task, except that only the female faces of 
the latter task were used as well as the calm and scrambled faces based on the female ID’s from 
the Pleasant-Neutral and Unpleasant-Neutral tasks. Furthermore, the female-related and neutral 
word sets from the Word-Face Stroop task served as target stimuli. The longest word of this set 
subtended a visual angle of approximately 4.40° in width as opposed to 1.41° of visual angle for 
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the shortest word. Target words (female-related and neutral) were displayed centrally on the 
screen and were flanked by the various distractor faces (female (angry, happy and calm 
expressions) and scrambled). 
The Male-Neutral task followed the design of the Female-Neutral task only that instead of 
selecting the female word and face stimuli from the respective aforementioned tasks the relevant 
male versions were taken. This change was also reflected in the width of the target stimuli 
whereby the longest word now measured 3.52° of visual angle with the shortest word, due to the 
identical neutral word set being used, remaining unchanged. Thus, male-related and neutral word 
types functioned as targets and these, in turn, were flanked by male (angry, happy and calm 
expressions) and scrambled faces. 
 
Procedure 
Male-Female task 
 
The procedure for the Male-Female task was virtually identical to that of the Pleasant-
Unpleasant task. Any differences in this regard are noted in the following. 
Instructions were to discriminate the target words as either “male” or “female”. Training 
over two practice blocks was provided to enhance participants’ accuracy of gender labeling. In 
the first practice block (100 trials) only the gender-related target words were presented (= no 
distractor faces); the second practice block consisted of the actual experimental task, but, again, 
with only 100 trials. The factorial combination of word type (male-related, female-related), 
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compatibility (compatible, incompatible) and face emotion (angry, happy) yielded 8 unique trial-
types. Each trial type was repeated 64 times, resulting in 512 trials overall (50% compatible 
trials; 50% incompatible trials). Hence, including both practice blocks, participants performed a 
total of 712 trials. Compatible trials were those where target word and face gender corresponded 
(e.g. female-related target word and a female distractor face); incompatible trials were those 
where there was no correspondence on gender (e.g. female-related target word and a male 
distractor face). 
Female-Neutral task 
The procedure of this task was based on the Male-Female task; any departures from the latter 
procedure are stated below. 
The response options in this task were “female” versus “neutral”. Response keys 
(“Space” (= neutral), “H”, “J”) and mapping were analogous to the Unpleasant-Neutral task, but 
this time care was taken that each of the various target words in the three gender tasks (male-
related, female-related, neutral) was associated with only one response key per participant. There 
were 8 distinct trial-types according to the combination of word type (female-related, neutral), 
compatibility (compatible, incompatible) and face emotion (angry, happy, calm, scrambled)
22
. 
To ensure an even split between face and scrambled distracters, the 2 trial-types with scrambled 
faces amounted to 192 trials each (total: 384), whereas the remaining 6 trial-types with facial 
expressions consisted of 64 trials each (total: 384), resulting in 768 experimental trials and 968 
trials (including practice) overall. Altogether, compatible versus incompatible trials were 
                                               
22 All angry, happy and calm expressions were from female models in this task and therefore could not be 
incompatible with the female-related word type as such. At the same time angry and happy faces could not be 
compatible with neutral targets and scrambled distracters not with female targets. Calm expressions, same as in the 
Word-Face Stroop paradigm, were in the unique position of being compatible with female targets based on the face 
gender and compatible with neutral targets based on the emotion of the face. 
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displayed equally often (41.7% each), with the remainder (16.7%) being of ambiguous 
compatibility (see footnote 22). More specifically, 16.7% of all trials were compatible trials 
involving face distracters; an equal percentage (16.7%) was allocated to the equivalent 
incompatible trials with face distracters. Compatible versus incompatible trials with scrambled 
images were each presented 25% of the time, with the remaining 16.7% of all trials, as 
mentioned above, being of ambiguous compatibility. The duration of this task was approximately 
22 minutes. 
Male-Neutral task 
The procedure of the Male-Neutral task was analogous to the Female-Neutral task, with the 
change that the response choice was “male” versus “neutral” and the female words and faces 
were exchanged for male ones. All 3 gender decision tasks (Male-Female, Female-Neutral and 
Male-Neutral) were run in random order with the randsample function. These three tasks were 
run jointly with the emotional decision ones. Both the emotional and gender versions were 
presented in counterbalanced order across two sessions separated by at least one day in order to 
minimize any carry-over effects of the response mapping from the previous session. The Ospan 
task was always completed in the first testing session after the word-face flanker tasks and then 
followed by the questionnaire measures. Participants were debriefed by the end of the second 
session. Examples of the trial types of the gender decision tasks are given in Figure 12. 
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a)  
 
b)  
 
c)  
 
Figure 12. Example displays of trial types in the gender decision tasks. a) female-
related target word flanked by a scrambled distractor face (incompatible 
scrambled), b) male-related target word with a happy, female distractor face 
(incompatible happy), c) neutral target word flanked by a calm, female distractor 
face (in-/compatible, see footnote 22). Note: Male faces are not shown due to 
copyright issues. 
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Results. 
1) Pre-processing for all Word-Face Flanker tasks 
One participant was excluded from the analyses due to technical errors during testing. The same 
pre-processing steps as in the Word-Face Stroop paradigm were followed for the remaining 
participants with computation of mean RT, RT SDs and mean ACC, outlier removal at subject 
and group levels (+/- 2.5 SD from mean; here: less than 10% of rejections) and normalisation. 
Eight participants (8.25%) were also excluded from the Ospan data for not maintaining a 
minimum accuracy of 85% in the maths problems. Again, since some error rates were marginally 
above 10% ART was used for all subsequent analyses with this paradigm.
23
 
 
2) ANOVAs 
Pleasant-Unpleasant task 
 
Overall, it is expected that threatening material, especially when distracting, impairs 
performance. Such effects are, however, expected to be reduced with elevated task demands 
(gender decision task). To assess the effect of flankers on ART performance a Within-Subjects 
ANOVA was performed with word type (angry-related, happy-related) and compatibility 
(compatible, incompatible) as factors. There were significant main effects of target word (happy 
targets faster; F(1, 59) = 7.52, p = .008, ηp
2
 = .11) and compatibility (compatible trials faster; 
F(1, 59) = 13.919, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .19), but no significant target word X compatibility interaction 
(F(1, 59) = 1.92, p = .17, ηp
2
 = .03). The means (SEs) for ART are presented in Figure 13. 
 
                                               
23 The RT and ACC data generally exhibited comparable trends. 
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   Figure 13. The means (SEs) for ART for the different types of stimuli. 
 
Unpleasant-Neutral task 
 
I examined the effect of flankers with a Within-Subjects ANOVA where word type (angry-
related or neutral) and compatibility (compatible, incompatible, scrambled) served as factors. 
Results showed a significant main effect of compatibility (F(2, 120) = 7.36, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .11) 
as well as a significant word type X compatibility interaction (F(2, 120) = 16.09, p < .001, ηp
2
 = 
.21), but no significant main effect of word type (p = .44, ηp
2
 = .01). Pairwise comparisons using 
Bonferroni correction revealed that responses on incompatible, as opposed to scrambled, trial-
types were significantly faster for angry-related targets (p < .001, 95% CI -61.317; -16.19), 
whereas the reverse pattern (= incompatible slower) was true for neutral-related targets (p = .01, 
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95% CI 3.33 ; 33.31). Additionally, response latencies for scrambled faces were significantly 
slower than those for compatible stimulus-types for angry targets (p < .001, 95% CI 24.31; 
70.09); all other comparisons of compatibility at the different levels of word type did not reach 
significance (p > .05). Mean ART and SEs are displayed in Figure 14. 
 
 
    Figure 14. The means (SEs) for ART for the different types of stimuli. 
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Pleasant-Neutral task 
 
I conducted a 2 (word type: happy-related or neutral) X 3 (compatibility: compatible, 
incompatible, scrambled) Within-Subjects ANOVA. I found significant main effects of word 
type (F(1, 62) = 17.62, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .22), compatibility (F(2, 124) = 3.73, p = .03, ηp
2
 = .06) as 
well as a significant word type X compatibility interaction (F(2, 124) = 7.81, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .11). 
Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni correction indicate that, for happy targets, responses on 
trials with compatible (p < .001, 95% CI -44.25; -11.62) or incompatible expressions
24
 (p = .07, 
95% CI -30.49; 1.03) were significantly faster than on trials with scrambled images – none of the 
other comparisons of compatibility at the different levels of word type reached significance (p > 
.05). An overview of the ART performance in this task is provided in Figure 15. 
 
 
                                               
24 The comparison between incompatible and scrambled trials was only marginally significant. 
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     Figure 15.  Overview of the ART means (SEs) for the various trial-types. 
 
Male-Female task 
 
 A Repeated-Measures ANOVA was run with word type (male-related, female-related), 
compatibility (compatible, incompatible) and face emotion (angry, happy) as factors. I obtained 
significant main effects of word type (female faster; F(1, 61) = 5.84, p = .02, ηp
2
 = .09) and 
compatibility (compatible faster; F(1, 61) = 32.21, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .35) and a marginally 
significant main effect of face emotion, with responses to happy faces being faster than angry 
faces (F(1, 61) = 3.58, p = .06, ηp
2
 = .06) – none of the interactions yielded significant effects (all 
ps > .05). The ART results of the Male-Female task are presented in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16. Means (SEs) for all stimulus-types of the Male-Female task. 
 
Female-Neutral task 
Given the uneven distribution of compatible versus incompatible trial-types across the two target 
words, I administered two separate Repeated-Measures ANOVAs, one for each word type. Using 
a Within-Subjects ANOVA for female target words with face emotion (angry, happy, calm, 
scrambled) as factor, the differences between the means were found to be statistically significant 
(F(3, 180) = 6.87, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .10). Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni correction 
produced significant differences between scrambled images and each of the other distracters, 
whereby scrambled faces yielded slower ARTs than angry (p < .001, 95% CI 39.97; 10.01), 
happy (p = .016, 95% CI 2.27; 33.41) and calm (p = .002, 95% CI 6.16; 39.09) distractors; any 
other comparisons did not reach significance (all ps = 1). For neutral targets I also conducted a 
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Within-Subjects ANOVA with face emotion (angry, happy, calm, scrambled) as factor. Similar 
to female target words, I found the differences between the means to be significant (F(3, 180) = 
8.40, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .12). However, this time follow-up tests (with Bonferroni correction) 
demonstrated that scrambled distracters exhibited significantly faster ARTs compared to the 
other face distracters: angry (p = .006, 95% CI -40.34; -4.64), happy (p < .001, 95% CI -50.90; 
13.85), calm (p < .001, 95% CI -45.04; -12.56) – all other comparisons were non-significant (ps 
= 1). These results are shown in Figure 17. 
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a)  
b)  
Figure 17. Mean (SE) ART findings for all types of stimuli split across 
word type. (a) female target words; (b) neutral target words. 
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Male-Neutral task 
 
As for the female-neutral task above, I split the Repeated-Measures ANOVA here into two 
separate ones according to word type. Thus, I ran a Repeated-Measures ANOVA on the 
conditions concerning male target words, that is with face emotion (angry, happy, calm, 
scrambled) as a factor. Results showed that the differences between the means were statistically 
significant (F(3, 183) = 7.83, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .11). Pairwise comparisons (corrected with 
Bonferroni adjustment) revealed that, again, as for female words, scrambled trial-types differed 
significantly from all other distractor faces, that is angry (p = .02, 95% CI 1.93; 31.06), happy (p 
< .001, 95% CI 9.24; 40.96), calm (p = .001, 95% CI 7.57; 35.57), whereas the remaining 
comparisons were non-significant (ps > .70). The second Repeated-Measures ANOVA, this time 
for neutral target words, was also carried out with face emotion (angry, happy, calm, scrambled) 
as a factor. There was a main effect of face emotion (F(3, 183) = 16.35, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .21). 
Only the pairwise comparisons between scrambled stimuli and the remaining face flankers 
reached significance (angry: p < .001, 95% CI -58.97; -22.10; happy: p < .001, 95% CI -45.97; -
11.63; calm: p < .001, 95% CI -66.95; -24.62; all other comparisons, ps > .27). ART means 
(SEs) are displayed in Figure 18. 
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a)  
b)  
Figure 18. Overview of the means (SEs) for the different trial-types. (a) males        
target words; (b) neutral target words. 
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3) Individual difference analyses 
To summarise, compatible (compared to incompatible) trial-types were found to be faster and 
this was also true for compatible scrambled trials. By contrast, scrambled images, when 
incompatible, tended to produce slower performance than compatible and other incompatible 
stimulus types. The findings for calm distracters (the other control stimulus set) were less clear in 
terms of compatibility, possibly due to their ambiguous nature in the gender decision task. Happy 
targets were faster than angry ones and female targets than male ones. It was of interest whether 
angry distracters exhibited more interference than other distracter types. Relevant analyses 
revealed that there was a hint of a speeded performance of happy distracters over angry ones 
when task demand was high (gender decision task), although this did not reach conventional 
levels of significance. Moreover, unlike in the Word-Face Stroop task, angry and happy 
distracters did not seem to have any differential effects on target performance when task load 
was low (emotion decision task; paired-samples t-test between the relevant compatibility scores: 
t(59) = 1.29, p = .17, r = .17; for details on these compatibility scores, see Pleasant-Unpleasant 
task in footnote 25). In general then, whilst there was a trend for greater interference of 
threatening distracters under high task demand, when task demand was low this trend was not 
replicated and instead a speeding effect for happy targets was found. 
As for the individual difference measures, I expected that elevated trait neuroticism is 
paired with increased attentional bias to threat as well as greater intra-individual variability (i.e. 
greater compatibility scores – see below for further details). Moreover, high trait reappraisal (or 
attentional control) can attenuate the impact of neuroticism on threat appraisal and intra-
individual variability, respectively. For each of the 6 Word-Face Flanker tasks I computed 
flanker compatibility effect scores by subtracting the mean ART performance level in the 
140 
 
compatible from that in the incompatible trial type, such that higher scores denote faster 
responses to the compatible material – equivalent scores were calculated for the RT SD data.25 I 
then ran a series of Pearson correlation analyses between neuroticism, state and trait anxiety, 
verbal intelligence, reappraisal, attentional control along with the absolute and total Ospan scores 
versus these flanker compatibility effect measures. None of these correlations, however, survived 
correction for multiple comparisons (minimum p = .02). 
Following the same procedure as in the Word-Face Stroop paradigm, I employed the 
MODPROBE macro of Hayes and Matthes (2009) to examine the potential moderating roles of 
reappraisal or attentional control (M) on the link between neuroticism (focal predictor) and 
flanker compatibility scores (i.e. those for Pleasant-Unpleasant and Male-Female tasks; outcome 
variables
26
). The analyses also controlled for working memory capacity (= the absolute and total 
Ospan scores) and either reappraisal or attentional control (as before, whichever of these did not 
act as a moderator in a particular analysis). Contrary to my predictions the results did not reveal 
any significant interaction effects of neuroticism and reappraisal/ attentional control on the 
flanker compatibility measures (maximum: t(53) = 2.22; minimum p = .03)
27
 after correction for 
                                               
25
 The following compatibility scores were created. Pleasant-Unpleasant task: (1) compatible angry targets 
(distracter emotion: angry) were subtracted from incompatible angry targets (distracter emotion: happy) – equivalent 
steps were taken for happy targets. Pleasant-Neutral task: compatible happy targets (distracter emotion: happy) were 
subtracted from incompatible happy targets (distracter emotion: neutral or scrambled) – this was done analogously 
with angry targets for the Unpleasant-Neutral task. Male-Female task: compatible male targets (distracter gender: 
male) were subtracted from incompatible male targets (distracter gender: female), with both minuend and 
subtrahend always having the same distracter emotion (i.e. angry or happy) – an equivalent procedure was adopted 
for female targets. Male-Neutral task: compatible neutral targets (distracter gender: male – no gender for scrambled 
images; distracter emotion: calm or scrambled) were subtracted from incompatible neutral targets (distracter gender: 
male; distracter emotion: angry or happy) – for the Female-Neutral task a similar procedure was followed with 
neutral targets. 
 
26 See footnote 25 
27 Only 1 (out of 12) moderation analysis for the Pleasant-Unpleasant and Male-Female tasks reached the 
conventional level of significance (p < .05) – i.e. that involving the compatibility score for female targets with happy 
distracters. This interaction was no longer significant after correcting for multiple comparisons and is therefore not 
reported in further detail – all other interactions, p > .05. 
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multiple comparisons; exploratory analyses with the remaining flanker compatibility scores did 
not show statistically significant moderation effects either (all ps > .05). 
 
Discussion. 
It was expected that response times would be impeded in the face of threatening information. 
This bias as well as intra-individual variability was thought to be particularly strong in 
individuals with enhanced trait neuroticism, but expected to be reduced under high task demand 
or in individuals with high trait reappraisal or attentional control. Results showed that for 
compatible trial-types, relative to incompatible ones, speeded performance was observed. While 
happy targets improved performance, threatening distracters impaired performance under high 
(but not low) task demand. As for the individual difference analyses, against expectations 
(Bishop, 2007; Mathews et al., 1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Pessoa, 2009; Robinson & 
Tamir, 2005), no significant effects were obtained. These results indicate that, similar to the 
findings from the Face Flanker paradigm, happy targets accelerate performance compared to 
other target types. This is suggestive of a facilitatory effect of early sensory representations for 
low arousing or positive content in target stimuli (Pessoa, 2009). Against predictions (Mathews 
et al., 1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Pessoa, 2009), threatening information did not lead 
to an increased impairment in performance when task demands are low. If anything, performance 
to happy distracter faces is particularly slowed in this context, albeit not significantly so when 
compared to angry ones. By contrast, under high task demand, where the effect of threat was 
expected to be attenuated (Mathews et al., 1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998), threatening 
distracters significantly slowed performance. This finding could be seen to suggest that 
sensitivity to threat has attained priority in our system through evolution (Öhman & Mineka, 
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2001), whereby threat has an advantage in detection over other emotions at an unconscious level, 
but not at a conscious level. However, this reading seems to be in conflict with numerous studies 
reporting robust effects of threat at a conscious level (Mathews et al., 1997; Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 1998; Pessoa, 2009). Future studies will need to further examine the effect of task 
difficulty or awareness on threat in this type of task to address this issue. Moreover, it should be 
noted that targets (words) and distracters (faces) consisted of different stimulus types, with 
speeded performance only being observed for happy target words, but not for happy distracter 
faces. Hence, it will be crucial to further test these findings using other stimulus modalities (e.g. 
auditory) or by switching the stimulus types of targets and distracters (e.g. target faces versus 
distracters words) to see if similar effects are still observed. 
As hypothesized, the results yielded significant compatibility effects (unlike in the Face-
Flanker task). This extends previous non-emotional Word-Face Flanker tasks (Bindemann et al., 
2005; Brebner & Macrae, 2008), demonstrating that compatibility effects can also be obtained 
using affective stimuli in this paradigm. 
Given the similarities between the Word-Face Stroop and Word-Face Flanker paradigms, 
many of the issues raised the discussion of the Word-Face Stroop task apply here too. In 
particular, it seems plausible that the lack of a relationship between the Flanker measures and 
individual differences in the Word-Face Flanker studies reported here is due to comparable 
reasons, such as the different forms of reappraisal (early vs. late onset reappraisal; Joormann & 
Siemer, 2011). Although the proportion of compatible versus incompatible trials was largely kept 
equal across the different tasks, thereby strengthening the dominance of compatible trials 
somewhat compared to the two preceding paradigms (Face Flanker and Word-Face Stroop 
tasks), this proportion may nevertheless have been insufficient to create a prepotent response for 
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the compatible trials. This design feature may thus have affected the strength of the interference 
effects (Casey et al., 2000; Crump et al., 2006, 2008; Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979; Lowe & Mitterer, 
1982; West & Baylis, 1998) and, in turn, the associations between the individual difference 
variables and threat appraisal. Moreover, the data also seem to be in line with the interpretation 
that scrambled images are more salient and more closely associated with (a) neutral 
targets/emotion. This Flanker experiment also has similar limitations in terms of calm faces (i.e. 
ambiguity in the gender decision tasks).  
On a more theoretical level it is also unclear what produced the interference effects. 
Compatible and incompatible trials differ in that the distracter image is non-identical as well as 
associated with a different button press. The current findings therefore do not allow the 
distinction as to whether an interference effect is due to response conflict or stimulus 
compatibility (e.g. different valence). This issue could be explored in future research by 
systematically associating two stimulus types to each response button (e.g. happy faces of high 
vs. low arousal: response button A; angry faces of high vs. low arousal: response button B). Such 
a scenario would then permit the comparison of incompatible trials where both target and 
distracter differ on only one dimension (e.g. they are associated with the same response button, 
but differ in level of arousal; for instance, target: high arousing happy face, distracter: low 
arousing happy face) vs. incompatible trials where they differ on more than one dimension (e.g. 
they differ on the response button and on valence; for instance, target: high arousing happy face, 
distracter: high arousing angry face). Given the already fairly complex nature of this study such 
an approach was not adopted in order to reduce the overall amount of trials/ testing time. 
However, it seems fruitful to further investigate this issue in future research. 
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Whilst similar future studies could be conducted as suggested for the Word-Face Stroop 
paradigm, it could also be of interest to future researchers to vary the onset time of emotional 
distracters, which could elucidate the temporal impact unique to a particular emotion. Moreover, 
whilst this was not conducted for this thesis, it could be of interest to examine the effects of 3-
way interactions (e.g. with reappraisal and attentional control as simultaneous moderators) in 
predicting attentional bias. It should also be noted that even though the self-report measures 
employed throughout this thesis demonstrate respectable validity and reliability, comparing well 
to behavioural results, response bias could nevertheless have been a problem. Future 
investigators should therefore where possible complement such measures with additional 
behavioural, physiological or neural measures, as was done here, for example, with the Ospan 
task. 
Overall, these findings are in line with proposals of the capacity limits for face processing 
(Bindemann et al., 2005) in that with only one face per trial display flanker compatibility effects 
were obtained, demonstrating for the first time that emotion has an impact on performance in a 
Word-Face Flanker task. The results also suggest that early sensory representations of low 
arousing or positive cues (Pessoa, 2009) may facilitate target processing. Against predictions, 
threat impeded performance under high (but not low) task demand, indicative of an advantange 
in threat processing at an unconscious (as opposed to conscious) level (Öhman & Mineka, 2001). 
Threat appraisal, counter my hypotheses, was not associated with the various individual 
difference measures employed in this study. This might be due to a number of limitations of this 
study concerning the proportion of compatible versus incompatible trials, amongst others. A 
number of recommendations for future studies have been made, which might help in 
disentangling the interpretation of these effects. 
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The work reported up until this point has explored the effect of personality traits and 
threat on distracter interference in a number of different paradigms. The next chapter will 
examine the impact of these variables on a slightly different type of cognitive control: response 
inhibition. 
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Chapter 5: Impact of emotional expressions on response inhibition in the Stop signal 
paradigm 
 
Introduction. 
Response inhibition is a well-known feature of cognitive control, denoting the suppression of 
behaviours that have become obsolete (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). As outlined in the General 
Introduction, cognitive control is presumed to consist of three unique, but inter-related 
mechanisms: shifting, updating and inhibition (Miyake et al., 2000; Pessoa, 2009), with response 
inhibition forming part of the inhibition component (Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Pessoa, 2009). 
Several lines of evidence have lend support to this perspective of unity and diversity in cognitive 
control (Miyake & Friedman, 2012; Munakata et al., 2011; Verbruggen et al., 2004). Pessoa 
(2009) draws on this idea in his Dual-Competition model, proposing that the joint, inter-related 
mechanism of cognitive control, which he refers to as a common resource pool, is affected by 
use from the cognitive control functions, threatening material as well as individual differences. 
So, for example, recruitment of this resource pool for an updating task or the presentation of high 
threats would also affect the resources available for the response inhibition mechanism. Whilst 
traditionally response inhibition has been associated with motor inhibition (Verbruggen & 
Logan, 2008), recent findings suggest that it may instead be related to context-monitoring, which 
serves the detection and interpretation of the stop signal (Chatham et al., 2012). 
To date there have been only a small number of studies investigating the impact of 
emotional material on response inhibition. An affective stop-signal task where emotional images 
preceded the target stimuli revealed that response and stop latencies were slowed as a function of 
the high arousal content, but not the valence (positive, negative) of the images (Verbruggen & 
147 
 
De Houwer, 2007). Hare, Tottenham, Davidson, Glover, and Casey (2005), however, revealed an 
effect of valence in an emotional Go/ NoGo task when affective items functioned as targets. The 
researchers demonstrated that response latencies to fearful faces were slower than comparison 
stimuli (i.e. happy and neutral), but participants were less accurate at inhibiting responses for 
happy items, an effect that can also be modulated by individual differences (e.g. Ladouceur et al., 
2006). 
Studies have shown that stop signal performance is not only affected by the stimulus 
(Pessoa et al., 2012; Verbruggen & De Houwer, 2007; Wilkowski, 2012), but also by situational 
or trait variables (Krypotos, Jahfari, Van Ast, Kindt, & Forstmann, 2011; Logan et al., 1997; 
Padmala & Pessoa, 2010). Logan et al. (1997) demonstrated, for example, that stopping 
performance is slowed in individuals with high trait impulsivity, a personality facet linked to 
neuroticism (DeYoung, 2010c). Padmala and Pessoa (2010), in turn, showed that stop signal 
inhibition can be increased in a reward scenario. Moreover, findings from Krypotos et al. (2011) 
suggest that individuals with adaptive emotion regulation skills, as measured by heart rate 
variability, exhibit better execution and inhibition performance when confronted with negative 
images in a stop signal task. These findings indicate that trait measures as well as emotional 
states have an influence on response inhibition. Furthermore, of particular note are the findings 
that impulsivity and heart rate variability are linked with performance in the stop signal 
paradigm. This could be relevant to the mental noise hypothesis (Robinson & Tamir, 2005), 
which stipulates that intra-individual variability in response latencies is positively associated 
with neuroticism. One could thus speculate that neuroticism might be related to intra-individual 
variability in response latencies of this task (i.e. RT SDs of go trials). 
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Based on this evidence and the affective stop signal task by Verbruggen & De Houwer 
(2007) in particular, I devised 6 experimental stop signal tasks, in three of which emotion was 
task-relevant (emotional decision task) and in three of which gender was task-relevant (gender 
decision task), with emotional cues acting as distracters. Stimuli were angry (high and low 
arousal), happy (high and low arousal) as well as scrambled images thereof. Participants 
typically engaged in a binary choice task on each trial (e.g. “is the target image pleasant or 
unpleasant?”; go trial). However, on a small subset of the trials (stop signal trials), a signal 
appeared (here: a blue rectangle), indicating that they should refrain from responding on this 
trial. The stop signal trials served as a measure of response inhibition, as indexed by SSRTs (see 
Methods for more details), whereas the go trials provided an executive response, indexed by 
response latencies (Choice Reaction Time, CRT). Participants were also assessed on emotional 
and regulatory individual difference measures (neuroticim, reappraisal, attentional control) to 
assess the impact of trait measures on threat appraisal or stop signal performance more generally. 
Based on Pessoa’s (2009) Dual-competition model I predicted that threatening stimuli impair 
stop signal performance, as indexed by a longer CRTs and SSRTs (see methods), with this bias 
being more pronounced at high levels of trait neuroticism and when more than one cue is 
displayed per trial. Moreover, as outlined above, in line with the mental noise hypothesis 
(Robinson & Tamir, 2005), high levels of trait neuroticism were expected to be linked with 
greater intra-individual variability on go trials. Furthermore, elevated levels of voluntary control 
(reappraisal or attentional control) decrease the impact of neuroticism on threat appraisal and 
intra-individual variability (Blechert et al, 2012). 
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Methods. 
Participants 
 
Participant recruitment and requirements was as for the Word-Face Stroop paradigm. I tested 66 
students (33 females) in this study who had a mean (SD; range) age of 20.6 (3.9; 18-47).  
 
Stimuli, Questionnaire measures and Ospan 
Pleasant-Unpleasant task 
 
I employed the same experimental set up (stimulus presentation tools and software) as in the two 
preceding paradigms (Word-Face Stroop and Word-Face Flanker tasks). 
My target stimuli corresponded to the distractor faces from the Pleasant-Unpleasant task of the 
Word-Face Flanker paradigm (same actors as well as the same angry and happy expressions) 
with the addition of also including the closed-mouth counterpart for each target face. The closed 
mouth versions had undergone the identical matching procedure as their open-mouth equivalents 
on measures of arousal, valence, reaction time, accuracy, emotional intensity and rater agreement 
(see Appendix). As my pilot work has shown (Appendix), the open- and closed-mouth 
expressions of the NimStim differ in arousal, with faces with a closed-mouth tending to be less 
arousing compared to faces with an open-mouth. Hence, these two face sets (open- versus 
closed-mouth) constituted my manipulations of arousal (high versus low). 
I selected emotional faces of high and low arousal in line with previous work on the affective 
stop signal paradigm (Frederick Verbruggen & De Houwer, 2007) where arousal and valence 
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had been manipulated. Moreover, happy and angry expressions were chosen for (1) being 
particularly well matched compared to other specific emotion pairs (see Appendix) and (2) for 
rendering this task more comparable to my previous experiments (Word-Face Stroop and Flanker 
tasks), thereby facilitating potential comparisons. Stimulus development (i.e. cropping) of the 
faces was followed as in the Word-Face Flanker task. My stop signal consisted of a dark blue 
rectangle of 35 pixel units in width framing the target face shortly after its onset. An illustration 
of the various trial sequences in the emotional and gender decision tasks is provided in Figure 
19. 
 
 
a)  
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b)  
c)  
Figure 19. Typical trial sequences of the affective stop signal task. a) 
sample stop signal trial (angry, female, high arousal) in tasks 1., 3., 4., and 
6.; b) sample go trial (scrambled) in tasks 2., 3., 5., 6.; c) sample stop signal 
trial (happy, female, low arousal) in tasks 1., 2., 4., 6. Tasks: 1. Pleasant-
Unpleasant, 2. Pleasant-Scrambled, 3. Unpleasant-Scrambled, 4. Male-
Female, 5. Male-Scrambled, 6. Female-Scrambled. 
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For the stop signal experiment I employed the same self-report measures as for my previous 
experiments, including the Ospan (Unsworth et al., 2005) as used in the Word-Face Flanker 
experiment.  
 
Other emotion and gender tasks 
 
The remaining emotion and gender tasks were largely the same in terms of stimulus selection 
and preparation as the Pleasant-Unpleasant task. Any departures from this are noted below. 
The Pleasant-Scrambled task utilised all happy expressions (male and female) from the 
Pleasant-Unpleasant task as well as scrambled controls, which were created out of the happy 
faces, following the scrambling procedure in the Word-Face Flanker task. The Unpleasant-
Scrambled task presented angry expressions instead of the happy ones for both the emotional and 
scrambled images.  
Experimental stimuli of the Male-Female task were identical to the Pleasant-Unpleasant 
task. Moreover, the Female-Scrambled task consisted of all female face images (angry and 
happy) from the Pleasant-Scrambled and Unpleasant-Scrambled tasks as well as the scrambled 
counterparts thereof. The Male-Scrambled task was equivalent to the Female-Scrambled task, 
but contained the relevant male faces and scrambled images. 
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Procedure 
Pleasant-Unpleasant task 
 
I instructed participants to (a) determine whether the target face was “pleasant” or “unpleasant”, 
(b) to attempt to withhold their responses whenever a stop signal appeared and (c) to respond as 
fast and accurately as possible. Those trials where participants responded are commonly referred 
to as go trials. The RTs recorded on these trials are known as the go RT or Choice Reaction Time 
(CRT). Those trials where a stop signal appeared are referred to as stop signal trials and allow 
computation of the stop signal RT (SSRT – see below for further details). To prevent waiting 
strategies, I further informed participants of the tracking procedure, emphasizing that the onset 
time of the stop signal would be adjusted such that their probability of stopping would approach 
.50, regardless of their performance. Response keys were “h” and “j”, to be pressed with the 
index and middle fingers, respectively. Stimulus-response mapping was counterbalanced across 
participants. Feedback was provided at the end of every trial during training as well as during the 
experiment so that participants could improve the accuracy of their stopping and going 
responses. On stop trials the word “correct” was presented when participants correctly refrained 
from pressing a response key whereas the word “stop” appeared whenever a response key was 
(incorrectly) pressed. On go trials the words “correct” and “incorrect” were shown depending on 
the accuracy of the response choice and the word “respond” was displayed when (erroneously) 
no key press was made. Feedback was always presented in white upper case letters in Courier 
New type (font size 25). 
Based on the factorial combination of emotion (angry vs. happy), arousal (high vs. low) 
and gender (male, female) there were 8 separate trial-types. The order of trials was random as 
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determined with the randperm function. Each trial-type appeared 96 times during the 
experimental phase, resulting in 768 trials. The prior practice phase consisted of two training 
blocks; the first block comprised a go-task (no stop signals shown) so that participants could 
familiarise themselves with the response choices (128 trials), the second block was a shortened 
version of the experimental task and served as preparation for it (128 trials). Thus, participants 
completed a total of 1024 trials for the Pleasant-Unpleasant task.  
The fixation signal was displayed for 500 ms at the beginning of a trial, followed by the 
target face. Participants had to make a speeded response within 1250 ms in order for the stop 
trials to be challenging and, on correct stop trials, to keep the waiting interval until the next trial 
minimal. Next, feedback was provided for a duration of 250 ms. Self-paced breaks were 
provided every 192 trials. This experiment lasted approximately 34 minutes. Fixation, target 
faces and feedback were all displayed in the screen centre.  
Stop signals were randomly presented, by means of the randsample function, on 25% of 
all trials for each stimulus-type (= 24 stop trials per trial-type). The initial stop signal delay 
(SSD) was set at 250 ms and thereafter adapted regularly in line with discrete staircase tracking 
procedures (Levit, 1971) to achieve a probability of stopping of .50 for each stimulus-type. The 
SSD was increased by 25 ms after a correct response on a stop trial (inhibition success) and 
decreased by the same time interval after an incorrect response (inhibition failure). 
 Following the guidelines by Verbruggen, Chambers and Logan (in revision) I used the 
integration method (Logan, 1994; Verbruggen et al., 2010) to estimate the SSRT. Since I did not 
employ a block-variant design, however, I used the experiment-wide integration method, which, 
as Verbruggen et al. (in revision) note, is still considered reliable and provides unbiased 
estimates if no gradual increase in RT is observed. 
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In the integration method goRTs for a particular stimulus-type are ranked and the nth RT, which 
represents the finishing time of the stop process, is identified. To obtain the nth RT the number 
of the goRT trials is multiplied by the probability of responding on stop trials for this type of 
stimulus. The SSRT is then computed by deducting mean SSD from the finishing time (nth RT). 
To illustrate, with P(respond│signal) = .52 and 84 goRT trials for stimulus type A, the nth RT is 
ranked 44
th
 (0.52 x 84). Hence, mean SSD is subtracted from the 44
th
 fastest goRT to arrive at 
the SSRT for stimulus type A. 
 
Other emotion and gender tasks 
 
Bar the following modifications, I copied the procedure of the Pleasant-Unpleasant stop signal 
task for the other emotion and gender tasks (Pleasant-Scrambled, Unpleasant-Scrambled, Male-
Female, Male-Scrambled, Female-Scrambled).  
In the Pleasant-Scrambled task participants’ needed to determine whether a target was 
“pleasant” or scrambled”. As for the Affect-Neutral tasks of the Word-Face Flanker paradigm 
the potential response keys for the “pleasant” responses were one of either “h” or “j”, depending 
on which of the two keys was associated with this response in the Pleasant-Unpleasant task. The 
second response key (= “space”) was always allocated to the neutral response-choice and 
required a thumb press; “h” and “j” were to be pressed with either the index or middle fingers, 
depending on handedness. Across the three emotional decision tasks each response key (“h”, “j” 
or “space”) was only mapped onto a single response choice. For example, if “h” was linked to 
“pleasant” targets in one task it would be linked to this response choice in other tasks, too. 
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The task consisted of 5 unique types of stimuli as derived from the combination of emotion 
(happy), arousal (high, low), gender (male, female) and scrambled
28
. This resulted in 96 trials for 
each arousal and gender type and because all stimulus-types of arousal and gender were 
simultaneously happy in this task the total number of happy trials amounted to 384 (4 x 96). In 
order to balance the number of happy versus control trials there were also 384 trials for 
scrambled faces. As a consequence there were 24 stop signal trials for each of the gender and 
arousal types, which resulted in 96 stop trials for happy expressions and 96 stop trials for 
scrambled faces. Overall, the number of trials in the Pleasant-Scrambled task totalled 768 for the 
experimental phase and 1024 when including the trials from both practice blocks.  
The Unpleasant-Scrambled task followed the procedure of the Pleasant-Scrambled task 
with the happy target stimuli being replaced by angry faces, along with the corresponding change 
in response choice (“unpleasant” in lieu of “pleasant”). The Pleasant-Unpleasant task was 
completely replicated in the Male-Female task, but with the response choice now being gender 
related  (“male” versus “female”). Furthermore, the Female-Scrambled task comprised 5 
different stimulus-types, resulting from the combination of gender (female), emotion (angry, 
happy), arousal (high, low) and scrambled. Each type of emotion and arousal consisted of 96 
trials resulting in an overall amount of 384 female trials. Again, in order to maintain a balance 
between female and control trials, scrambled faces also totalled 384. There were 24 stop signal 
trials for all the different types of emotion and arousal (= combined 96 stop trials for female 
faces) and 96 stop trials for scrambled faces.  
 
                                               
28
 Scrambled faces were not manipulated along the factors of emotion, arousal and gender, but 
constituted a separate category of trial-types. 
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Instructions were to discriminate targets as either “Female” or “Scrambled”. According to 
the same principle as in the Pleasant-Scrambled task, “space” was assigned as response key for 
scrambled images whereas either “h” or “j” functioned as response keys for female targets, 
depending on which of the two keys had been allocated to the female response option in the 
Male-Female task – again any one response key was assigned to only one gender target (i.e. 
male, female or scrambled) across the three gender decision tasks.  
The Male-Scrambled task followed the procedure of the Female-Scrambled task with 
male stimuli and responses replacing the female ones. The three gender decision tasks (Male-
Female, Female-Scrambled and Male-Scrambled) were presented in random order, using the 
randsample function – likewise for the three emotion decision tasks (Pleasant-Unpleasant, 
Pleasant-Scrambled, Unpleasant-Scrambled). Testing order of the emotional and gender versions 
was counterbalanced across two sessions with a minimum gap of one day in between so that any 
carry-over effects of the response mapping from the previous session would be reduced. 
Subsequent to the set of stop signal experiments in the first testing session participants performed 
the Ospan study, which was followed by the self-report measures. Debriefing occurred at the end 
of the second session.  
 
Results 
1) Pre-processing for all Stop signal tasks 
I pre-processed CRT and SRT (i.e. signal response time, which is the RT for those stop signal 
trials where participants failed to inhibit their key press) data in accordance with the procedure 
from the Word-Face Flanker paradigm, involving calculation of the respective mean (here: CRT 
and SRT) and standard deviation (here: CRT SD) scores, exclusion of outliers at subject and 
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group levels (+/- 2.5 SD from mean; stop signal data: less than 9% of rejections; Ospan data: 
8.25% removed) and normalisation. To focus on only the key conditions of interest all trial-types 
were collapsed across gender (e.g. male angry high arousing stimuli were combined with female 
angry high arousing stimuli to yield a combined condition of angry high arousing stimuli, which 
is then made up of both male and female faces). All p-values of pairwise comparisons were 
adjusted using Bonferroni correction. 
 
2) ANOVAs 
Pleasant-Unpleasant task 
 
For the stop signal task, I predicted that threatening information slows responding. To test this, 
Within-Subjects ANOVAs were run on CRT and SSRT data with emotion (angry, happy) and 
arousal (high, low) as factors. For CRTs I observed a statistically significant main effect of 
emotion (F(1, 64) = 14.24, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .18) and an emotion X arousal interaction (F(1, 64) = 
9.26, p = .003, ηp
2
 = .13), but no significant main effect of arousal (F(1, 64) = .05, p = .83, ηp
2
 < 
.01). Pairwise comparisons indicated that response latencies to angry (compared to happy) faces 
were significantly slower on both low (p = .06, 95% CI -.26; 19.93; marginally significant) and 
high arousal (p < .001, 95% CI 13.99; 34.67) trials, with the difference between angry and happy 
faces being larger for high arousing stimuli. For stop latencies I obtained a statistically 
significant main effect of emotion (F(1, 64) = 4.10, p = .047, ηp
2
 = .06), showing that SSRTs 
were slower to angry than happy faces. However, the main effect of arousal (F(1, 64) = .60, p = 
.44, ηp
2
 = .01) and the interaction (F(1, 64) = .22, p = .64, ηp
2
 < .01) did not reach statistical 
significance. Results of the Pleasant-Unpleasant task are presented in Figure 20. 
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a)  
b)  
Figure 20. (a) CRTs and (b) SSRTs, both with SEs for all trial types of emotion and 
arousal. 
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Pleasant-Scrambled and Unpleasant-Scrambled tasks 
 
Following the significant effect of emotion in the Pleasant-Unpleasant task, comparisons in all 
subsequent tasks involving scrambled trial-types focused on the comparison between emotion 
(angry or happy) versus scrambled stimuli. For this purpose all relevant trial-types were 
collapsed across arousal, to examine the main effects of angry vs. happy faces vs. scrambled 
images, depending on the task. Separate paired samples t-tests were used to examine differences 
in CRT and SSRT between happy vs. scrambled (Pleasant-Scrambled task) and angry vs. 
scrambled faces (Unpleasant-Scrambled task). Results demonstrated that response latencies for 
CRTs of happy targets were significantly faster compared to scrambled targets, t(63) = -.2.81, p 
= .007, r = .33, whereas the reverse (performance for happy targets slower) was found for 
SSRTs, t(63) = 5.61, p < .001, r = .58 (Pleasant-Scrambled task; see figure 10).  My analyses for 
the Unpleasant-Scrambled task indicated that response times for angry faces did not significantly 
differ from those for scrambled stimuli as regards to CRTs, t(64) = -.96, p = .34, r = .12. By 
contrast, angry targets exhibited slower SSRTs than scrambled stimulus-types, t(64) = 6.48, p < 
.001, r = .63. The three significant findings above for both Pleasant-Scrambled and Unpleasant-
Scrambled tasks also survived correction for multiple comparisons using Bonferroni adjustment 
– the corrected p-value for each of the two tasks was .03. Figure 21 displays mean (SE) CRTs 
and SSRTs for these results. 
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a)  
b)  
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c)  
d)  
Figure 21. Mean (SE) CRT and SSRT for the Pleasant-Scrambled (a and b, 
respectively) and Unpleasant-Scrambled tasks (c and d, respectively). 
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Male-Female task 
 
To examine the main effects of emotion and arousal, when these were not the focus of attention, 
2 (emotion: angry versus happy) X 2(arousal: high versus low) Repeated-Measures ANOVAs 
were performed on CRT and SSRT scores to allow direct comparisons with the findings from the 
Pleasant-Unpleasant task. For CRT there was a statistically significant main effect of arousal 
(F(1, 64) = 4.39, p = .04, ηp
2
 = .06), suggesting that response latencies on low arousal trials were 
faster than on high arousal trials. However, there was no significant main effect of emotion (F(1, 
64) = 1.00, p = .32, ηp
2
 = .02) nor an emotion X arousal interaction (F(1, 64) = 2.04, p = .16, ηp
2
 
= .03). For SSRTs this pattern of results was replicated in that there was a marginally significant 
main effect of arousal (F(1, 64) = 3.11, p = .08, ηp
2
 = .05; low arousal trials shorter SSRTs) and, 
again, no main effect of emotion (F(1, 64) = 1.95, p = .17, ηp
2
 = .03) and no statistically 
significant interaction (F(1, 64) = .06, p = .80, ηp
2
 < .01). Figure 22 displays CRTs (SEs) and 
SSRTs (SEs) to make a gender decision for the different trial-types. 
Next, to focus on the key condition of interest (i.e. emotion) and following on from the 
four tasks including scrambled trial-types I collapsed trial-types over arousal in the Pleasant-
Unpleasant and Male-Female tasks, resulting in two final trial-types of angry and happy. 
Following Pessoa, Padmala, Kenzer and Bauer (2012) I then created CRT, CRT SD and SSRT 
difference scores for each of the six stop signal tasks. Scores from happy trial types were 
subtracted from the corresponding scores of angry trial-types (A-H CRT score, A-H CRT SD 
score and A-H SSRT score hereafter)
29
. Moreover, scores from scrambled stimulus-types were 
                                               
29  These scores were created for the Pleasant-Unpleasant, the Male-Female, the Female-Scrambled and the Male-
Scrambled tasks. Section subheadings or clarifications in the actual sentence denote which of these four tasks a 
score was derived from (e.g. a subheading for the Pleasant-Unpleasant task means that scores discussed in this 
particular section are based on this task). A similar logic is applied to the A-SC and H-SC scores, which are derived 
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subtracted from trial-types of emotion (angry and happy; A-SC CRT score, A-SC CRT SD score, 
A-SC SSRT score, H-SC CRT score, H-SC CRT SD score, H-SC SSRT score hereafter). These 
new measures were created to account for individual differences in general response speed.  
I then performed two paired-samples t-tests on the A-H CRT and A-H SSRT scores of 
the Pleasant-Unpleasant versus the Male-Female tasks. Results showed that the A-H CRT score 
for the Pleasant-Unpleasant task (mean: 17.12, SD: 36.78) was significantly greater than that for 
the Male-Female task (mean: 1.86, SD: 14.23; t(63) = 3.10, p = .003, r = .36). Similar findings 
were obtained for the A-H SSRT score, with that for the Pleasant-Unpleasant task (mean: 13.35, 
SD: 52.76) being significantly larger than the one for the Male-Female task (mean: -3.35, SD: 
21.69; t(63) = -2.50, p = .02, r = .30). This suggests that the difference between angry and happy 
trial-types was more pronounced when emotion was directly task-relevant (Pleasant-Unpleasant 
task) as opposed to when it was distracting information (Male-Female task). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
from the Pleasant-Scrambled, the Unpleasant-Scrambled, the Female-Scrambled and the Male-Scrambled tasks. 
Again, section subheadings or clarifications in the sentence denote which of these four tasks a score is based on. 
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a)  
b)  
Figure 22. CRTs (a) and SSRTs (b) with SEs for all trial-types of the Male-Female 
task. 
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Male-Scrambled and Female-Scrambled tasks 
 
A series of One-way Repeated-Measures ANOVAs was run for the Male-Scrambled and 
Female-Scrambled tasks with emotion (angry, happy, scrambled) as factor; all pairwise 
comparisons were adjusted using Bonferroni correction. For the Female-Scrambled task I found 
statistically significant differences between the means for CRTs (F(2, 130) = 3.77, p = .03, ηp
2
 = 
.06). However, pairwise comparisons showed that only the difference in response times between 
happy (faster) and scrambled stimuli reached marginal significance (p = .09, 95% CI -21.71; 
1.05) – all other comparisons were non-significant (ps > .29). There were also statistically 
significant differences between the means for SSRTs (F(2, 130) = 43.49, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .40). 
Pairwise comparisons indicated that stop latencies of angry (p < .001, 95% CI 66.13; 142.68) and 
happy trial-types (p < .001, 95% CI 64.63; 138.32) were statistically significantly slower 
compared to those of scrambled trials, but angry versus happy stimulus-types did not 
significantly differ from each other (p = 1.0, 95% CI -8.14; 14.00). These results are presented in 
Figure 23. 
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a)  
b)  
Figure 23. Mean CRTs (a) and SSRTs (b) with SEs for the Female-Scrambled task. 
 
For the Male-Scrambled task the tests also revealed statistically significant differences 
between the means for CRTs (F(2, 130) = 3.57, p = .03, ηp
2
 = .05). Again, pairwise comparisons 
only detected a marginally significant difference on performance for happy versus scrambled 
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trial-types (p = .09, 95% CI -20.48; .93), the other comparisons did not reach significance (all ps 
> .24). Statistically significant differences between the means were also observed for stopping 
latencies (F(2, 130) = 50.18, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .44). Similar to the Female-Scrambled task, pairwise 
comparisons demonstrated that this effect was explained by differences between angry (p < .001; 
95% CI 68.03; 135.89) and happy (p < .001; 95% CI 68.59; 139.69) versus scrambled trial-types 
– angry versus happy targets did not differ from each other on stopping performance (p = 1.0, 
95% CI -14.10; 9.74). These findings are shown in Figure 24. 
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a)  
b)  
Figure 24. Means and SEs for CRT (a) and SSRT (b) data for the Male-Scrambled task. 
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3) Individual difference analyses 
 
In summary, the results for the stop signal task have shown so far that angry and happy cues 
produce slower SSRTs compared to scrambled images, regardless of whether the former are 
target cues or distracter cues. By contrast, happy cues are faster than scrambled stimuli for CRT, 
whereas angry cues do not differ in such response latencies from scrambled ones – again, these 
effects hold true for both when the emotional cues are targets versus distracters. In a direct 
comparison, performance for angry targets is shown to be slower than that for happy targets 
(CRT and SSRT), albeit these emotional cues do not differ from each other when functioning as 
distracters (CRT and SSRT). So, in other words, the difference in performance between angry 
and happy trial-types was more striking when emotion was the target (Pleasant-Unpleasant task) 
as compared to when it was distracting information (Male-Female task). Indeed, for gender 
targets, distracters differ on arousal (low arousal cues faster; both CRT and SSRT) and, 
interestingly, when emotional cues are targets, for CRTs they interact with arousal distracter cues 
– angry targets produce a stronger slowing effect with high arousing distracter cues. In short, 
these findings suggest that the interference from threatening relative to happy faces is most 
salient when these cues are targets, although general effects of emotion over control stimuli 
(here: scrambled images) were observed for both emotional target as well as distracter cues. 
As for the individual difference measures, based on the Mathews and Mackintosh model 
(Mathews et al., 1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998) and the mental noise hypothesis 
(Robinson & Tamir, 2005), I expected that attentional bias to threat as well as intra-individual 
variability are increased (as reflected in large positive difference scores) at elevated levels of trait 
neuroticism. This effect should, according to the Mathews and Mackintosh model, be more 
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prominent when threat acts as a distracting cue amongst a set of other cues, as in the gender 
decision task, but be lessened on trials where there is only one main cue (emotion decision task). 
Furthermore, I predicted that heightened voluntary control (reappraisal or attentional control) 
diminishes the effect of neuroticism on the appraisal of threat as well as intra-individual 
variability.  
In line with these predictions, first, a series of Pearson correlations was conducted 
between the difference scores  (involving mean CRTs, CRT SDs and SSRTs) from all six stop 
signal tasks versus neuroticism, state and trait anxiety, verbal intelligence, reappraisal, 
attentional control and the two Ospan measures (i.e. total and absolute scores). I found weak-to-
moderate negative correlations between the A-H SSRT score for the Pleasant-Unpleasant task 
and the absolute and total Ospan scores (r = -.30, p = .023 and r = -.28, p = .04, respectively). 
Moreover, the A-H SSRT score for the Male-Female task produced significant weak-to-moderate 
correlations with reappraisal (negative association) and trait anxiety (positive association; r = -
.29, p = .02 and r = .26, p = .04, respectively). Trait anxiety also exhibited weak-to-moderate 
positive correlations with the A-H CRT score of the Female-Scrambled task (r = .25, p = .04), 
the A-H CRT SD score of the Pleasant-Unpleasant task (r = .30, p = .02) as well as the H-SC 
CRT SD score of the Male-Scrambled task (r = .32, p = .01). Finally, neuroticism was weak-to-
moderately correlated with the A-H CRT SD score of the Pleasant-Unpleasant task (positive 
association: r = .28, p = .03), whereas the H-SC SSRT score of the Pleasant-Scrambled task 
showed a weak-to-moderate negative correlation with state anxiety (r = -.27, p = .04). It should 
be noted, however, that the aforementioned correlations for the stop signal paradigm were only 
significant at the conventional significance level. When correcting for multiple comparisons 
none of these correlations remained statistically significant. 
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Consistent with the procedure from the Word-Face Stroop paradigm and, again, using the 
MODPROBE macro of Hayes and Matthes (2009) for this purpose, I explored the prediction that 
reappraisal or attentional control (M) moderate the strength of the association between 
neuroticism (focal predictor; F) and the A-H CRT, A-H CRT SD and A-H SSRT scores of the 
Pleasant-Unpleasant and Male-Female tasks (outcome variables). As before, the absolute and 
total Ospan scores as well as either reappraisal or attentional control were entered as covariates 
in each regression model. This prediction was, on the whole, supported with some significant, 
albeit weak in terms of variance accounted for, interaction effects. Each of these moderation 
effects will be discussed in turn for each outcome variable. 
 
Pleasant-Unpleasant task 
CRT, CRT SD and SSRT 
The interaction between neuroticism and reappraisal/ attentional control with regard to the A-H 
CRT and A-H CRT SD scores as respective outcome variables was not significant (A-H CRT 
score – reappraisal: b = -.68, t(49) = -1.93, p = .06; see Table 1a, column 2; attentional control: b 
= -.18, t(49) = -1.01, p = .32; see Table 2a, column 2; A-H CRT SD score – reappraisal: b = -.21, 
t(49) = -1.23, p = .23; see Table 3, column 1; attentional control: b = -.05, t(49) = -.57, p = .57; 
see Table 4, column 1), neither was the moderation effect between neuroticism and attentional 
control concerning the A-H SSRT score (b = -.63, t(49) = -1.88, p = .07; see Table 2a, column 
1). However, as can be seen from Table 1a (column 1), my results show a statistically significant 
interactive effect of neuroticism and reappraisal on the A-H SSRT score (b = -1.42, t(49) = -2.15, 
p = .04). Whereas 21% of the variance in the A-H SSRT score was accounted for by the 
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regression model, an additional 8% of the variance was solely explained by the interaction (see 
Table 1a). An effect size of this magnitude for the interaction is not entirely unexpected, given 
that the variance explained by moderation effects is usually comparatively small (Chaplin, 1991). 
The interaction suggests that the level of reappraisal affects the impact of neuroticism. So, in 
individuals with low levels of reappraisal (mean: 23.89; b = 11.65, SE = 5.12, t(49) = 2.28, p = 
.03, 95% CI = 1.36; 21.94), neuroticism was related to the A-H SSRT score as expected (high 
neuroticism = large positive difference, low neuroticism = large negative difference; see thin 
smooth line, figure 15) – a positive A-H SSRT score indicates that responses to angry 
expressions were slower. In other words, the higher the level of neuroticism, the more 
participants are slowed by angry expressions.
30
 For individuals of medium and high levels of 
reappraisal this association was not statistically significant, however (medium reappraisal: mean: 
29.00; b = 4.41, SE = 4.73, t(49) = .93, p = .36, 95% CI = -5.10; 13.92; high reappraisal: mean: 
34.11; b = -2.83, SE = 6.42, t(49) = -.44, p = .66, 95% CI = -15.73; 10.07). Next, I used the 
Johnson–Neymann (J-N) technique of the modprobe macro to examine the features of the 
interaction in more detail (Hayes & Matthes, 2009). This technique determines the thresholds(s) 
to significance on the spectrum of the moderator variable, i.e. the transition point(s) or value(s) 
of the moderator variable where the association between the predictor and the outcome reaches 
significance. Here, at a reappraisal sumscore of 25 (out of a maximum of 42), the conditional 
effect of neuroticism on the A-H SSRT score shifted in significance (i.e. significant below this 
point and non-significant above; b = 9.61, SE = 4.78, t(49) = 2.01, p = .05, 95% CI = .00; 19.21) 
– this score (i.e. 25) was at the 21st percentile in our sample distribution. The interaction is 
displayed in Figure 25. 
                                               
30 Given the observed slowing effect of performance towards angry targets and that both angry and happy SSRTs 
were slower compared to scrambled SSRTs (see ANOVAs), it seems unlikely that a large, positive A-H SSRT score 
would be due to a facilitation effect of responses to happy faces. 
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Figure 25. The A-H SSRT score was plotted against neuroticism. Participants were split into 
subgroups of high (+1SD), medium (mean) and low (-1SD) reappraisal for the purpose of 
displaying the interaction. 
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Male-Female task 
 
CRT, CRT SD and SSRT 
 
In line with my predictions the interaction effect of neuroticism and reappraisal was statistically 
significant with the A-H CRT score (b = -.41, t(50) = -2.53, p = .02; see Table 1b, column 2), 
accounting for 11% of unique variance in this outcome variable. It should be noted though that 
the conditional effects of the focal predictor at different levels of the moderator variable were 
only marginally significant at best. In particular, results showed a marginally significant 
association for individuals of low reappraisal, whereby, similar to the Pleasant-Unpleasant task, 
the higher the level of neuroticism of a person was, the slower were his/her responses to targets 
with angry distracters (mean: 23.97; b = 2.02, SE = 1.27, t(50) = 1.59, p = .12, 95% CI = -.54; 
4.56). Once more, the conditional effects were not significant for medium and high levels of 
reappraisal, but showed, with a weak trend, some resemblance to the pattern of results from the 
Pleasant-Unpleasant task (mean: 29.04; b = -.08, SE = 1.18, t(50) = -.07, p = .94, 95% CI = -
2.45; 2.28; mean: 34.10; b = -2.18, SE = 1.59, t(50) = -1.37, p = .18, 95% CI = -5.38; 1.02, 
respectively). To further probe the interaction I, as before, employed the J-N technique using the 
modprobe macro (Hayes & Matthes, 2009). This revealed a transition in significance at a 
reappraisal sumscore of ~ 22/42 (i.e. the 4.5
th
 percentile in our sample distribution; again, scores 
below this threshold reached significance, scores above did not; b = 2.95, SE = 1.47, t(50) = 
2.01, p = .05, 95% CI = .00; 5.89).  
 The moderation effect of neuroticism and reappraisal on the A-H CRT SD score also 
reached statistical significance (b = -.43, t(50) = -3.36, p < .01; see Table 3, column 2), 
explaining 17% of distinct variance in this outcome variable. This time the conditional effects 
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were not significant at low and medium levels of reappraisal (mean: 23.97; b = .84, SE = .99, 
t(50) = .85, p = .40, 95% CI = -1.15; 2.83; mean: 29.04; b = -1.33, SE = .92, t(50) = -1.45, p = 
.15, 95% CI = -3.18; .52), with a significant association between neuroticism and the A-H CRT 
SD score at high levels of reappraisal (mean: 34.10; b = -3.50, SE = 1.24, t(50) = -2.82, p < .01, 
95% CI = -6.00; -1.00). Employing the J-N technique of the modprobe macro (Hayes & Matthes, 
2009), I further probed this interaction. Results showed a transition in significance at a 
reappraisal sumscore of ~20/42 (i.e. the 3
rd
 percentile in our sample distribution; again, scores 
below this threshold reached significance, scores above did not up until a second transition point; 
b = 2.64, SE = 1.32, t(50) = 2.01, p = .05, 95% CI = .00; 5.29) as well as ~31/42 (i.e. the 68
th
 
percentile in our sample distribution; here, scores above this threshold reached significance, 
scores below did not up until the former transition point (i.e. ~20/40); b = -1.97, SE = .98, t(50) = 
-2.01, p = .05, 95% CI = -3.95; .00). Thus, at low levels of reappraisal, the higher the level of 
neuroticism, the more variable participants’ performance was towards threatening information, 
whereas, at elevated levels of reappraisal, the higher the level of neuroticism, the less variable 
participants’ performance was towards threatening information. 
 Against my expectations, there was no interaction effect of neuroticism and 
reappraisal/attentional control on the A-H SSRT score (reappraisal: b = -.25, t(49) = -.93, p = 
.36; see Table 1b, column 1; attentional control: b = -.13, t(49) = -1.00, p = .32; see Table 2b, 
column 1), nor was there an interaction effect between neuroticism and attentional control 
concerning the A-H CRT and A-H CRT SD scores (A-H CRT: b = -.09, t(49) = -1.10, p = .28; 
see Table 2b, column 2; A-H CRT SD: b = -.09, t(49) = -1.25, p = .22; see Table 4, column 2). 
Figure 26 presents the interaction effect of the A-H CRT score, and Figure 27 the interaction 
effect of the A-H CRT SD score. 
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Figure 26. Neuroticism plotted against the A-H CRT score for three different subgroups of 
reappraisal (low, medium, high).  
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Figure 27. Neuroticism plotted against the A-H CRT SD score for three different subgroups of 
reappraisal (low, medium, high).  
 
These moderation effects were unique to A-H scores from the Pleasant-Unpleasant and 
Male-Female tasks. Exploratory analyses with the remaining difference scores did not yield any 
statistically significant effects after correcting for multiple comparisons.
31
  
 
 
                                               
31 Only 3 (out of 48) exploratory moderation analyses reached the conventional level of significance: the interaction 
of neuroticism and attentional control with regard to the H-SC CRT SD score of the Pleasant-Scrambled task (b = 
.28, t(49) = 1.07, p = .01) and the interactions of neuroticism and reappraisal with regard to the H-SC CRT SD score 
(b = -.48, t(49) = -2.28, p = .03) as well as the A-H CRT SD score (b = .58, t(49) = 2.92, p < .01) of the Female-
Scrambled task, all other ps > .05). 
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Table 1. OLS regression estimating indicators of the A-H scores from neuroticism, reappraisal, 
as well as their interaction, with attentional control and the absolute and total Ospan scores as 
covariates. 
 
a)  
                  
 
Pleasant-Unpleasant task 
 
A-H SSRT score     
 
A-H CRT score     
  b          SE t           p   b          SE t           p 
Constant   -184.03 120.03 -1.53 0.13 
 
-40.38 63.96 -0.63 0.53 
Attentional Control (W1) 0.42 1.10 0.38 0.70 
 
-0.71 0.59 -1.21 0.23 
Absolute Ospan score 
(W2) -0.45 0.81 -0.56 0.58 
 
0.07 0.43 0.16 0.88 
Total Ospan score (W3) -0.59 1.04 -0.57 0.57 
 
-0.53 0.56 -0.95 0.35 
Neuroticism (F) 45.54 18.57 2.45 0.02 
 
20.90 9.90 2.11 0.04 
Reappraisal (M) 6.69 3.75 1.78 0.08 
 
3.69 2.00 1.85 0.07 
F x M -1.42 0.66 -2.15 0.04   -0.68 0.35 -1.93 0.06 
 
b)  
                  
 
Male-Female task 
 
A-H SSRT score     
 
A-H CRT score     
  b          SE t           p   b          SE t           p 
Constant   -67.40 48.52 -1.39 0.17 
 
-38.76 29.59 -1.31 0.20 
Attentional Control (W1) 0.75 0.44 1.69 0.10 
 
-0.04 0.27 -0.15 0.88 
Absolute Ospan score 
(W2) -0.19 0.33 -0.57 0.57 
 
0.01 0.20 0.06 0.96 
Total Ospan score (W3) 0.36 0.42 0.85 0.40 
 
-0.26 0.26 -1.00 0.32 
Neuroticism (F) 9.49 7.56 1.25 0.22 
 
11.94 4.61 2.59 0.01 
Reappraisal (M) -0.04 1.53 -0.03 0.98 
 
1.91 0.93 2.05 0.05 
F x M -0.25 0.27 -0.93 0.36   -0.41 0.16 -2.53 0.01 
 
Note: (a) Pleasant-Unpleasant task: A-H score (SSRT): R
2
 = 0.21, F(6, 49) = 2.20, p = 0.6, 
R
2inter
 = 0.08, F = 4.63, p = 0.036; A-H score (CRT): R
2
 = 0.18, F(6, 49) = 1.78, p = 0.12, R
2inter
 
= 0.06, F = 3.73, p = 0.06; (b) Male-Female task: A-H score (SSRT): R
2
 = 0.18, F(6, 50) = 1.77, 
p = 0.12, R
2inter
 = 0.01, F = .86, p = 0.36; A-H score (CRT): R
2
 = 0.18, F(6, 50) = 1.87, p = 
0.11, R
2inter
 = 0.11, F = 6.42, p = 0.02. 
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Table 2. OLS regression estimating indicators of the A-H scores from neuroticism, attentional 
control, as well as their interaction, with reappraisal and the absolute and total Ospan scores as 
covariates. 
 
a) 
  Pleasant-Unpleasant task 
 A-H SSRT score      A-H CRT score     
  b          SE t           p   b          SE t           p 
Constant   -122.88 108.46 -1.13 0.26  7.97 58.73 0.14 0.89 
Reappraisal (W1) -1.52 1.69 -0.90 0.37  -0.06 0.91 -0.07 0.95 
Absolute Ospan score 
(W2) -0.18 0.86 -0.20 0.84  0.09 0.47 0.19 0.85 
Total Ospan score (W3) -0.87 1.10 -0.79 0.43  -0.52 0.60 -0.88 0.38 
Neuroticism (F) 35.46 15.90 2.23 0.03  10.74 8.61 1.25 0.22 
Attentional Control 
(M) 4.05 1.94 2.09 0.04  0.46 1.05 0.43 0.67 
F x M -0.63 0.33 -1.88 0.07   -0.18 0.18 -1.01 0.32 
 
b) 
  Male-Female task 
 A-H SSRT score      A-H CRT score     
  b          SE t           p   b          SE t           p 
Constant   -61.31 43.74 -1.40 0.17  -7.28 28.03 -0.26 0.80 
Reappraisal (W1) -1.54 0.67 -2.28 0.03  -0.38 0.43 -0.89 0.38 
Absolute Ospan score 
(W2) -0.12 0.35 -0.34 0.74  0.01 0.22 0.03 0.98 
Total Ospan score (W3) 0.30 0.44 0.68 0.50  -0.22 0.28 -0.80 0.43 
Neuroticism (F) 8.76 6.36 1.38 0.17  4.92 4.07 1.21 0.23 
Attentional Control (M) 1.51 0.78 1.93 0.06  0.61 0.50 1.21 0.23 
F x M -0.13 0.13 -1.00 0.32   -0.09 0.09 -1.10 0.28 
 
Note: (a) Pleasant-Unpleasant task: A-H score (SSRT): R
2
 = 0.20, F(6, 49) = 1.99, p = 0.09, 
R
2inter
 = 0.06, F = 3.55, p = 0.07; A-H score (CRT): R
2
 = 0.14, F(6, 49) = 1.27, p = 0.29, R
2inter
 = 
0.02, F = 1.03, p = 0.32; (b) Male-Female task: A-H score (SSRT): R
2
 = 0.18, F(6, 50) = 1.80, p 
= 0.12, R
2inter
 = 0.02, F = 1.00, p = 0.32; A-H score (CRT): R
2
 = 0.10, F(6, 50) = .93, p = .49, 
R
2inter
 = 0.02, F = 1.22, p = 0.28.
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Table 3. OLS regression estimating indicators of the A-H scores from neuroticism, reappraisal, 
as well as their interaction, with attentional control and the absolute and total Ospan scores as 
covariates. 
                    
 
A-H CRT SD score 
 
Pleasant-Unpleasant task 
 
Male-Female task 
  b          SE t           p   b          SE t           p 
Constant   -17.09 31.62 -0.54 0.59 
 
-36.75 23.10 -1.59 0.12 
Attentional Control (W1) -0.44 0.29 -1.50 0.14 
 
-0.17 0.21 -0.83 0.41 
Absolute Ospan score 
(W2) 0.30 0.21 1.41 0.17 
 
0.15 0.16 0.93 0.36 
Total Ospan score (W3) -0.54 0.27 -1.97 0.05 
 
-0.39 0.20 -1.92 0.06 
Neuroticism (F) 7.40 4.89 1.51 0.14 
 
11.10 3.60 3.08 p < .01 
Reappraisal (M) 1.73 0.99 1.75 0.09 
 
2.22 0.73 3.05 p < .01 
F x M -0.21 0.17 -1.23 0.23   -0.43 0.13 -3.36 p < .01 
 
Note: (a) Pleasant-Unpleasant task: R
2
 = 0.22, F(6, 49) = 2.31, p = 0.05, R
2inter
 = 0.02, F = 1.50, 
p = 0.23; (b) Male-Female task: R
2
 = 0.26, F(6, 50) = 2.87, p = .02, R
2inter
 = 0.17, F = 11.26, p < 
.01. 
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Table 4. OLS regression estimating indicators of the A-H scores from neuroticism, attentional 
control, as well as their interaction, with reappraisal and the absolute and total Ospan scores as 
covariates. 
 
                    
  A-H CRT SD score 
 
Pleasant-Unpleasant task 
 
Male-Female task 
  b          SE t           p   b          SE t           p 
Constant   -0.77 28.62 -0.03 0.98 
 
-2.41 22.72 -0.11 0.92 
Reappraisal (W1) 0.56 0.45 1.25 0.22 
 
-0.14 0.35 -0.39 0.70 
Absolute Ospan score 
(W2) 0.30 0.23 1.31 0.20 
 
0.13 0.18 0.72 0.48 
Total Ospan score (W3) -0.53 0.29 -1.83 0.07 
 
-0.34 0.23 -1.49 0.14 
Neuroticism (F) 3.89 4.20 0.93 0.36 
 
3.35 3.30 1.02 0.31 
Attentional Control (M) -0.10 0.51 -0.20 0.84 
 
0.44 0.41 1.09 0.28 
F x M -0.05 0.09 -0.57 0.57   -0.09 0.07 -1.25 0.22 
 
Note: (a) Pleasant-Unpleasant task: R
2
 = 0.20, F(6, 49) = 2.06, p = 0.08, R
2inter
 < 0.01, F = .33, p 
= 0.57; (b) Male-Female task: R
2
 = 0.12, F(6, 50) = 1.10, p = .38, R
2inter
 = 0.03, F = 1.57, p = 
0.22. 
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In summary, there were no consistent correlations between the difference scores and the 
individual difference variables. However, the association between neuroticism and the A-H 
scores was moderated by reappraisal for SSRT (but not CRT or CRT SD) when emotion was 
task-relevant (Pleasant-Unpleasant task) and for CRT and CRT SD (but not SSRT) when 
emotion served as distracting information (Male-Female task). These interactions indicated that 
for low levels of reappraisal high neuroticism was related to slowed performance when exposed 
to angry targets (SSRT) or distracters (CRT). For higher levels of reappraisal this association 
became non-significant. Additionally, for CRT SD scores (Male-Female task) the results 
indicated that, at low levels of reappraisal, the higher the level of neuroticism, the more variable 
participants’ performance was towards threatening information, whereas, at elevated levels of 
reappraisal, the higher the level of neuroticism, the less variable participants’ performance was 
towards threatening information. 
 
Discussion. 
 
I predicted that threatening stimuli impair performance, with this bias being more pronounced at 
high levels of trait neuroticism and when more than one cue is displayed per trial. Moreover, 
high levels of trait neuroticism were expected to be linked with greater intra-individual 
variability on go trials. Furthermore, I hypothesized that elevated levels of voluntary control 
(reappraisal or attentional control) decrease the impact of neuroticism on intra-individual 
variability on go trials and on threat appraisal. In line with these predictions, I found that angry 
targets produce greater interference relative to happy ones (SSRT and CRT), with this effect only 
being significant when emotion is task-relevant. Moreover, for gender targets results showed 
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speeded stop and response latencies for low (versus high) arousal distracter cues, whereas, when 
emotion is task-relevant, arousal interacts with valence (angry targets exhibit greater interference 
with high arousing distracter cues). Also in line with my hypotheses, for low levels of reappraisal 
high neuroticism was related to slowed performance when exposed to angry targets (SSRT) or 
distracters (CRT). Additionally, at low levels of reappraisal, elevated trait neuroticism was 
associated with increased variability for angry distracters (CRT SD scores). By contrast, at upper 
levels of reappraisal, high trait neuroticism was linked with decreased intra-individual variability 
towards threatening information (CRT SD scores).  
 These results extend previous findings (Pessoa et al., 2012; Verbruggen & De Houwer, 
2007), confirming that arousal does play a role when emotion is task-irrelevant and that effects 
of valence are obtained when emotion is task-relevant. This is also consistent with proposals that 
threat impacts on a common resource pool, leading to impaired performance (Pessoa, 2009). 
According to the Dual-competition model, response inhibition is related to this common resource 
pool. Recent studies suggest that stop signal performance loads highly on this common factor of 
cognitive control (Miyake & Friedman, 2012). Indeed, as these authors show, inhibitory 
functions are particularly strongly linked to the common resources. So, when threatening 
material taps into the resource pool, this will likely have a substantial impact on diminishing the 
available resources for exerting response inhibition (Pessoa, 2009).  
The data presented in this chapter also supports, at least in some contexts, the regulatory 
role of reappraisal on the association between neuroticism and A-H scores. This is the first time 
that reappraisal has been shown to buffer the impact of neuroticism on stop signal performance 
and provides a useful extension of cognitive models of threat processing (Bishop, 2007; 
Mathews et al., 1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Pessoa, 2009). The Mathews and 
185 
 
Mackintosh model stipulates that elevated anxiety and neuroticism are linked to a stronger 
activation of the threat evaluation system, which, in turn, leads to greater processing resources 
being directed towards the threatening information. Blechert et al. (2012) have demonstrated that 
reappraisal can substantially reduce the extent to which cortical resources, as measured by ERPs, 
are activated in the context of threat. My results indicate that individuals high in neuroticism 
with adequate emotion regulation skills can counter the enhanced sensitivity of the threat 
evaluation system such that threatening content is stopped from further impinging onto the 
cortical processing resources, thereby leaving stop signal performance relatively unimpaired in 
these individuals. 
It is of note that angry targets seem to exhaust resources for both going and stopping in 
the Pleasant-Unpleasant task. However, this is not found for the remaining emotional decision 
tasks (Pleasant-Scrambled and Unpleasant-Scrambled) nor for any of the gender decision tasks. 
Here, except for the Male-Female task where no main effect of valence is observed, angry faces 
produce slower SSRTs and faster CRT compared to scrambled images. One reason for this 
discrepancy between the results of the Pleasant-Unpleasant and the other tasks involving 
scrambled stimuli could be that in the former it is necessary for correct task performance to focus 
on the emotional cue. In all of the tasks involving scrambled images participants might have 
engaged in a slightly different strategy, however. Namely, instead of basing their decision, as 
instructed, on either the gender or emotion cue, participants may have decided on each trial 
whether the image was a face or non-face (scrambled). This strategy would have facilitated their 
performance on the task as this decision involves less cognitive steps compared to an emotion or 
gender decision (Bruce & Young, 1986; Young & Bruce, 2011), whilst still allowing them to 
perform correctly. The consequence of this strategy is that the emotional cue would be rendered 
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task-irrelevant even if, according to the task instruction (Un-/Pleasant-Scrambled tasks), it 
should be task-relevant. Following on from this argument, the current findings may suggest that 
when threat is directly task-relevant – and threat meaning is more deeply processed at late stages 
of processing, as in the Pleasant-Unpleasant task – threat may exhaust the common pool 
resources (Pessoa, 2009) at both executive (CRTs) and inhibitory (SSRTs) levels. By contrast, 
when task-irrelevant, as in the other tasks according to this point, its impact would be lessened, 
hence only leading to interference with SSRTs. This argument, that in all four tasks involving 
scrambled faces (i.e. two for emotion decision and two for gender decision) the emotional 
component might have been task irrelevant for participants when making their responses, could 
also explain why all four tasks have similar findings.  
Given that the scrambled faces, which I used as control stimuli, can also be considered 
non-face stimuli, it is unclear whether any differences between emotional vs. scrambled images 
arose due to the effects of (a) emotional vs. neutral or (b) face vs. non-face cues. Generally, calm 
or other neutral face images might be used as control stimuli to address this issue. In this 
particular paradigm calm or other neutral faces were, however, avoided due to their ambiguous 
nature in a gender decision task. For example, in a task involving a decision between male vs. 
calm faces, calm images will be also be of a specific gender (here: male), hence simultaneously 
being associated with both available response options (calm and male) and thereby creating 
ambiguity.
32
 For this reason, scrambled images were preferred as control images as they are not 
linked to any specific gender, incurring the disadvantage that any differences between emotional 
and scrambled images may be due to two reasons (a vs. b, see above). It is thus not possible to 
                                               
32 Using calm, female faces would result in a similar dilemma in that the “not male” response option would then be 
linked to two different cues (calm vs. female), thus not constituting an unambiguous neutral control condition. 
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unambiguously determine whether any direct interference or facilitation effects are due to the 
specific emotional or the more general face components of the stimuli. 
Typical for stop signal tasks, it is unclear in this study to what degree performance on 
stop trials can be explained by motor inhibition versus target detection, a process that is activated 
on stop trials by the fact that an additional, salient cue (= stop signal) appears requiring detection 
(Hampshire et al., 2010). Behaviourally, these processes are difficult to disentangle. Previous 
research has tried to address this by, for example, displaying a similar cue to that of the stop 
signal on each trial (e.g. a blue rectangle), with the colour or another dimension of the cue 
changing (e.g. from blue to red) to indicate a stop signal trial (Sagaspe et al., 2011). However, 
even in this case it remains that some features change between go and stop trials (e.g. colour), 
which, again, will need to be detected to ensure correct task performance. Hence, the issue of 
target detection versus response inhibition is not conclusively addressed, as the fact remains that 
stop vs. go trials differ on at least one feature (e.g. colour of the stop signal). Alternatively, 
analogously to Hampshire et al.'s (2010) imaging study, one could create an additional task that 
mainly measures target detection and then subtract behavioural performance on this task from 
that in the stop signal task, thereby potentially controlling for any processes related to target 
detection. However, such an additional task was not run for this study nor is it clear how exactly 
such a “subtraction process” might be implemented. It therefore remains subject to future 
investigations to determine to what degree threat produces a slowing effect on stop signal trials 
due to affecting motor inhibition or target detection (or both). 
A striking feature of the results is that an interaction of neuroticism and reappraisal in 
predicting threat appraisal was found with SSRTs (but not CRTs or CRT SDs) when emotion 
was task-relevant and with CRTs and CRT SDs (but not SSRTs) when it was task-irrelevant. 
188 
 
This finding might be accounted for by the effect of these traits on the different underlying 
processes of these measures (executive response vs. response inhibition) at varying levels of 
task-relevance of emotion. So, when emotion is task-relevant these traits seem to be mainly 
associated with threat in the context of response inhibition, whereas when emotion is task-
irrelevant they seem to be mainly associated with threat in terms of its effect on the executive 
response. This might be explained by the effect of task-relevance of emotion on these cognitive 
control processes. Alternatively, this might be due to the perception of threat as a result of these 
control processes and task-relevance. For example, one could argue that on stop signal trials in 
the emotional decision task the emotional cue is task-relevant, due to the emotional decision on 
the corresponding go trials of this task, but obsolete; on go trials in the gender task the emotional 
cue is task-irrelevant but not obsolete as the target face cue still needs to be processed 
(intermediate levels of processing). On go trials in the emotion task, in turn, emotion is directly 
task-relevant (and not obsolete), whereas on stop trials in the gender task the emotional cue is not 
only task-irrelevant, but has also become obsolete (= absolute levels of processing). It may be 
possible that neuroticism and reappraisal interact with threat appraisal mainly at more 
intermediate, but not at absolute, levels of processing. 
Although this study was not conducted on a psychiatric sample, the findings nevertheless 
have interesting implications for healthy and clinical populations. The data suggest that the 
impact of neuroticism on threat appraisal can be buffered by good reappraisal skills. Reappraisal 
has been an integral part of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy in the form of cognitive restructuring 
since its inception (Beck et al., 1979) and has been shown to be amenable to training (Schartau, 
Dalgleish, & Dunn, 2009). Future avenues might therefore entail an examination of whether 
participants (clinical or non-clinical) with initially poor habitual use of reappraisal can be trained 
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to increase their use and whether such increased use of reappraisal might, in turn, be reflected in 
a more adaptive appraisal of threat (e.g. in a response inhibition paradigm). It will therefore be 
crucial not only to extend this work to more experimental based methods of reappraisal (Troy et 
al., 2010), but also to determine if different types of reappraisal maybe more or less suitable for 
reducing the effect of neuroticism on threat appraisal (vanOyen Witvliet, Knoll, Hinman, & 
DeYoung, 2010).  
A further issue that deserves consideration is which aspect of the stimulus in this study 
was the subject of reappraisal respectively was attended to. It is, for example, conceivable that 
individuals of higher trait levels of reappraisal were more adapt at attending to certain features of 
the face stimuli that allowed them to perform with decent accuracy whilst at the same time 
avoiding those features that are more closely associated with threat, such as the eye region (Fox 
& Damjanovic, 2006). Indeed, such a strategy might produce “buffer effects”, even if 
participants did not utilise their reappraisal skills to this end, using strategies of selective 
attention to regulate their emotions instead. This point could usefully be addressed using eye-
tracking methods. It is also unclear what levels of processing participants’ reappraisal strategies 
involved. Research has shown that reappraisal can operate at implicit as well as explicit task 
levels (Blechert et al., 2012), leaving open the question to what degree reappraisal is necessarily 
a conscious or deliberate process, especially when in habitual form, or to what degree more 
semantic processing was involved. It seems unlikely that participants engaged in more 
deliberative processing because of the relatively brief trial durations and because reappraisal did 
not significantly buffer the impact of threat when it needed to be directly appraised (go trials in 
emotion decision task). Future studies might want to further investigate the specific (re)appraisal 
190 
 
processes that participants may have employed in order to reduce the impact of threat by means 
of, for example, post-experiment interviews, targeted self-report measures etc. 
To conclude, in line with relevant models of emotional reactivity and threat processing 
(Bishop, 2007; Mathews et al., 1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Pessoa, 2009; Robinson & 
Tamir, 2005) results from this study have not only shown that threat, when task-relevant, impairs 
executive and stopping responses, but also that neuroticism and reappraisal interact in predicting 
threat appraisal in some circumstances. This is an important and novel extension of these models, 
particularly in view of the clinical relevance of emotion regulation (Aldao et al., 2010; Gross & 
Munoz, 1995).  
 
 
191 
 
Chapter 6: General discussion 
 
Cognitive models of threat processing maintain that threat, depending on the task at hand, can 
speed (when task relevant) or impair (when task irrelevant) cognitive performance (Pessoa, 
2009). It is generally assumed that attentional bias to threat is modulated by anxiety, with 
increased anxiety leading to increased bias (Bishop, 2007; Mathews et al., 1997; Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 1998). Evidence suggests that such biases are not actually specific to anxiety, 
however, and instead are linked to the broader personality spectrum of negative affect or 
neuroticism (Griffith et al., 2010; Clark & Watson, 1991; Clark, Watson, & Mineka, 1994), of 
which anxiety, like depression and aggression, is but one facet. Further, according to certain 
models (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998), such emotion-linked attentional biases to threat may be 
modulated both by task demands, and also by individual differences in ‘regulatory’ traits or 
cognitive functions, including emotion regulation and attentional control abilities.  
The majority of previous studies on cognition-emotion interactions have focused on the 
influence of threat on spatial and temporal aspects of attention, as assayed by tasks such as dot-
probe detection and attentional blink. It has recently been suggested, however (Pessoa, 2009), 
that threat material may also influence higher-level cognitive control processes, such as response 
inhibition. In particular, Pessoa (2009) proposed a dual competition framework to describe 
cognitive-emotional interactions, such that emotional content influences both perceptual and 
cognitive control competition processes (Pessoa, 2009). Mildly intense emotional stimuli are 
suggested to have enhanced sensory representation and thereby improve behavioural 
performance, especially when task relevant. By contrast, high-arousal stimuli (e.g. angry threats) 
are proposed to generally impair performance on tasks of cognitive control (e.g. response 
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inhibition) since they consume processing resources that are shared with cognitive control tasks 
(see also Bishop, 2007).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 28: Dual competition model illustrating the impact of stimulus-driven and state-
dependent effects on cognitive control functions (grey circles) and the common resource pool 
(blue circle). Thick (thin) arrow denotes stimuli of elevated (lower/state) threat levels (adapted 
from Pessoa, 2009). 
 
 
In the present thesis, I examined the influence of emotional content (arousal and valence) on 
different tasks of selective attention and cognitive control: the Stroop interference task, the 
Flanker paradigm, and the Stop-signal reaction time task (SSRT). In addition, I examined the 
influence of ‘reactive’ trait negative emotion (neuroticism) and ‘regulatory’ abilities (emotion 
regulation and attentional control) on selective processing of emotional material, particularly 
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selective processing of threat-related material (angry facial threats). Overall, the results can be 
taken to provide at least some initial support of Pessoa’s dual competition model. An overview 
of the results from this thesis is provided in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Summary of main findings 
  
Task 
Task demand Prediction Face-Flanker Word-Face Stroop Word-Face Flanker 
Stop 
signal 
     
CRT SSRT 
       
Low task 
demand 
Impairment to threat x  (speeding for happy targets) + x (speeding for happy targets) + + 
      Positive association: N vs. TB 
     mean  latency - x x x x 
latency SDs - x x x x 
      Moderation: N vs. R vs. TB 
     mean  latency - x x x + 
latency SDs - x x x - 
              
High task 
demand 
Impairment to threat 
attenuated - + + + + 
      Positive association: N vs. TB 
     mean  latency - x x x x 
latency SDs - x x x x 
      Moderation: N vs. R vs. TB 
     mean  latency - x x + x 
latency SDs - x x + - 
              
Note: “+” denotes that the predicted effect was found whereas “x” denotes that it was not; “-“ indicates that this was not tested.  
N = Neuroticism; R = Reappraisal; TB = Threat bias.
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In two (Word-Face Stroop, Chapter 3, and Stop signal, Chapter 5) out of four tasks I 
found that threatening targets interfere with performance, such that responses are selectively 
slowed in the presence of angry threat content, particularly when it is task-relevant. These 
findings provide good support for Pessoa’s (2009) Dual-competition model, which asserts that 
highly arousing emotional content consumes common processing resources that are shared with 
cognitive control processes, thus interfering with task performance. Furthermore, at least in the 
case of the Stop signal reaction task performance impairment in the presence of threat material 
(SSRT, a measure of response inhibition) was greater in individuals with higher levels of trait 
neuroticism and reduced emotion regulation abilities (reappraisal). These latter findings could 
suggest that neuroticism is particularly linked to response inhibition (as opposed to distracter 
interference: Stroop/Flanker tasks), but only at low levels of trait reappraisal and might explain 
the inconsistent findings in the literature on neuroticism and cognitive control. This discrepancy 
in findings between these tasks might be explained by the fact that threat, being associated with 
fight and flight responses, might be more strongly linked to emotional motor responses. Such a 
motor component might, in turn, be more salient in the Stop signal task which involves motor 
inhibition (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008) and may provide an explanation for why emotional traits 
were found to interact with stop signal performance, but not with performance on the other tasks. 
As a more general conclusion arising from this finding, it would be useful for future studies to 
consider emotion regulation skills when examining the relationship between neuroticism and 
cognitive control.  
In terms of the theoretical frameworks of this thesis, the findings are consistent with and 
extend the cognitive model of Mathews and Mackintosh (1997, 1998). According to this model, 
neuroticism (especially its anxiety facet) is associated with greater sensitivity of a threat 
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evaluation system, which when activated leads to enhanced processing resources being diverted 
to threatening content. Blechert et al. (2012) have recently found that variation in emotion 
regulation is associated with reduced cortical processing at both early and late stages of selective 
attention, as indexed by ERPs. My findings suggest that individuals high in neuroticism with 
effective emotion regulation abilities are able to counter the enhanced output from the threat 
evaluation system, to prevent threat material from gaining increased access to cortical processing 
resources, such that threat material does not impair SSRT in high neurotic individuals with 
adequate emotion regulation. In view of Bishop's (2007) neural model of threat processing one 
could argue that high habitual use of reappraisal strengthens the input of prefrontal top-down 
regions on bottom-up regions such as the amygdala even when this region is hyper-responsive as 
is likely to be the case in high trait neuroticism. My findings extent Pessoa’s (2009) model by 
showing important modulatory influences of key personality traits and suggest that emotional 
appraisal is a key determinant of resource allocation to emotional material. Specifically, Pessoa 
(2009) stipulates that individual differences such as trait anxiety or reward sensitivity can have 
an effect on the common pool resources. My data suggest that his model could usefully be 
extended to encompass individual differences in neuroticism and, crucially, in that positive 
emotion regulation traits like reappraisal can exert a buffering role on the impact of such 
emotion-linked traits on cognitive resources. This idea is resonant with the model by Bishop 
(2007) in that voluntary control mechanisms (e.g. from prefrontal regions) are assumed to 
regulate reactivity from bottom-up regions (e.g. amygdala). It will be important to extend this 
work to neuroimaging applications to determine where in the brain (fMRI) and when 
(EEG/MEG) these personality traits have their influence on such resource allocations. 
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This result (i.e. the moderation effect) is also promising as reappraisal is a construct that 
is amenable to training or interventions (Beck et al., 1979; Schartau et al., 2009). However, not 
only could reappraisal be trained behaviourally, but by targeting the relevant brain mechanisms 
(e.g. the prefrontal circuit; Ochsner & Gross, 2007), using techniques such as TMS or deep brain 
stimulation (Mayberg et al., 2005), it might also be possible to improve someone’s reappraisal 
skills. Future avenues in research could examine the underlying brain mechanisms of these tasks 
and traits (e.g. using fMRI) as well as their temporal signatures (EEG/MEG), followed by 
investigations concerned with the stimulation of specific brain regions.  
Another clinically relevant aspect arises from recent evidence on depression. That is, 
research shows that depressed individuals exhibit a poor cognitive control capacity (Joormann & 
Siemer, 2011; Joormann, 2004). This suggests that the impact of negative material in a cognitive 
control task should be greater in depressed individuals, something that is also in accord with 
models of threat processing (Bishop, 2007; Mathews et al., 1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 
1998). An important extension of the work reported here could therefore be to test if reappraisal 
can still buffer the impact of negative appraisals when cognitive control skills are low, which 
would likely be paired with a stronger effect of the emotional material. This could be tested 
using populations that are known to have poor cognitive control skills, such as depressed 
individuals (Joormann & Siemer, 2011; Joormann, 2004), or by depleting the cognitive control 
resources (Freeman & Muraven, 2010; Sheppes & Meiran, 2008). Such experiments would be 
very useful as they could establish to what degree the adaptive effects of reappraisal found here 
apply to clinical levels where it would, without doubt, be of most benefit. 
In contrast to the results from the Stroop and Stop signal paradigms, in both Flanker tasks 
I showed a speeding for happy targets. It is noteworthy that this finding was obtained with two 
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different target types (words and faces). It is therefore unlikely due to stimulus specific features, 
although a useful extension of these studies would be to target other sensory modalities (e.g. 
using auditory material). Again, this finding could be consistent with Pessoa’s (2009) Dual-
competition model, which argues that low arousing emotional stimuli have enhanced early 
sensory representations and thereby improve behavioural performance when task-relevant. 
Indeed, prior neuroimaging evidence has shown enhanced early visual cortex activation for 
happy relative to neutral faces (Pessoa, 2009). This finding highlights the fact that even though 
Stroop, Flanker and Stop signal tasks may have some common underlying mechanism 
(Response-Distracter Inhibition; Friedman & Miyake, 2004), they each also possess unique 
features (Miyake et al., 2000; Miyake & Friedman, 2012), the latter of which might explain this 
result. Specifically, at least on a theoretical level, Stroop and Stop signal tasks involve prepotent 
processes, whereas the Flanker task is thought to mainly tap into distracter interference processes 
(MacLeod, 1991; Miyake et al., 2000).
33
 In the context of the experiments reported in this thesis 
such a distinction might, however, be overly simplistic in that the Word-Face Stroop and Word-
Face Flanker tasks were designed to be very similar, with the same targets and virtually identical 
distracter cues. In the traditional word Stroop task the distracter cue (word reading) is considered 
to be the prepotent cue. Even though there is some evidence suggesting that face cues fulfil the 
same (prepotent) function in the Word-Face Stroop paradigm (Beall & Herbert, 2008), by virtue 
of the fact that both Word-Face Stroop and Flanker tasks utilised face distracters, such a 
prepotent role for face distracter cues would then also need to apply to the Flanker task in this 
context. Nevertheless, it seems that one of the key differences between the Flanker versus the 
                                               
33 It should be noted that some researchers categorize the Stroop and Flanker tasks into one group (e.g. interference 
inhibition) and the Stop signal task into another (e.g. motor response inhibition) (Hart et al., 2013; Nigg, 2000; 
Wöstmann et al., 2013 - see General introduction for a more detailed discussion) based on their assumed 
predominant underlying processes of interference versus motor inhibition, respectively. 
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Stroop and Stop signal tasks is that (1) the distracter cue in the Flanker paradigms was spatially 
separated from the target and (2) the face cues were substantially smaller compared to those of 
the other paradigms. It is possible that these distinctions may have resulted in the targets being 
differentially processed, thereby leading to the current pattern of results.  
A discussion of the findings of this thesis is, however, incomplete without a consideration 
of the potential limitations. Throughout this thesis, family-wise errors were consistently 
corrected using Bonferroni adjustment. This approach could, however, be considered too 
stringent, potentially leading to a failure to reject an incorrect null-hypothesis (Nakagawa, 2004). 
Some of the analyses (e.g. for the Face-Flanker task) were therefore also run using a less 
conservative approach (Sidak correction), but the pattern of results remained unchanged. 
Nevertheless, studies now suggest using alternative, statistically more powerful approaches, such 
as the false discovery rate or confidence intervals when multiple testing is involved (Benjamini, 
Drai, Elmer, Kafkafi, & Golani, 2001; Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995; Nakagawa, 2004) and it is 
likely that future studies will benefit from such approaches. 
Consideration should also be given to some of the stimulus features. Research suggests 
that physical properties of stimuli, such as luminance, contrast or spatial frequency (Delplanque, 
N’diaye, Scherer, & Grandjean, 2007) may affect performance to affective cues if not controlled 
for. The stimuli in this thesis were not matched on these properties and therefore it could be that 
any differences observed between the different emotions can, at least partly, be explained by 
differences in physical properties. Still, the results are mostly in accord with existing theoretical 
models (Bishop, 2007; Mathews et al., 1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Pessoa, 2009) and 
exhibit a theoretically meaningful pattern, suggesting that physical properties may not have 
played a strong role, if any. However, this argument assumes that a specific stimulus type (e.g. 
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happy faces) was not strongly associated with a particular stimulus feature (e.g. high luminance), 
which, if the case, might account for some of the findings. Hence, it is essential that these 
findings are replicated in future studies, with the physical properties of the stimuli being 
controlled for. One way to disentangle this could be by using, for example, a fear conditioning 
procedure, such that the same physical stimulus (neutral) is paired with threat or safety, 
depending on the condition. In this way emotionally neutral and perceptually matched stimuli 
can become associated with different, potentially opposing, emotional states (e.g. threat or 
safety), as would be needed for the type of paradigm reported in this thesis. This approach has 
been used by Pessoa and colleagues (Pessoa et al., 2012).  
The advantage of non-clinical samples, as used in this thesis, is that they are 
comparatively easy to recruit in larger numbers and that performance is not affected by 
concurrent medication, as is often the case in patient research. At the same time, this may also 
entail a certain problems. Specifically, it could be that insufficient variation in neuroticism or 
few participants with extreme scores, as is not uncommon in some healthy samples, may partly 
explain the lack of associations between individual difference variables and threat appraisal. 
During testing an attempt was made to address this potential shortcoming by adding 10 further 
participants with extreme scores on neuroticism to the samples of the Word-Face Stroop and 
Word-Face Flanker tasks. However, it is not unlikely that an increased variability or a greater 
proportion of participants with extreme scores would be needed to observe a link with 
neuroticism and threat appraisal in the Stroop and Flanker tasks. Indeed, as has been mentioned 
before, attentional bias to threat is particularly strong at high levels of anxiety (Mathews et al., 
1997), but may not be seen at lower levels. So, even though these samples contained participants 
with extreme scores on the BFI-11, it should also be noted that high scores on this scale may not 
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necessarily be equivalent to clinical levels respectively there may not have been a sufficiently 
large number of participants with extreme scores that would allow the detection of an attentional 
bias. In other words, the current findings cannot be generalized to clinical sample where quite 
possibly a link between neuroticism and attentional bias may have been observed. Nevertheless, 
the sample for the Stop signal task was recruited from the same population and here a 
moderation effect of reappraisal was found. Hence, small differences in variability of 
neuroticism between the tasks of this thesis aside, it is therefore likely that other factors have 
also contributed to the lack of an association between individual difference variables and threat 
appraisal for the Stroop and Flanker tasks. 
For example, as has been discussed before, a limitation of all Stroop and Flanker 
experiments reported in this thesis is that the proportion of compatible trials may have been too 
low to develop a prepotent response, thereby potentially reducing the strength of the interference 
effects (Casey et al., 2000; Crump et al., 2006, 2008; Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979; Lowe & Mitterer, 
1982; West & Baylis, 1998). This is particularly noteworthy as in none of these tasks an 
association or interaction with trait variables was found, whereas in the Stop signal task, where 
go trials were sufficiently frequent to become prepotent, neuroticism and reappraisal were found 
to interact in predicting threat appraisal. This point is further supported by the finding that 
expectancy of threat-related distracters (frequent vs. infrequent threat distracter blocks) has been 
linked to decreased activation of lateral prefrontal regions in people with enhanced state anxiety 
(Bishop, Duncan, Brett, & Lawrence, 2004), suggesting that the frequency of a particular 
distracter type does affect links to measures of personality. Other differences between the 
paradigms aside, this explanation may account for the lack of associations between individual 
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difference variables and threat appraisal in Chapters 2-4 and should be more closely examined in 
future work. 
It should also be mentioned that although the measures of neuroticism and reappraisal 
used here exhibit high reliability and validity (Gross & John, 2003; Rammstedt & John, 2007), 
they may nevertheless be prone to demand effects or other self-report biases. One way to, at least 
partly, address this in future research could be to experimentally induce state anxiety in 
participants, which has also been linked to attentional bias (see e.g. Macleod & Mathews, 1988). 
Further avenues would include using neurobiological markers of these trait measures, such as 
genetics (Aleksandrova et al., 2012; Canli et al., 2009; Canli & Lesch, 2007; Canli, 2008; 
Murakami et al., 2009; Sen et al., 2004; van Rijn et al., 2006), neurotransmitter concentration 
(Boy et al., 2011), facial muscle activation (Urry, 2009) or pupil diameter (Johnstone, Van 
Reekum, Urry, Kalin, & Davidson, 2007). Moreover, instead of trait reappraisal, as measured by 
a questionnaire, reappraisal ability could also have been recorded in an experimental task 
(McRae et al., 2012; Troy, Shallcross, Davis, & Mauss, 2012; Troy et al., 2010). Finally, there 
have been suggestions that interview, behavioural observation, diary, or peer report methods 
could usefully supplement any self-report based measures of personality (Caspi, Roberts, & 
Shiner, 2005; Funder, 2001).  
Another key issue is the nature (i.e. severity) of the threat. This could be tailored to 
individual concerns (e.g. via autobiographical memories; Schartau et al., 2009), or threats could 
be rendered more severe/ realistic by manipulating the realism of faces (e.g. via dynamic multi-
modal stimuli; De Silva, Miyasato, & Nakatsu, 1997), the threat value or the self relevance 
(N’Diaye, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2009). Moreover, studies could create scenarios of social 
threat (e.g. fear of public speaking; Pertaub, Slater, & Barker, 2001) or utilise film sequences 
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(Dunn, Billotti, Murphy, & Dalgleish, 2009), music (Blood, Zatorre, Bermudez, & Evans, 1999; 
Trost, Ethofer, Zentner, & Vuilleumier, 2012) or virtual reality environments (Pertaub et al., 
2001), amongst others, to further investigate the link between personality and threat processing.  
The experiments in this thesis provide an essential step in further elucidating the 
construct of neuroticism and its impact on behaviour. As Lahey (2009) has convincingly argued, 
neuroticism is a personality trait with potentially vast implications for the public health sector. 
This is, as the author emphasises, because it has been linked to numerous physical as well as 
mental disorders. However, compared to other disorders of emotion, the significance of 
neuroticism for public health is frequently under-appreciated (Lahey, 2009). Further research 
focussing on the identification of the factors that may aid in alleviating the behavioural 
consequences of high levels on this trait is therefore urgently needed. The evidence from Chapter 
5 suggests that reappraisal may be one such factor. Currently there are no known treatments that 
can effectively reduce levels of neuroticism (Lahey, 2009). Even though the data from this thesis 
do not allow conclusions as to whether trait neuroticism can be reduced, they do suggest that, in 
at least some circumstances, its impact on behaviour can be buffered by adequate emotion 
regulation skills. It seems plausible to assume that such a buffering effect may already aid in or 
contribute to coping with certain disorders of public health, which might have positive effects for 
people’s well being as well as costs associated with the public health sector. However, this 
would ultimately have to be tested more rigorously in dedicated future experiments. 
Another important contribution of this thesis is that novel behavioural paradigms (e.g. 
affective Flanker and Stop signal tasks) or improved versions compared to previous studies 
(Word-Face Stroop task) were tested (see Chapter 1 for further details). Except for the Face 
Flanker task, all paradigms have demonstrated an effect of emotion on the underlying cognitive 
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control mechanism (distracter interference and response inhibition), attesting to their usefulness 
for future research. Moreover, this work has further elucidated the role of various emotion-linked 
trait measures in a series of affective cognitive control paradigms. This has not been reported 
before in such scope and provides a useful addition to the literature. 
 To conclude, by examining the mechanisms that subserve interactions between 
personality, emotion and cognitive control, my findings provide new insights for understanding 
the mechanisms of cognitive deficits that are frequently observed in mood disorders, conditions 
that are thought to represent extreme variants of normal range personality traits, like neuroticism.  
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Appendix 
 
1. Word lists and ratings 
Word type Word 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Angry-
related 
anger 5.00 48.00 9.06 4.00 2.00 604.24 1.00 603.58 0.96 
angry 5.00 45.00 9.51 0.00 2.00 559.97 0.97 624.89 1.00 
disturb 7.00 10.00 7.24 0.00 2.00 627.76 1.00 660.14 1.00 
enraged 7.00 1.00 6.32 2.00 2.00 737.41 0.94 762.96 1.00 
frustrated 10.00 10.00 8.47 1.00 3.00 688.07 0.94 634.92 0.96 
irritate 8.00 - 6.46 1.00 3.00 758.13 0.97 738.39 0.82 
mad 3.00 39.00 9.79 29.00 1.00 584.94 0.97 563.86 1.00 
noisy 5.00 6.00 7.92 1.00 2.00 554.09 0.97 589.42 0.96 
            
Mean  6.25 22.71 8.10 4.75 2.13 639.33 0.97 647.27 0.96 
SD   2.19 20.31 1.34 9.88 0.64 79.28 0.02 70.43 0.06 
Happy-
related 
merry 5.00 8.00 7.54 10.00 2.00 759.18 0.97 663.41 0.96 
cheer 5.00 8.00 7.55 3.00 1.00 603.47 1.00 627.82 0.96 
elated 6.00 3.00 5.51 4.00 3.00 718.74 1.00 635.80 0.96 
success 7.00 93.00 10.52 0.00 2.00 591.50 0.97 712.74 1.00 
happy 5.00 98.00 11.17 6.00 2.00 536.27 1.00 555.93 1.00 
joke 4.00 22.00 9.92 10.00 1.00 578.22 0.94 539.11 1.00 
laughter 8.00 22.00 8.54 1.00 2.00 572.82 1.00 602.41 1.00 
joy 3.00 40.00 9.37 13.00 1.00 516.91 1.00 588.48 1.00 
            
Mean  5.38 36.75 8.77 5.88 1.75 609.64 0.99 615.71 0.99 
SD  1.60 38.09 1.86 4.70 0.71 85.32 0.02 56.82 0.02 
Neutral 
lamp 4.00 18.00 8.80 12.00 1.00 587.85 1.00 556.48 1.00 
month 5.00 130.00 11.24 2.00 1.00 602.82 1.00 607.48 0.96 
circle 6.00 60.00 9.90 0.00 2.00 634.13 0.94 635.14 0.97 
vehicle 7.00 35.00 9.53 1.00 3.00 650.31 1.00 627.22 0.96 
cabinet 7.00 17.00 8.77 0.00 3.00 684.91 0.97 625.65 1.00 
fabric 6.00 15.00 8.68 0.00 2.00 618.24 0.97 622.71 1.00 
garment 7.00 6.00 6.98 0.00 2.00 697.09 1.00 589.32 0.96 
hat 3.00 56.00 9.37 26.00 1.00 577.06 1.00 632.93 1.00 
            
Mean  5.63 42.13 9.16 5.13 1.88 631.55 0.99 612.12 0.98 
SD   1.51 40.60 1.21 9.37 0.83 43.72 0.02 27.05 0.02 
 
Table 1. Angry-related, happy-related and neutral words with ratings on (source: Balota et al., 
2007): 1. word length, 2. Kučera and Francis (1967) frequency norms, 3. log-transformed 
Hyperspace Analogue to Language (HAL) frequency norms (Lund & Burgess, 1996), 4. 
orthographic neighbourhood (Coltheart et al., 1977), 5. number of syllables, 6. mean lexical 
decision latency, 7. accuracy (lexical decision task), 8. mean naming latency and 9. accuracy 
(naming task). 
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Table 2. Female-related and male-related words with ratings on (source: Balota et al., 2007): 1. 
word length, 2. Kučera and Francis (1967) frequency norms, 3. log-transformed Hyperspace 
Analogue to Language (HAL) frequency norms (Lund & Burgess, 1996), 4. orthographic 
neighbourhood (Coltheart et al., 1977), 5. number of syllables, 6. mean lexical decision latency, 
7. accuracy (lexical decision task), 8. mean naming latency and 9. accuracy (naming task). 
Word type Word 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Female-
related 
Amy    3.00 15.00 9.00 4.00 2.00 615.62 0.97 596.56 1.00 
Alice  5.00 14.00 8.65 3.00 2.00 646.64 0.97 623.07 1.00 
Sarah  5.00 26.00 8.95 2.00 2.00 595.18 0.97 642.15 1.00 
Lucy   4.00 45.00 8.15 2.00 2.00 656.13 1.00 641.37 1.00 
Lauren 6.00 10.00 7.44 1.00 2.00 653.13 0.97 614.41 1.00 
Charlotte 9.00 13.00 8.63 0.00 2.00 699.97 0.97 739.80 0.96 
Molly  5.00 5.00 7.50 8.00 2.00 636.62 0.97 637.48 1.00 
Anna   4.00 7.00 8.37 3.00 2.00 680.55 1.00 607.67 1.00 
            
Mean  5.13 16.88 8.33 2.88 2.00 647.98 0.98 637.81 1.00 
SD   1.81 13.02 0.60 2.42 0.00 33.43 0.01 44.42 0.01 
Male-
related 
Oliver 6.00 7.00 8.85 3.00 3.00 650.06 1.00 592.79 1.00 
Jacob  5.00 1.00 8.47 0.00 2.00 612.15 1.00 618.61 1.00 
Leon   4.00 5.00 8.41 8.00 2.00 645.50 0.97 663.96 1.00 
Brandon 7.00 8.00 8.42 2.00 2.00 755.16 1.00 650.74 1.00 
Jake   4.00 6.00 8.75 15.00 1.00 642.97 1.00 606.43 1.00 
Nathan 6.00 5.00 8.74 1.00 2.00 681.23 0.94 666.89 1.00 
Adam   4.00 44.00 9.89 1.00 2.00 602.12 0.94 635.31 0.96 
John   4.00 362.00 12.11 5.00 1.00 605.94 0.97 575.15 0.96 
            
Mean  5.00 54.75 9.20 4.38 1.88 649.39 0.98 626.24 0.99 
SD   1.20 124.90 1.27 5.01 0.64 50.38 0.03 33.67 0.02 
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Word type Word 1 2 3 4 5 
Angry-related 
anger 17.00 2.34 1.32 7.63 1.91 
angry 18.00 2.85 1.70 7.17 2.07 
disturb 727.00 3.66 2.00 5.80 2.39 
enraged 149.00 2.46 1.65 7.97 2.17 
frustrated 177.00 2.48 1.64 5.61 2.76 
irritate 235.00 3.11 1.67 5.76 2.15 
mad 856.00 2.44 1.72 6.76 2.26 
noisy 904.00 5.02 2.02 6.38 1.78 
        
Mean  - 3.05 1.72 6.64 2.19 
SD   - 0.91 0.22 0.90 0.30 
Happy-related 
merry 872.00 7.90 1.49 5.90 2.42 
cheer 69.00 8.10 1.17 6.12 2.45 
elated 138.00 7.45 1.77 6.21 2.30 
success 417.00 8.29 0.93 6.11 2.65 
happy 200.00 8.21 1.82 6.49 2.77 
joke 826.00 8.10 1.36 6.74 1.84 
laughter 251.00 8.45 1.08 6.75 2.50 
joy 240.00 8.60 0.71 7.22 2.13 
        
Mean  - 8.14 1.29 6.44 2.38 
SD  - 0.35 0.39 0.44 0.29 
Neutral 
lamp 838.00 5.41 1.00 3.80 2.12 
month 283.00 5.15 1.09 4.03 1.77 
circle 687.00 5.67 1.26 3.86 2.13 
vehicle 473.00 6.27 2.34 4.63 2.81 
cabinet 675.00 5.05 0.31 3.43 1.85 
fabric 742.00 5.30 1.20 4.14 1.98 
garment 762.00 6.07 1.61 4.49 2.50 
hat 783.00 5.46 1.36 4.10 2.00 
        
Mean  - 5.55 1.27 4.06 2.15 
SD   - 0.43 0.57 0.38 0.35 
 
Table 3. 1. ANEW word number, 2. valence (mean), 3. valence (SD), 4. arousal (mean), 5.  
arousal (SD) for angry-related, happy-related and neutral words (source: Bradley & Lang, 1999).
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Word 
type Word 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Angry-
related 
anger 1.07 0.25 4.40 1.16 2.50 1.36 2.23 1.33 1.97 1.38 
angry 1.03 0.19 4.48 0.95 2.45 1.27 2.55 1.24 2.14 1.36 
disturb 1.04 0.19 2.89 1.10 1.61 0.92 1.75 1.17 1.68 1.02 
enraged 1.07 0.36 4.03 1.28 2.10 1.08 2.60 1.36 1.67 1.01 
frustrated 1.00 0.01 3.75 1.17 2.00 1.12 1.75 1.11 1.82 1.28 
irritate 1.23 0.50 3.52 0.96 1.52 0.72 1.52 0.72 1.55 0.93 
mad 1.14 0.45 3.79 1.17 2.18 1.19 2.24 1.20 1.89 1.26 
noisy 1.29 0.71 2.89 0.88 1.36 0.78 1.32 0.77 1.32 0.67 
             
Mean  1.11 0.33 3.72 1.08 1.97 1.06 2.00 1.11 1.76 1.11 
SD  0.10 0.22 0.60 0.14 0.43 0.23 0.48 0.24 0.26 0.25 
Happy-
related 
merry 4.07 1.13 1.07 0.26 1.17 0.47 1.14 0.74 1.10 0.31 
cheer 4.14 1.16 1.07 0.37 1.07 0.37 1.21 0.68 1.24 0.79 
elated 3.90 1.22 1.25 0.78 1.16 0.44 1.12 0.41 1.05 0.19 
success 3.94 1.18 1.26 0.58 1.42 0.96 1.84 1.21 1.16 0.45 
happy 4.48 1.00 1.10 0.40 1.32 0.83 1.16 0.45 1.10 0.30 
joke 3.94 1.00 1.48 0.85 1.16 0.45 1.16 0.45 1.58 0.89 
laughter 4.35 0.98 1.10 0.30 1.16 0.45 1.06 0.25 1.06 0.25 
joy 4.23 1.12 1.10 0.40 1.26 0.68 1.16 0.52 1.19 0.79 
             
Mean  4.13 1.10 1.18 0.49 1.22 0.58 1.23 0.59 1.19 0.50 
SD  0.21 0.09 0.14 0.22 0.11 0.22 0.25 0.29 0.17 0.28 
Neutral 
lamp 1.61 0.96 1.11 0.42 1.11 0.42 1.18 0.55 1.11 0.42 
month 1.49 0.92 1.04 0.19 1.00 0.00 1.07 0.38 1.04 0.19 
circle 1.76 1.12 1.03 0.19 1.03 0.19 1.17 0.60 1.03 0.19 
vehicle 2.70 1.42 1.70 0.99 1.57 1.04 2.00 1.14 1.30 0.88 
cabinet 1.47 0.82 1.10 0.31 1.07 0.25 1.13 0.43 1.27 0.83 
fabric 1.62 0.90 1.31 0.85 1.21 0.82 1.21 0.77 1.34 0.90 
garment 1.97 1.30 1.33 0.66 1.17 0.53 1.13 0.43 1.17 0.46 
hat 2.40 1.43 1.17 0.46 1.20 0.55 1.10 0.40 1.27 0.83 
             
Mean  1.88 1.11 1.22 0.51 1.17 0.48 1.25 0.59 1.19 0.59 
SD   0.45 0.25 0.22 0.30 0.18 0.34 0.31 0.26 0.12 0.31 
 
Table 4. Ratings for angry-related, happy-related and neutral words on: 1. happy (mean), 2. 
happy (SD), 3. angry (mean), 4. angry (SD), 5. sad (mean), 6. sad (SD), 7. fear (mean), 8. fear 
(SD), 9. disgust (mean), 10. disgust (SD) (source: Stevenson et al., 2007). 
